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ABSTRACT 
 
In marking an historical change in large parts of the Arab region, the Arab uprisings have 
also triggered a process of soul searching in the scholarship of Arab politics. The events 
unfolding in the region since 2011 prove indeed that the two paradigms dividing the 
academic community, that of authoritarian resilience (also known as the post-
democratization paradigm) and that of democratization, are alone insufficient in 
accounting for the political developments of the area.  
In this regard, extant contributions explaining the different paths undertook by Tunisia 
and Egypt between 2011 and 2013 enlighten the point in case. On the one hand, 
democratization studies pinpoint to the different choices taken by transitional actors but 
remain only partial in that don’t go further than the observed behavior. On the other hand, 
post-democratization studies focus on the structures and the mechanisms underpinning 
the previous authoritarian regimes but fall short in providing the causal link between them 
and the observed outcome.  
In line with the transitology approach, this research moves from the acknowledgment that 
the failure or the success of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia is to be attributed to 
political parties’ choice about whether to cooperate or not with the other ones within the 
phase of installation. Yet, unlike any other kind of transitional actor, parties’ strategy 
profiles result from the interplay among: i) extant social divisions; ii) power resources 
and iii) ideological polarization. By breaking down the concept of agency in this way, the 
different structures of competition underneath the previous authoritarian rule in Tunisia 
and Egypt account for much of the variation across the two countries. First, they are 
responsible for the uneven distribution of seats’ share inside the transitional national 
assemblies encouraging stronger parties to defect from cooperation in order to 
institutionalize their power advantage. Second, they are responsible for the different 
degrees of ideological polarization which is deemed to reduce the common ground 
available for the constitutional bargaining.   
While offering new insights accounting for the political developments in Tunisia and 
Egypt following the ousting of the previous dictators, this work combines the two 
contending paradigms into a unified reading fulfilling their respective shortcomings. On 
the one hand, the concept of agency so formulated allows democratization studies to go 
deeper than ‘what ought to be’. On the other hand, it provides post-democratization 
studies a causal link, i.e. parties’ agency, connecting previous regimes’ structures with 
the outcome of transition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................................... 7 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 9 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
1 CHARTING DIFFERENT TRANSITIONS: TUNISIA AND EGYPT COMPARED ....................................... 19 
1.1 TUNISIA ................................................................................................................................... 19 
1.1.1 The ‘Deep State’ tries to control the transition ................................................................... 20 
1.1.2 The ‘tabula rasa’ ............................................................................................................... 22 
1.1.3 Establishing the ‘rules of the game’ from the ANC to the National Dialogue ...................... 25 
1.2 EGYPT...................................................................................................................................... 30 
1.2.1 The SCAF controls the transition ........................................................................................ 30 
1.2.2 Writing the Constitution: Parliament’s dialogue of the deaf .............................................. 35 
1.2.3 From the intra-parliamentary to the inter-institutional conflict ......................................... 39 
2 DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES OR AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE? ............................................. 47 
2.1 THE PARADIGM OF DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES ................................................................................. 49 
2.1.1 Processes ........................................................................................................................... 51 
2.1.2 Actors ................................................................................................................................ 55 
2.1.3 Socio-economic determinants ............................................................................................ 71 
2.2 THE PARADIGM OF POST-DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES.......................................................................... 76 
2.2.1 Degree and form of stateness ............................................................................................ 78 
2.2.2 Mechanisms underneath previous authoritarianisms ........................................................ 81 
2.3 BEYOND THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE ........................................................................................... 83 
3 DEMAND OF REPRESENTATION, POWER RESOURCES AND PARTIES’ AGENCY: POLITICAL PARTIES 
IN TRANSITION PROCESSES .................................................................................................................... 85 
3.1 TRANSITIONS AT CROSSROADS: DEFINING INSTALLATIONS ..................................................................... 86 
3.1.1 The necessity of installations ............................................................................................. 86 
3.1.2 Determinants of installations............................................................................................. 90 
3.2 A MODEL FOR PARTIES’ AGENCY WITHIN INSTALLATIONS ...................................................................... 93 
3.2.1 Pre-existent social divisions ............................................................................................... 96 
3.2.2 Institutional incentives ...................................................................................................... 97 
3.2.3 Choices parties define ........................................................................................................ 98 
3.3 THE INVISIBLE HAND OF UPGRADED AUTOCRACIES ON PARTIES’ STRATEGIES .............................................. 99 
3.3.1 Previous opportunity structures and transitional party advantage................................... 100 
3.3.2 Political learning and transitional party systems’ polarization ......................................... 102 
4 HOMOGENEOUS VS. DIVIDED SOCIETIES? ANALYZING THE DEMAND OF REPRESENTATION...... 105 
4.1 2011-2012 FOUNDING ELECTIONS: TRANSITIONAL CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM THE EMERGENCE OF TWO 
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES ........................................................................................................................ 105 
4.1.1 Islamists vs. Secularists and the need of a pre-constitutional consensus .......................... 105 
4.1.2 Why does the religious divide matter? Substance vs. Form .............................................. 107 
4.2 HYPOTHESIZING THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIST/SECULAR DIVIDE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIC 
INSTALLATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 109 
6 
 
4.2.1 The political sociology approach ...................................................................................... 109 
4.2.2 Post-independence state building strategies and national fractures ................................ 110 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION, MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY ......................................................................... 112 
4.4 HOW MUCH DIVIDED? ............................................................................................................... 117 
4.4.1 Egypt ............................................................................................................................... 118 
4.4.2 Tunisia ............................................................................................................................. 122 
4.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES ................................................................... 126 
5 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND TRANSITIONAL PARTIES’ POWER RESOURCES ......... 133 
5.1 FROM LEFTIST PROTESTS TO THE ISLAMIST DOMINION: THE GAP OF THE FOUNDING ELECTIONS .................... 134 
5.2 BLAME ON THE FOUNDING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS? ............................................................................. 139 
5.2.1 The Tunisian electoral system .......................................................................................... 140 
5.2.2 The Egyptian Electoral System ......................................................................................... 141 
5.2.3 Comparing the effects of the electoral systems ................................................................ 143 
5.3 THE DOUBLE STANDARD: PATTERNS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN LEFTISTS AND ISLAMISTS BEFORE THE ARAB 
SPRING 144 
5.3.1 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Tunisia .................................................. 146 
5.3.2 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Egypt .................................................... 151 
5.4 ISLAMISTS’ SUPREMACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANTAGES AND REPUTATION ........... 156 
5.4.1 Authoritarian repression and transitional parties’ organizational advantages ................. 157 
5.4.2 Divided structures of competition and transitional parties’ reputation ............................ 161 
5.5 SHAPE AND REASONS OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL GAP AWARDING ISLAMIST PARTIES ................................... 162 
6 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND THE POLARIZATION OF TRANSITIONAL PARTY 
SYSTEMS .............................................................................................................................................. 165 
6.1 THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE AND POLARIZATION PARTIES WORK OUT ............................................................ 165 
6.1.1 The pernicious effects of polarization within installations ................................................ 165 
6.1.2 Parties as countervailing mechanisms to polarization? .................................................... 167 
6.2 POLARIZATION PARTIES DEFINE: THE POLITICAL SPACE IN 2011 TUNISIA AND EGYPT ................................. 168 
6.2.1 Locating parties on a political space ................................................................................ 168 
6.2.2 The case for an unsupervised approach ........................................................................... 170 
6.2.3 Measuring polarization in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt ........................................................... 171 
6.3 PARTIES’ STRUCTURING POLITICS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PAST ......................................................... 177 
6.3.1 Formal structures, political learning and polarization ...................................................... 177 
6.3.2 Beyond mere configurational explanations: political center and polarization .................. 179 
6.4 DIVIDED THEY STOOD, DIVIDED THEY FAILED .................................................................................... 182 
6.4.1 Coalition building in Tunisia ............................................................................................. 183 
6.4.2 Coalition building in Egypt ............................................................................................... 185 
6.4.3 Common destiny of repression, incentives for joining forces and the resolution of the 
commitment problem................................................................................................................... 188 
CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 191 
ANNEX ................................................................................................................................................. 197 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 199 
 
  
 
 
7 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1. Results of Tunisian Constituency Assembly, 23 October 2011 .............................. 25 
Table 1. 2: Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, 28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012
 ......................................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 3.1: The installlation game ........................................................................................ 92 
Table 3.2: Political parties' installation game ...................................................................... 95 
Table 4.1: Declared vote intention for the elections of the Constituent Assembly/Parliament
 ....................................................................................................................................... 113 
Table 4.2: Dependent variable coding .............................................................................. 114 
Table 4.3: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Egypt ....... 120 
Table 4.4: Vote determinants in Egypt .............................................................................. 121 
Table 4.5: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Tunisia ..... 124 
Table 4.6: Vote determinants in Tunisia ........................................................................... 126 
Table 4.7: Wald test for independent variables ................................................................. 127 
Table 4.8: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Tunisia) ...................................... 128 
Table 4.9: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Egypt) ........................................ 128 
Table 4.10: Measures of fit for multivariate models .......................................................... 129 
Table 4.11:  T-test results on two independent samples, Egypt ......................................... 130 
Table 4.12: T-test results on two independent samples, Tunisia ........................................ 130 
Table 6.1: Stemming process with arabicStemR ................................................................ 173 
  
8 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 5.1: Perceived priorities in Tunisia and Egypt, 2011 ................................................ 136 
Figure 5.2: Suitabiltity of a Parliamentary system wherein all parties can contest elections, 
2011 ................................................................................................................................ 137 
Figure 5. 3: Index of secularism, 2011 ............................................................................... 138 
Figure 5. 4: Support for gender equality ........................................................................... 138 
Figure 6.1: Estimated party positions in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt ........................................ 174 
Figure 6.2: : Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Egypt ... 175 
Figure 6.3: Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Tunisia .. 176 
 
 
  
 
 
9 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
When meeting Michael Driessen during my first year, he told me that the PhD is a 
“solitary journey”.  
These worlds have always hummed in my head, and day by day I realized there was lot 
truth in them. Nonetheless, I occasionally had the luck of enjoying a good company. Both 
inside and outside the university, I’ve been surrounded by persons I could count in for 
whatsoever reason, and that contributed in many ways to this PhD thesis.    
First of all, I want to thank Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, who first believed in me and in my 
research project, Fabio Franchino, for his intellectual vitality and his supervision, and 
Francesco Zucchini, who followed me and my NASP fellows. Also, I wish to thank Luigi 
Curini, who tough me to familiarize with quantitative methods and clarified many of my 
doubts, Francesca Pasquali, for her support, and Licia Claudia Papavero, who gave the 
opportunity to be a TA in course of Political Science. A special thanks goes also to Lise 
Storm who hosted me in her department. She made me feel part of a worthy academic 
enterprise and she furnished me the coordinates I needed to pursue it at best. In the same 
line, a special thanks goes to Leonardo Morlino and Rosita Di Peri who reviewed this 
work furnishing insightful comments and suggestions.   
Moreover, if leaving home in the morning to go to work has never been so stressing, it 
has been for the fabulous Sopralzos: Beatrice, Sabrina, Federico, Ferruccio, Simone, 
Silvia and Stefano – thanks for your smiles, your encouragements, and your care. Thank 
also to my fellows Francesco, Venera, Massimo and Serena for enduring my disorder and 
my changes of mood. And thanks to Elisa, Tullia, Andrea, Alessandro, Camilla M. and 
Camilla G., for show me there’s life in the post-Doc and for never give up. A truly thanks 
goes to those passionate and gifted researchers met in conferences or summer schools, 
source of inspiration and insightful debates. And, of course, thanks to Ric and the 
“altrimenti mi arrabbio” crew, for being always there, despite the distance and the 
different paths our lives have taken.  
A not ironic thanks goes also to my family. To my mother, “quando ti trovi un lavoro 
vero?”. To Nicola, “ma se ti sei laureata cinque anni fa, perché sei ancora all’università?” 
and Matteo “tu e tutti quella della tua categoria..parassiti sociali”. Thank you, you made 
me feel like being in an ivory tower (been paid for doing what I like) and this pushed me 
to work hard to maintain this privilege.   
To conclude, I wish to thank Filippo. For uncountable reasons.  
10 
 
  
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
“Democracy is almost always the fruit of popular struggle, and this must never be 
forgotten, but the design of formal democratic institutions is, out of necessity, the work 
of a political elite”.  
Nancy Bermeo, 1992  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
On March 2015, Morten Valbjørn published an article on Democratization entitled 
“Reflections on self-reflections – On framing the analytical implications of the Arab 
uprisings for the study of Arab politics” which perfectly reflects the process of ‘soul 
searching’ (Jung 2011) the discipline is undergoing. The Arab uprisings have marked 
indeed an historical change in the Arab region, but also on the scholarship of Arab 
politics. Even though the effects of these mass protests have varied from country to 
country, these have irreparably altered the structures of the authoritarian regimes that up 
to that moment scholars thought unchallengeable.  
In the last two decades, studies aimed at accounting why and how the Arab region 
appeared immune to democracy, despite some room for economic liberalization and 
multiparty politics, gave rise to the paradigm of the authoritarian resilience (also known 
as that of post-democratization), which replaced the more optimistic one of 
democratization through which students have read the Arab politics from the 1970s. In 
this way, hopeful expectations for a ‘fourth wave’ of democracy left the floor to hybrid 
regime theorizing. The eruption of the 2011 uprisings putted then an entire scholarly 
tradition under question but wasn’t sufficient to fully rehabilitate the democratization 
paradigm. Despite a promising start, only in one case these have been conducive to 
democracy.  
Competing explanations drawing from one paradigm or another have been put forth to 
account for why the uprisings were not always successful in toppling the regime (as 
happened in Yemen), or why regime breakdowns did not always produce a transition (as 
was the case for Libya) or, again, why eventual transitions were not always conducive to 
the rise of new democratic regimes. As far as the inter-paradigm debate is concerned, this 
latter question is by far the more intriguing. Following Ben Ali’s ousting, Tunisia 
managed to achieve a democratic installation and is currently on its way to democratic 
consolidation. By contrast, in Egypt the transitional experience ran out into a military 
coup. To account for these diverging outcomes, explanations within and between the two 
paradigms have been offered.  
For democratization studies both processes were indeed transitions from the authoritarian 
rule. Out of this assumption, the Egyptian breakdown is explained in terms of lack of 
14 
 
preconditions to democracy or by looking to more contingent factors. In this respect, 
explanations revolving on actors’ ‘bad choices’ or to the fuzziness of the transitional 
roadmap enjoy great appeal. By contrast, scholars subscribing to the authoritarian 
resilience paradigm are much less inclined in framing 2011-2013 Egypt as an instance of 
transition because of the continuity with the past in terms of the structures of power and 
the patterns of interaction among the relevant political elite.   
Both lines of inquiry offer a copious and insightful corpus of literature that has 
contributed to our understanding of the Arab politics in the aftermath of the uprisings. 
Yet, because of the normative and theoretical rigidity characterizing each of the 
paradigms underneath them, these two streams of research proceed along parallel 
binaries. Nonetheless, the two are indeed much more complementary than thought. While 
democratization studies offer a precious theoretical framework to appraise the 2011-2013 
events in the region but are deemed to be too much concerned on what ‘ought to be’, post-
democratization studies are really useful in enlightening ‘what actually is’ but fall 
nonetheless short in locating the causal factors in time and space. What is actually missing 
is a hinge between the two. This lack is filled by the present work through a focus on 
political parties’ behavior. Normally, the literature on party politics conceives them as 
combiners of institutional and social constraints. Yet, by reappraising the concept of 
agency proposed by transitologists to suit the unique nature of political parties as 
intermediate institutions, this work puts forward that political parties offer themselves as 
combiners of the paradigms of democratization and authoritarian resilience by 
enlightening how they transform structural inputs into their transitional agency thus 
providing new and insightful points.  
 
This thesis proceeds as follow. The first chapter is dedicated at charting the different 
transitions by recounting the mere events happening in the two countries from the 
downfall of the previous dictators to the adoption of a democratic constitution in Tunisia 
and the military coup in Egypt. Yet, one thing is to report events, quite different things is 
to account for them. The second chapter will review the broad variety explanations 
offered to discriminate the Tunisian experience from the Egyptian one moving from the 
two different paradigms, following different approaches and having different units of 
analysis. In line with some of them, the Egyptian military coup is here conceived as the 
 
 
15 
 
result of political parties’ inability to successfully manage the process of democratic 
installation.  
Chapter three will therefore justify such choice and provide a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the role of political parties in determining the success or the failure of 
transitional experiences. Accounts aimed at explaining actors’ behavior during processes 
of installation conceive their ideology and their resource distribution as determining the 
prospects to find a compromise on the new rules of the game. Yet, being political parties 
intermediate institutions, i.e. part of the mobilized public and the relevant political elite 
at the same time, their governing agency is influenced by their representative agency. 
Simply put, parties’ payoffs from cooperation with others, within installation processes 
are the result of the interplay between i) the extant social divisions; ii) the power resources 
they have at disposal and iii) by their ideological polarization.  
Sectioning parties’ agency in this way allows to pinpoint how the structures of the 
authoritarian regime have a role in accounting for transitions’ failure or success by 
creating deep social divisions, providing parties with balanced power resources 
distribution, or fostering political polarization. The more the extent of social divisions, 
uneven distribution of power among parties, and polarization, the lesser the chances 
political parties will arrive to find an agreement. Accordingly, each of the following 
chapter will then deal with the analysis of each of these aspects.  
Chapter four investigates the nature and depth of social divisions at the time of the 
founding elections. Drawing from the political sociology approach, according to which 
political parties represent pre-existent social divides, this section seeks whether, and in 
what degree, these can be held accountable for the success in finding a compromise in 
Tunisia and for the concomitant dialogue of the deaf occurred in the Egyptian parliament. 
In so doing, I will recur to a multinomial choice modeling on Arab Barometer data aimed 
at detecting the determinants of the vote choice in the 2011 elections.  
Chapter five is not directly aimed at detecting the extent of uneven power distribution 
among constituent parties, this can be easily get by looking at parties’ share of seats inside 
the elected parliaments. Rather, it intends to investigate what is at the base of the observed 
distribution of power through the analysis of the effects of the electoral system used by 
the two countries in occasion of the 2011 founding elections, but also by looking at the 
16 
 
opportunity structures provided by the previous authoritarian regime allowing political 
parties to reach, or not, those who would eventually become voters in 2011.  
Finally, chapter six measures and explains the political polarization within the two party 
systems at the time of the founding elections. The assumption at the base of this kind of 
investigation is that parties’ positioning on a political space is a signaling game whereby 
political entrepreneurs cast out different kinds of representation with their voters (e.g. 
moderating trusteeship or polarizing ones) on the base of previous political learning. In 
this guise, the way in which previous regime structured the political conflict, e.g. by 
exploiting the religious divide to prevent the unification of leftist and Islamist 
oppositions, proves to have a great impact on the stemming degree of polarization during 
the transition. 
 
The findings of the present work show that the different outcome of the transition in 
Tunisia and Egypt largely relies on the different distribution of power among parties 
involved in the phase of installation and to the resolution of their commitment problems. 
In Egypt Islamist parties monopolized the parliament by mean of their electoral strength 
which had no equal in Tunisia. Moreover, no Egyptian party exerted itself in bringing 
forth a consensual transition like that occurred in Tunisia. In the absence of any 
remarkable distinction in the degree of divisiveness or ‘Islamization’ of the society across 
the two countries, or even of stark ideological distance among transitional parties, both 
aspects are attributable to the way party competition has been structured during the 
authoritarian regime. The way and the effectiveness whereby the transitional parties have 
been previously manipulated in contexts of ‘liberalized autocracy’ like those of Tunisia 
and Egypt before the eruption of the 2011 uprisings vary across the two countries. In 
Egypt, the Islamists benefited from more organizational advantages than other parties in 
that they controlled the opposition front while nonetheless filing independent candidates 
at the elections. By contrast, in Tunisia Islamist and leftist oppositions were equally 
repressed by the regime and joined force to challenge it. These diverse previous 
experiences are reflected both in the different compositions of transitional parliaments 
and in parties’ behavior. While the Egyptian parliament was monopolized by Islamists 
and characterized by mistrust among parties, in Tunisia no formation controlled the 
absolute majority of seats and each party could count on a tradition of dialogue with 
 
 
17 
 
others. Endeavored as an explorative study on the role of political parties within political 
transitions, this work advocates with new empirical findings the long-standing notion that 
transitions are ultimately decided by political parties’ moves, yet these latter very much 
reflect –and replicate – the uneven patterns of competition within which they socialized.       
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1 CHARTING DIFFERENT TRANSITIONS: TUNISIA AND EGYPT 
COMPARED 
 
The wave of protests that the shacked the regimes of the Arab region produced extremely 
different results ranging from civil war, government reshuffle or the ousting of the 
incumbent dictators. Tunisia and Egypt are instances of this latter case. In both countries 
the departure of the ruler inaugurated a transition process intended to be toward 
democracy. Yet, despite some similarities, namely the initial attempt of the deep state at 
controlling the transition and the election of a Parliament charged – directly or indirectly 
- with writing a democratic constitution, the development of the transition in the two 
countries diverges significantly. Tunisia has experienced a somewhat linear transition 
process controlled by partisan entities inside representative institutions who managed to 
contain the political conflict within the circuit of party politics. In Egypt, by contrast, 
contentions among the different parties sitting inside the Parliament resulted in a conflict 
among the different institutions of the state and was intertwined with it, making the 
transition much more muddled than the Tunisian one. In light of similar premises across 
Tunisia and Egypt, it then emerges how the role of the Egyptian military, and perhaps 
also the less emphasized role of the judiciary, is more contingent than hypothesized thus 
far. The following pages will chart these two different trajectories thus offering empirical 
evidences for the formulation of hypothesis about the reasons of such different outcomes.  
   
1.1 TUNISIA 
 
Tunisia represents by far the best outcome following the so-called Arab Spring. The 
protests initiated in December 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi 
provoked the ousting of the incumbent dictator, as happened in Libya and Egypt. Yet, 
contrary to those countries, in Tunisia this led to the installation of democracy with the 
adoption of an agreed Constitution in January 2014. 
Despite the initial attempt of Ben Ali’s entourage at controlling the transition, civilians 
managed to take over. The creation of the Higher Reform Political Commission, better 
known as “Ben Achour commission” after its president, and made by civilians, became 
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the main decision-making body, and turned to be the place of negotiations and consensus-
building among the different components of the Tunisia society. This commission crafted 
the transitional roadmap by providing for the elections of a parliament directly charged 
to write a constitution, form a government and nominate an interim president of the 
republic.  
In light of this, already in 2012, Stepan looked at the Tunisian experience with great 
optimism for it displayed all the features identified as crucial in neutralizing the 
authoritarian resilience, namely: a sufficient agreement on the procedures to produce and 
elected government; the presence of a government as direct result of popular vote; the 
effectiveness of the government and the absence of power sharing with other bodies de 
jure upon the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers (Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Stepan 2012). Yet, the hardest moment of the Tunisian transition arrived in the summer 
2013 when the contested legitimacy of the governing power led to the suspension of the 
National Constituent Assembly. In those days, and for similar reasons, Egypt was 
abandoning its path toward democracy. Probably because of this negative example, the 
major competing parties, led by Ennadha and Nidaa, managed to solve the crisis and 
found an agreed compromise. Even though some observers referred to such agreement as 
a radical departure from the realization of the revolutionary claims (Achcar 2013; 
Boubekeur 2016; Merone 2015), this allowed Tunisia to be, thus far, the only Arab and 
Islamic country enjoying a democratic installation.      
 
1.1.1 The ‘Deep State’ tries to control the transition  
Following the departure of Ben Ali on 14th January 2011, its clique constituting the old 
regime attempted to appease the protesters while trying to preserve the extant apparatus. 
At the beginning, doubts were casted upon the irreversibility of Ben Ali’s leave. 
Convinced that this would be only temporary, its Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, 
according to article 56 of the 1959 Constitution, advocated to himself presidential powers 
waiting for the President to come back. Yet, the Constitutional Council was indeed of the 
advice that such leave would rather be permanent and, as provided by article 57 of the 
Consitution, vested the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Fouad Mebazaa, with the 
functions of interim president of the Republic. A new government saw the light on 
January 17th with the aim of soothing protesters while making only cosmetic changes. 
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Three members of the country’s formal opposition and one activist were included in the 
new cabinet. Yet, they were reserved only ancillary positions: Ahmad Najib al-Chebbi of 
the Progressive Democratic Party (hereafter PDP) was appointed minister of 
development; Mustafa Ben Jaar, from the Union of Freedom and Labor, obtained the 
ministry of health; Ahmad Ibrahim, of Ettajdid, received the ministry of higher education, 
while Slim Amamou, the young activist who had been jailed during the uprisings against 
Ben Ali, had the ministry of youth and sport1. The hard-core of the authoritarian era was 
still sound and well.  
Confronting with this continuity, and supported by authoritative opposition voices, such 
as those of Rachid Gannouchi and Moncef Marzouki, a new wave of street protests arose. 
From the inner and poorer areas of Kasserine, Thala, Regueb and Sidi Bouzid, hundreds 
of peoples marched towards Tunis in the “liberation caravan”2 to demand the resignation 
of Gannouchi’s government.  During the same days the “14th January Front” saw the light 
under the impulse of radical leftist parties, in particular the Tunisian Workers’ Party 
(PCOT, form its French acronym). This Front asked for the dismissal of Gannouchi’s 
government, the dissolution of the RCD and of all institutions representing the previous 
regime – first of all the parliament and the political police-, along with the inception of a 
veritable process of transitional justice and the improvement of Tunisians’ living 
conditions3. The “liberation caravan” arrived in the Qasbah square of Tunis, residence of 
the government, on 23th January. Together with the “14th January Front” and other 
oppositions, they organized a sit-in asking the immediate dissolution of the government, 
of the RCD and of the political police. On January 27th, Gannnouchi responded to the 
square with another government reshuffle only involving the ministry of National 
Defense and that of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, the civil society continued to 
autonomously organize itself, a National Council for the Protection of the Revolution 
(NCPR) was created including the “14th January Front”, the Tunisian General Labour 
                                                             
 
1 See: “Tunisia's Mohammed Ghannouchi defends new government” on the BBC website. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12213284 (last access: 1st March 2017)  
2  See: “’Liberation caravan’ reaches Tunis” on al Jazeera. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011123124352723753.html (last access: 1st March 
2017) 
3  See: “Communiqué de fondation du Front du 14 janvier”, 20th January 2011. Available at: 
http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article26968 (last access: 1st March 2017)  
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Union (UGTT), the Islamist party Ennadha and other political and civic associations 
(Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Zemni 2014). The goal of this new-born 
National Council was that of being “the sole depository of popular sovereignty and it 
asked to be recognized by presidential decree so that it could monitor the work of the 
transitional government” (Zemni 2014, 5). This led to the creation of the Higher 
Committee for Political Reform within the government and exponents of the NCPR where 
invited to join in. The Higher Committee and the National council eventually managed to 
merge in the High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution Objectives, Political  
Reform and Democratic Transition, established by Decree-law n° 2011-6 dated 18 
February 20114 with the task of “studying  the legislative texts having link with the 
political organization and proposing the reforms likely to concretize the revolution 
objectives relating to the democratic process”, and to advise the government (art. 2).  
However, Gannouchi’s perseverance to control the transition caused another sit-in on 20th 
February. Qasbah 2 “called for the prime minister’s resignation, the excision of all 
remnants of Ben Ali’s regime from the country’s government, and the election of a 
constituent assembly to write a new constitution” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 
2015, 128). This new wave of protests was partially successful and Gannouchi stepped 
aside on February 27th. His successor, Béji Caïd Essebsi, a former Bourguiba’s minister 
and speaker of the parliament under Ben Ali, inaugurated a new course of management 
of the transition in the direction of empowering the oppositions while dismantling the 
remnants of the old regime.   
 
1.1.2 The ‘tabula rasa’ 
 
Decree-law n° 2011-14 dated 23 March 2011, related to the provisional organization of 
the public authorities, dissolved the Parliament and suspended the 1959 Constitution. 
Formally, the provisional legislative and executive powers were entrusted to the interim 
President of the Republic and the interim government, with extremely little prerogatives. 
Actually, the bulk of the decision making became the High Authority composed by an 
                                                             
 
4  Full English text available at http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-
officiel/2011/2011G/Jg0132011.pdf (last access: 1st March, 2017) 
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expert committee of specialists and of a council of “national political personalities, 
representatives of the different political parties, authorities, organizations, associations 
and components of the civil society concerned by the national affairs in the capital and 
regions, among those who took part in the revolution or supported it and which will be 
appointed by order of the Prime Minister on proposal from the concerned organizations” 
(art.2). This broad composition served the purpose of legitimating the process of 
“formulating the orientations likely to adapt the legislations relating to the political life 
so that they meet the requirements of the realization of the democratic transition” (art. 3) 
with the broader aim of changing the balance of the control of the transition in favor of 
the civil society. Following the request of protesters, two different commissions were 
created to investigate on corruption and on the abuses perpetrated during the uprisings5. 
In addition, it was provided for the dissolution of the political police6 and of the RCD7 
whose members were banned from participating in politics for ten years. Finally, the 
Higher Independent Electoral Commission (ISIE, from its French acronym) was created 
in order to ensure democratic, pluralist, fair and transparent elections8. Its members, 
chosen by the High Authority among specialized and representative sectors of the society 
were entitled to supervise the entire electoral process, i.e. proposing the division of the 
electoral constituencies, preparing the electoral calendar, fixing the list electors, receiving 
the applications of candidacies, publishing the results of elections and deciding on 
possible controversies.  
As first step, the ISIE decided to postpone the elections (originally scheduled for July 24 
2011) in order to “meet the administrative, financial, and technical requirements of 
organizing a free and fair election” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 133). This 
decision created, unsurprisingly, divisions between the bigger and the smaller parties. The 
first ones, such as Ennadha, the Congress for Republic (CPR), or the Progressive 
Democratic Party (PDP), were afraid of losing their competitive advantage and appealed 
to the urgent need of giving the county a Constituent Assembly. The second ones, such 
                                                             
 
5 See: Decree-law n° 2011-7 dated 18 February 2011 and Decree-law n° 2011-8 dated 18 February 2011. 
6 See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12669461 (last access: March 2, 2017) 
7 See: Decree-law n° 2011-35 dated 10 May 2011. 
8 See: Decree-law n° 2011-27 dated 18 April 2011 
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as the Democratic Reform Meeting Movement and the PCOT, agreed with this decision 
seeing in it the opportunity to better organize in facing the ballot box.  
Another point of disagreement among the competing factions of the society around the 
transitional road map was related to the mandate of the elected assembly. Some parties, 
as Ennadha and others rallied around the “October 23rd coalition”, envisaged a 
Constituent Assembly with extended prerogatives (as originally stated by the decree law 
2011-14). Others, as the PDP and others fifty parties, called for the elections of an 
Assembly with the sole scope of writing a constitution within a six months and, 
eventually, to supervise for other six months the elected bodies. As Brownlee et al. note, 
“[t]his disagreement was not merely technical. According to many observers, some non-
Islamists feared that Ennadha was poised to capture a majority in the assembly, and 
therefore these non-Islamists wanted to limit both the assembly’s term and its mandate, 
lest it prove the gateway to Islamist dominion” (2015, 136). In the wake of reciprocal 
suspicions, an agreement between these two factions was finally casted on September 15 
2011 with the transitional Pact providing the election of a 1-year Constituent Assembly 
settling also the new structure of the public authority and electing an interim president. In 
line with the desire of guaranteeing the widest representation, and to safeguard the smaller 
parties from the threat of an overwhelming power handled by one party, in the case 
Ennadha (Lieckefett 2012), the ISIE predisposed that the election of the ANC were to be 
held according to a system of closed list proportional representation, that assured also 
equal representation between men and women. Seats were to be attributed with the largest 
remainders formula with no national threshold9. This encouraged the registration of some 
hundreds parties, some of which being offshoots of the RCD despite the ban. The 
registration of voters, however, didn’t reflect the enthusiasm of candidates and the 
procedures took longer than preview for the low affluence to the registration offices10.   
 
 
                                                             
 
9 See: Decree-law 35-2011 dated 10 May 2011.  
10  See: https://www.tunisienumerique.com/prorogation-jusquau-14-aout-2011-des-delais-dinscription-
sur-les-listes-electorales/62093  
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1.1.3 Establishing the ‘rules of the game’ from the ANC to the National Dialogue 
 
On October 23, 2011, Tunisian citizens went to the pool to express their political will. As 
table 1.1 shows, the Islamic party Ennadha won 89 of 217 seats, followed by the secular 
parties, namely the Congress for the Republic, hereafter CPR (29 seats), al-Aridha 
coalition (26 seats) and the Ettakatol party (20).  
 
Table 1.1. Results of Tunisian Constituency Assembly, 23 October 2011 
 Votes %* Seats  % 
Mouvement Ennadha  1498905 34,81 89 41,01 
Congress for Republic (CPR) 352825 8,19 29 13,36 
Democratic forum for labour and liberties (Ettkatol) 285530 6,63 20 9,22 
Popular petition (al-Aridha) 1 280382 6,51 26 11,98 
Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) 160692 3,73 16 7,37 
Al-Moubadara 129215 3 5 2,30 
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM)2 113094 2,63 5 2,30 
Tunisian Horizon Party (Afek Tounis) 76643 1,78 4 1,84 
Tunisian Workers’ Party (PCOT) 60620 1,41 3 1,38 
Free Patriotic Union 51594 1,2 1 0,46 
Mouvement of Democratic Patriots  32306 0,75 1 0,46 
Popular Mouvement 31793 0,74 2 0,92 
Movement of Social Democrats (MDS) 22842 0,53 2 0,92 
Sowat al mostakbal1 17340 0,4 1 0,46 
Social Democratic Nation Party  15572 0,36 1 0,46 
Neo-Destour Party 15459 0,36 1 0,46 
Maghribi Liberal Party  13053 0,3 1 0,46 
Almostakel1 12172 0,28 1 0,46 
al-Wafa1 11578 0,27 1 0,46 
al-Amal1 10681 0,25 1 0,46 
For a National Tunisian Front 1 9923 0,23 1 0,46 
Progressive Struggle Party 9329 0,22 1 0,46 
Equity 1 9221 0,21 1 0,46 
Euqality and Equity Party 7619 0,18 1 0,46 
Social Struggle1 6680 0,16 1 0,46 
Party of the Cultural Unionist Nation 5581 0,13 1 0,46 
Martyrs' wafa 3869 0,09 1 0,46 
Total 3244518 75,35 217  
* percentage of votes by registered voters 
1 independent lists 
2 coalition list 
Source: ISIE, Rapport relative au déroulement des élections de L’Assemblée Nationale Constituante, February 2012.  
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As hoped, no party gained the majority of seats that would allow a lone government. 
Ennadha, the CPR and Ettakatol (forming what will be known as the Troika) came to a 
power sharing agreement. Out of it, a coalition government among the three was guided 
by Hamada Jebali, a Ennadha’s MP; CPR’s leader, Moncef Marzouki was elected interim 
President of the Republic and Ettakatol’s Mustapha Ben Jaafar was elected as Speaker of 
the Parliament. Meanwhile, the elected Parliament began to draft the Constitution. The 
works began on February 2012 with the creation of six commissions, each reflecting the 
distribution of power inside the ANC, in charge of dealing with specific aspects of the 
constitution11. This phase of institution building has been characterized by profound 
disagreement around both procedural aspects and substantive issues concerning the 
outlook of the future regime. Both confrontations manifest the power struggle between 
the competing political forces, inside and outside the Parliament, over the control of the 
transition process to secure a stake in the upcoming regime. Already before the election 
of the ANC, the 23rd October coalition, gathering Ennadha, the CPR and other parties 
clashed against other political parties over the extent of the Constituent Assembly’s 
prerogatives. Despite what sanctioned by the declaration of the transitional pact, “in 
December 2011, Ennadha and its coalition partners rejected an attempt within the 
assembly to impose a timeline on the body or otherwise restrict its powers” (Brownlee, 
Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 141). Worried about the absence of effective balances to 
the Troika’s power and lamenting its autonomous management of the government and 
the constitution-making process alike, PDP, the Tunisia Horizon party and the Republican 
party gathered to form the Republican party with the aim of contrasting Ennadha and the 
Troika. This parliamentary initiative was followed by an extra-parliamentary one. On July 
2012 a new party arose with no other aim, at least in the beginning, of “contrasting 
Ennadha”12 . Later on, the Popular Front saw the light on October 7th 2012 by the 
convergence of a dozens of leftist parties including the Movement of Social Democrats 
(MDS after its French acronym), the People’s Movement, the Workers’ Party, the Green 
Party and the Ba’athist Movement of Tunisia. The rationale underneath the creation of 
                                                             
 
11 See: http://majles.marsad.tn/assemblee/commissions (last access: 2nd March 2017) 
12 Personal interview with Hafed Caïd Essebsi, July 2012.  
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this Front was that the more united the oppositions, the greater their bargaining power 
via-à-vis Ennadha.     
Coming to the substance, the major disagreements regarded the form of government and 
the role of Islam within the new regime. Ennadha was the sole party claiming for a 
parliamentary system, while all the other parties preferred a presidential one or some 
mixture of the two. Further, lot of politicians and observers were scared about Ennadha’s 
intention to introduce the Shari’a among the sources of law. Indeed, such question has 
never been on the party’s agenda13. Rather, it was the coming back of a traditional and 
Islamic view of society that preoccupied the constitution makers and Tunisians altogether 
(McCarthy 2015). Indeed, from two draft articles proposed by Ennadha it emerged the 
distinction, if not subordination, of the role of the woman within the family and the 
society. In this regard, this period has been referred to as the “reappearance of identity 
politics” or the struggle of “competing ways of life” (Zeghal 2013) thus underlying the 
challenge of accommodating different worldviews that Tunisia had to overcome in order 
to achieve the transition (Stepan and Linz 2013). Yet, such reading cannot obscure the 
broader battle-ground of the transition process that is the question of the legitimation of 
its governance. Attacks to Ennadha and Troika came from both inside and outside the 
state institutions.  
The new parties inside the ANC, namely the Republican Party and the Social Democratic 
Path joined with the extra parliamentary party Nidaa Tounes of Caïd Essebsi to form the 
Union for the Sake of Tunisia14.  
On February 6 2013, one of the leader of the leftist opposition, Chockri Belaïd was 
assassinated in an ambush that nobody never claimed. This episode of violence was not 
alone. Already in October an activist of Nidaa Tounes was killed in a clash with the 
National League for the Protection of the Revolution reported to have hidden ties with 
Ennadha and during the summer 2012 a cinema and an exposition have been targeted by 
the violence of radical Islamic groups. Confronting with these mounting violence, 
protesters called for the government resignation and blamed in particular the interior 
                                                             
 
13 Personal interview with Ajmi Lourimi, Ennadha’s MP and member of its Shura Council, the decisional 
body of the party, and Imen Ben Mohammed, Ennadha’s MP. July 2012.  
14 See: “Union for Tunisia - Jebali's Initiative 'Step Forward On Right Path'”, 12 February 2013. Tunis 
Afrique Press (TAP).  
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ministry accused to have been soft-handed in dealing with these episodes. PM Hamadi 
Jebali, from Ennadha, tried then to form a technocratic government in line with the 
requests of demonstrators, but his effort proved in vain following the reluctance of his 
own party to step back. In disagreement with Ennadha’s position, Jebali eventually 
resigned and was replaced precisely by the former minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh. 
Within the new cabinet, the presence of Ennadha’s members was drastically reduced and 
key ministries were assigned to independent personalities.  That spring was  also the 
season of great discontent following the release of the draft constitution alleged to 
threaten some basic rights and to impose an Islamic view of society15. Mass protests lead 
Moncef Marzouki to call for a National Dialogue, but this was boycotted by the UGTT, 
the Popular Front and Nidaa Tounes.  
New severe tensions arose after the murder of Mohamed Brahmi, the former leader of 
People’s movement on July 25. The following day, the coalitions Union for Tunisia and 
Popular Front joined to give way to the National Salvation Front. This urged the 
government, indicated as the responsible for the widespread violence, to be replaced by 
a government of independent technocrats and asked for the dissolution of the ANC and 
its replacement by a Commission of National Salvation, composed by politicians, 
exponents of the civil society and experts in constitutional law, in charge of writing the 
Constitution within 2 months to subsequently submit it to popular referendum. In so 
doing, the National Salvation Front also incited civil disobedience and made itself 
promoters of a series of general strikes, manifestations and sit-ins16. Bardo’s square (the 
ANC’s headquarters) was besieged by protesters and MPs belonging to the National Front 
who refused any further discussion inside the ANC to achieve the writing of Constitution 
nor any kind of discussion with Ennadha until a new independent government was 
elected. Social and political agitation never reached a peak so high within the constitution-
making process as in those months. Given this political impasse, on August 6, Ben Jaafar, 
the President of the Parliament, suspended the works of the ANC until a dialogue between 
the government and opposition was set up17. The transition appeared so as risk that some 
                                                             
 
15 See: “Tunisia's Theocratic Temptation”, 3 May 2013. The New York Times.  
16 See: http://front-populaire.org/?p=2414 (last access: March 2, 2017). Moreover, personal interview 
with Hamma Hammami. Tunis, August 2013.  
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observers also wondered if Ennadha would have followed the fate of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Tunisia that of Egypt 18.  
Following the idea of Moncef Marzouki, the General Union of the Tunisian workers 
(UGTT), the Tunisian Union for the Industry, Commerce and Craftsmanship (UTICA), 
the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH) and the National order of 
lawyers, constituted themselves as brokers of the National Dialogue to overcome the 
political impasse. Such “Quartet”, heard the different positions of the political actors 
involved, more remarkably the governing forces headed by Ennadha and the oppositions 
led by Nidaa, and drafted the roadmap of the transition. Out of this roadmap, the 
oppositions engaged in collaborating for the adoption of the Constitution, the creation a 
new ISIE and the promulgation of the electoral law. After the achievement of these 
objectives, the Troika government would resign. Both the opposition and the government 
abided by the road map of the National Dialogue and the transition continued, despite 
slowdowns such as the nomination of ISIE’s commissioner. In that occasion, political 
parties disagreed on the procedure of nomination and the Administrative Court was called 
to pronounce on this twice. Once again its seemed a deadlock “à la Egyptienne”. Yet, 
through negotiations within the ANC a political solution was found to bypass the legal 
obstacle19. The Constitution was finally adopted on January 26 2014 along with the 
institutions and laws to regulate new elections. The government of technocrats replaced 
the Troika government and between October and December 2014 new democratic 
elections were held to elect a new parliament and the new president of the Tunisian 
Republic.   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
18 See: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/07/27/Islamists-fall-from-grace-Will-
Tunisia-s-Ennahda-follow-the-Brotherhood.html (last access: March 2, 2017). 
19 Personal interview with Oussama Al Saghir, Ennhdha’s MP and member of the commission for the 
elections. Tunis, October 2013.  
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1.2 EGYPT 
 
The Egyptian transition, intending for it the eighteen months that go from Mubrak’s 
ousting to Morsi’s deposition, didn’t follow a more or less linear trajectory as the Tunisian 
one. If reasoning in terms of path dependence, the Egyptian experience is indeed 
characterized by the continuing emergence and shift of conflicts of power from one 
electoral consultation to another molding the transition as a muddled succession of ‘bad 
choices’ and ‘bad behaviors’ that made the democratic breakdown almost inevitable, as 
Brown rightly notices (2013b). In this regard, the inability of the elected Parliament to 
find a political solution upon a pure political matter had the twofold effect of allowing 
exponents of the deep state, namely the judiciary and the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces, to hijacked the transition and of putting the legitimate elected President in the 
condition of wrestling with them over the control of the transition. This power struggle 
was characterized by extreme uncertainty. Przeworski clearly shows how incomplete 
information between incumbents (in our case the remnants of the deep state) and 
oppositions (here the Islamists and left/secular parties) is a key ingredient in fostering a 
successful democratic transition (Przeworski 1991). Yet, in the Egyptian case, uncertainty 
and suspicion marked the mutual relations of the latter front that was nonetheless willing 
to break with the past. However, fearing the concentration of power in the hand of 
Mohamed Morsi, which was instrumental to contrast the SCAF and Mubarak’s judiciary, 
the left, the secular and even some Islamist oppositions turned in cherishing the SCAF’s 
intervention to depose him. Eventually, such a request was satisfied through the July 3 
2013 military coup that, up to now, has extinguished any democratic ambition for the 
country.  
 
 
1.2.1 The SCAF controls the transition 
 
Much like what occurred during the first weeks of the Tunisian transition, Mubarak’s 
resignation of February 11, was followed by the attempts of controlling the transition 
from the remnants of the deep state. Yet, contrary to the Tunisian case, the deep state, 
represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), succeed in 
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maintaining the control of the transition. Ousted Mubarak, “power in Egypt was assumed, 
not by the Speaker of the People’s Assembly (as called for by article 84 of the country’s 
constitution), nor by an interim government of national salvation (as called for by many 
of the protesters), but by the [SCAF], a conclave of twenty senior military officers led by 
the minister of defense, Muhammad Ḥussayn al-Ṭanṭāwī” (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015, 104). At first, this move drew little attention from Egyptians and 
observers alike. On the one hand, the military has always enjoyed the trust of the 
populace, and its denial of shooting on protesters during the uprising increased this 
sentiment of confidence articulated in the slogan “The army and the people are one hand” 
(Ketchley 2013). On the other hand, as Brown simply puts it, “no one else could come up 
with a timely alternative” (Brown 2013b, 54). As first step, on February 13, the SCAF 
dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution with the declared aim of creating 
a favorable environment allowing the building of the new political regime 20 . The 
timetable presented by the regent authority provided for a 6-months term wherein to draft 
constitutional amendments, submit them to a referendum and elect a new government. 
Such process, according to the declared plans, would have been followed by SCAF’s 
return to the barracks.  
While leaving in place Shafiq’s government put in place by Mubarak on January 29 
(Awad 2013), field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the defence minister acting as 
chief of state, in accordance with the roadmap, created an 8-member committee to amend 
the 1971 constitution to render it well suited to the transition. Unlike the Tunisian High 
Authority, which broadly represented all the components of the civil society, this 
constitutional review committee was very much the expression of the old establishment. 
It was formed by three members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, three law 
professors, one member of the Muslim Brotherhood’ Freedom and Justice Party (the sole 
party represented) and one former member of the Council of State with Islamic leanings21. 
The amendments presented on February 16, while diminishing the duration of the 
                                                             
 
20 Mai Shams El-Din, “Armed Forces suspend constitution, dissolve parliament”, 13 February 2011, Daily 
News Egypt. Available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/02/13/armed-forces-suspends-
constitution-dissolves-parliament/. Last access: 9 March 2017. 
21 See: “In Egypt, a Panel of Jurists Is Given the Task of Revising the Country’s Constitution”, 15 February 
2011, The New York Times.  
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mandate from six to four years and allowing just for one renewal, broadened the 
possibility for individuals to run for the Presidency of the Republic, thus filling the gap 
created with the 2005 constitutional revision (art. 76 and 77), even though preventing 
expats to apply (art. 75); established complete judicial supervision over all elections and 
referenda (art. 88); entrusted the Supreme Constitutional Court of deciding about the 
validity of membership of the People's Assembly MPs (art. 93); provided the appointment 
of a vice-president by the President for the Republic in order to prevent what elsewhere 
has been referred to as “the dauphin syndrome” (art. 139); strongly limited the 
applicability of the state of emergency while protecting human rights in any case (art. 148 
and 179); added provisions and established the procedures for the adoption of a new 
constitution thus coming right to the bulk of the transition process. Amended article 189 
entrusts the President of the Republic, after approval of the cabinet, and half of the 
People’s Assembly and the Shura council, with the power to ask for issuing a new 
constitution. Such constitution would be redacted by a 100 members Constituent 
assembly mostly elected by the two houses of parliament and submitted to popular 
referendum. 
To popular referendum have been subjected also the constitutional amendments on March 
19, 2011. They were approved by 77% of voters although the turnout was as low as 41%. 
Despite the fact that SCAF ousted Shafiq and dissolved the State Security Agency22, as 
asked by many oppositions, and remarkably by the Revolutionary Youth Coalition -a 
coalition formed in February 2011 to be the stakeholder of the young revolutionaries 
including the 6 April Youth movement, Justice and Freedom, Muslim Brotherhood youth, 
ElBaradei's campaign, The Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), the 
Democratic Front and the administrators of the renown Khaled Saeed Facebook group23- 
dissatisfaction toward the management of the transition was high. Many within the youth 
organizations and non-Islamist political parties still looked at the total dismantling of the 
old regime as precondition for the founding elections and feared the subsequent Islamist 
                                                             
 
22  “Egypt dissolves notorious internal security agency”, 15 March 2011, BBC News. Available at 
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23 See: “Egypt revolution youth form national coalition”, 9 February 2011, Ahram on line available at 
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dominion at the ballot box. By contrast, the two major factions of the country, namely the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Moubarak’s National Democratic Party, supported the 
amendments. The first saw in them the highway to parliamentary control, the second was 
at ease with the mild transition profiled by the military forces.  
However, what followed the popular consultation was not the reinstitution of the 1971 
Constitution as modified by the referendum, but a new Constitutional declaration 
unilaterally adopted on March 30 by the SCAF. This document was intended to be a 
fundamental law providing guidance towards civilian rule: it guaranteed democratic 
rights (art. 3 – 23) while indicating the timing and procedures of the transition (art. 24-
62). Controversially, in envisaging the developments of the transition, the SCAF 
arrogated to itself legislative and executive powers to “deal[..] with the administration of 
the affairs of the country” (art. 56) “until a time at which the People’s Assembly and the 
Shura Council assume their responsibilities and the president of the republic is elected 
and assumes his/her position” (art. 61). To counterbalance such maneuver, the SCAF 
convened a National Accord Conference with representatives of all political parties to 
reach a non-binding accord over the basic outlines of a new constitution. Yet, neither the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s new-born Freedom and Justice party (FJP), nor the youth 
revolutionary groups joined the conference in sign of protest toward SCAF’s ambivalent 
behavior24. At first, the National Accord Conference opted for drafting a constitution 
before parliamentary and presidential elections25 . However, the two major opposing 
groups, the FJP and the revolutionary youths, strongly rejected this proposal and elections 
were finally scheduled for November26.   
Amidst suspicions, each faction approached the elections trying to safeguards its 
prerogatives by undermining its rivals. At that time, two trends common to almost all 
political parties emerged. On the one hand, they cherished SCAF’s benevolence in order 
to count on a strong ally (De Smet 2014). On the other hand, political parties started to 
organize in broad electoral coalitions against what they saw as their worthiest rival. The 
FJP gathered with other parties such as the Dignity Party and Tomorrow Revolution to 
                                                             
 
24 See: “Deputy PM alleges attempts to spoil accord on constitution”, 26 May 2011, Egypt Independent.  
25  See: “National Accord Conference calls for constitution before elections”, 21 June 2011, Egypt 
Independent.  
26 See: “Egyptian Parliamentary Election Date Set for November”, 25 July 2011, IHS Global Insight.  
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prevent the return of Mubrark’s clique. By contrast, the Egyptian Bloc gathered left and 
secular parties, such as the Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party and the 
National Progressive Union Party (NPUP, also known as Tagammu), to counterbalance 
the power of Islamists parties, in particular that of the FJP. And finally, also Salafist 
parties, under Nour’s aegis united in the Islamist bloc to survive the plethora of secular 
parties.  
Sharing anti-Islamists parties’ preoccupations, SCAF’s cabinet declared its intention to 
settle super-constitutional principles in order to bind Islamists’ prerogatives within the 
constitution-making process. Again, opposition against this measure was vibrant and 
culminated with a meeting on September 19, between the SCAF and representatives of 
36 Egyptian political parties and movements to agree upon a new road-map. The new 
agreement was formalized in SCAF’s decree of 27 September calling for the national 
elections. Nonetheless, a new attempt at controlling the work of the Constituent Assembly 
arrived on November 1st with the Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the 
New Egyptian State, also known as the “Al-Salmi’s bill”27. This document was another 
attempt at guiding the transition process by settling super constitutional principles as well 
as the criteria for the election of the Constituent Assembly. Yet, this time more attention 
was devoted at securing the interests of all the factions involved in the transition. Secular 
factions would be reassured from religious attempts at establishing an Islamic state by the 
first fundamental principle reporting that “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic 
civil state which is based on citizenship and on the rule of law” (art. 1). By contrast, 
Islamists would be appeased by the acknowledgment that “Islam is the religion of state, 
and the Arab language is the official language of state. Islamic jurisprudence (shari’a) is 
the principle source of legislation” (art. 2). How these two principles would be reconciled 
in practice is difficult to guess. Also, the SCAF tried to secure itself from civilian 
interference with the provision that “the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces is solely 
responsible for all matters concerning the armed forces, and for discussing its budget, 
which should be incorporated as a single figure in the annual state budget. The Supreme 
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Council for the Armed Forces is also exclusively competent to approve all bills relating 
to the armed forces before they come into effect” (art. 9). Finally, the SCAF, here 
indicated as the defender of the “constitutional legitimacy”, tried to disempower the 
elected Parliament by envisaging a 100 members of Constituent Assembly composed by 
“eighty members, who are not members of the People's Assembly and of the Shura 
Council, and who represent all segments of Egyptian society including political forces, 
political parties, trade unions, professional and religious groups” and “the remaining 
members will be chosen from among the representatives of parties and independents, 
according to the proportion represented by the People's Assembly and Shura Council” 
(art. 1 of  the Criteria for the formation of the Constituent Assembly to develop a new 
constitution for the country). Unsurprisingly, this document encountered the massive 
opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Young Revolutionary Coalition. The first 
blamed the imposition of super-constitutional principles at the eve of their certain victory 
at the elections. The second saw in the document another attempt at hijacking the 
transition they provoked. Either because “the military preferred no supra-constitutional 
principles to a document that would consolidate liberal principles and ultimately sanction 
the supremacy of civilians in the political system” (Awad 2013) or because the SCAF 
didn’t want to confront with the mobilizing potential of both the Brotherhood and the 
young (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015), the document was withdrawn and a new 
government, without al-Salmi, saw the light.  
  
 
1.2.2 Writing the Constitution: Parliament’s dialogue of the deaf 
 
By modifying some provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on the People's Assembly, and 
Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council, SCAF’s decree 199 of September 27, 
constitutes, along with other decrees recalled by it and two subsequent decrees28, the legal 
framework of the voting procedures for the elections of the two chambers of the 
                                                             
 
28 Susequent decrees are Decree 123 dated 3 October 2011 (modifying disposition of Decree 120 dated 
26 September 2011, thus finally allowing political party members to contest individual candidacy seats) 
and Decree 130 dated 19 November 2011 (rules for voting abroad) 
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Parliament. Members of the People’s Assembly –now of 498 members (art.1)- would be 
elected on 3 stages, with the first stage starting on 28 November 2011 and the run-off for 
the third stage ending in 10 January 2012 while members of the Shura Council would 
have been voted in other three stages from 29 January to 11 March 2011 (article 6). In 
continuity with the Nasserist tradition, the electoral framework provided that half seats in 
Parliament were to be reserved to workers and farmers (art. 2). The voting system 
envisaged was a mixed one: two thirds of the members of each chamber would be elected 
through a closed party list system with national threshold of 0.5%, and the remnants third 
through the individual-candidate voting system (art. 2 and 3).  
The results of the elections confirmed the fears of the secular front but nonetheless 
surprised for the magnitude of the victories reported by the Islamists factions. As shown 
in table 1.2, Freedom and Justice party, leader of the Democratic Alliance rallying other 
minor parties like the Dignity Party, al-Hadara and affiliated independents, gained 218 
out of the 498 elected seats at the People’s Assembly and 105 out of the 180 elected seats 
in the Shura Council. Further, the salafist Nour party, head of the electoral coalition 
“Islamist Alliance” gained 108 seats within the lower chamber and 45 in the upper one. 
Facing this stunning performance, secular formation performed poorly. The New Wafd 
Party reported 42 seats in the People’s Assembly and 14 in the Shura Council.  
The electoral alliance born in august 2011 to counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood, 
namely the “Egyptian Bloc” gained 33 and 8 seats respectively. Among its founding 
parties, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, founded by Mohamed Abou El-Ghar, 
gained 15 seats at the People’s Assembly. The same poor figure applies also for the Free 
Egyptians Party established by the magnate of telecommunications Naguib Sawiris, while 
the oldest leftist opposition party of Egyptian history, namely the National Progressive 
Unionist Party gained only 3 seats inside the People’s Assembly. NDP’s offshoots, that 
reorganized despite the ban, contested elections divided in seven different parties 
achieving poor gains: the National Party of Egypt, born under NDP’s chairman, Talaat 
Sadat’s efforts to reorganize the party secured only 5 seats while the Union Party secured 
only 3 seats inside the People’s Assembly. Overall, NDP’s affiliated presence inside the 
People Assembly does not exceed the two dozen, while inside the Shura Council only the 
Freedom Party managed to elect 3 of its representatives.  
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Table 1. 2: Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, 28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012 
 Votes* %* Seats  % 
Democratic Alliance   10138134 37,5 235 46,2 
   Freedom and Justice Party   213 41,9 
   Dignity Party (al-Karama)   6  
   Tomorrow Revolution (Ghad al-Thawra)   2  
   Civilization Party    2  
   Islamic Labor Party   1  
   Egyptian Arab Socialist   1  
   Egyptian Reform   1  
   Affiliated Independents    9  
Islamic Alliance 7534266 27,8 123 24,2 
   Al Nour    107 21,1 
   Building and Development Party   13  
   Authenticity Party   1  
Egyptian Bloc 2402238 8,9 35 6,9 
  Socialist Democratic Party    16  
  Free Egyptians   15  
  Progressive Unionists (MPUP)   4  
New Wafd Party 2480391 9,2 38 7,5 
al-Wasat 989003 3,7 10 2,0 
Reform and Development 604415 2,2 9 1,8 
Revolution Continues 754863 2,8 7 1,4 
National Party of Egypt 425021 1,6 5 1,0 
Freedom Party 514029 1,9 4 0,8 
Egyptian Citizen Party 235359 0,9 4 0,8 
Union Party 141382 0,5 2 0,4 
Conservative Party  272910 1,0 1 0,2 
Demcratic Peace Party  248281 0,9 1 0,2 
Justice Party 184553 0,7 1 0,2 
Arab Egyptian Unity Party 149253 0,6 1 0,2 
Independents    21 4,1 
Total 27065134    
* PR votes 
Source: Masoud 2014 
 
 
As stated by the modified Law No. 38 of 1972, the People’s Assembly convened on 
March 17 2012 while the Shura Council on March 24 2012. Yet, instead of being the bulk 
of and agreed compromise to give the country a democratic constitution, the Parliament 
soon turned to be the arena of an unleashed conflict among the different political currents. 
Following the withdrawal of the Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the 
New Egyptian State, MPs were left with no guidance in determining the composition of 
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the Constituent Assembly. This provoked profound disagreement between Islamists and 
Secular. To the former, the composition of the assembly had to reflect the balance of 
power inside the elected Parliament. To the latter, the Constituent Assembly had to be the 
expression of the different political souls present in the country.  
During the first session of the People’s Assembly, parties agreed that the Constituent 
Assembly would be made by 50 MPs and 50 members from outside the Parliament29. 
Despite the fact such decision was voted by the Parliament, lawyers and activists appealed 
the administrative court alleging that the parliament-appointed panel did not reflected the 
diversity of Egyptian society and that such composition also violated article 60 of the 
March Constitutional Declaration related to the procedures for selecting the Constituent 
Assembly30.   
On March 22, amidst street protests contesting the criteria for selecting the constitution-
makers31, political parties and MPs announced their nominations for the Constituent 
Assembly that were finally voted by the parliament two days later. The Constituent 
Assembly would then be made up of 25 FJP’s MPs, 11 Nour’s MPs and other 14 MPs 
expression of the secular and leftist independents as far as the MPs’ quota was concerned 
(35 of them from thee People’s Assembly and 15 from the Shura Council), the remaining 
part of non-MPs was made up by 25 exponents of syndicate and unions and an equal 
amount of public Egyptian figures. In light of the overwhelming presence of Islamists 
inside the Constituent Assembly (even though according to some they contributed 58 
members inside it), the left and secular parties led by the Egyptian bloc decided to 
withdraw from it32. Such act of demonstration was not necessary to block the proceedings, 
however. On April 10, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the panel of 
constitution-makers unconstitutional on the ground that this was composed also by self-
appointed parliamentarians33 and the Constituent Assembly was finally dissolved. After 
confrontations among all parties and the SCAF34, a new one finally saw the light on June 
                                                             
 
29 See: “Egypt Parliament opens nominations for constituent assembly”, 18 march 2012, Al-Ahram online. 
30 “Legal experts challenge decision to stock constituent assembly with sitting MPs”, 19 march 2012, Al-
Ahram. 
31 “Protesters rally against Islamists dominating Constituent Assembly”, 23 march 2012, Daily News Egypt. 
32 “Egyptian secular parties withdraw from Constituent Assembly”, 27 March 2012, Xinhua General News 
Service.  
33“Egyptian Court Suspends Constitutional Assembly”, 10 April 2012, RTT News.  
34 “SCAF, political parties agree to 6 criteria for forming constituent assembly”, 28 April 2012, Al-Ahram.  
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1235, and again its composition was challenged to the court. However, this time the 
Supreme Constitutional Court disbanded the elected Parliament for unconstitutionality of 
the electoral law. According to the SCC, the electoral system used for the founding 
elections discriminated between independent candidates and party members insofar as the 
former were granted access only to one third of seats allocated through the first-past-the-
post electoral formula while the latter had instead access to both the individual 
candidature and the closed party list seats thus enjoying a much greater advantage.  
While it has been argued that SCC, entirely formed by judges appointed by Mubarak, 
with this decision has probably gone beyond its prerogatives (even though this is not an 
isolated episodes) (Brown 2013a), its intervention is surely indicative of “the persistent 
resort to adjudication to decide on essentially political conflicts” (Awad 2013, 287) due 
to the dialogue of the deaf brought about by political parties inside the Parliament.  
 
 
1.2.3 From the intra-parliamentary to the inter-institutional conflict 
 
The decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court arrived at an extremely delicate 
moment of the Egyptian transition, namely at the eve of the Presidential elections that 
took place between 23/24 May (first round) and 16/17 June (runoff). In this regard, the 
many interventions of Mubarak’s courts had direct and indirect results on both the 
electoral race and the political prerogatives of the highest office. On the one hand, already 
in April the High Judicial Election Commission disqualified MB’s first candidate al-
Shatir form the presidential race. In absolute legal continuity with the Mubarak era, as 
Brownlee et al. note, the electoral commission argued that al-Shatir could not yet enjoy 
its political rights following the 2008 penalty issued by a military court for membership 
of a banned organization (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 117). On the other 
hand, SCC’s decision to outlaw the Parliament had the, more or less unintentional, 
consequence of putting the elected president in open confrontation with the SCAF for the 
governing power and the control of the transition.  
                                                             
 
35 “Official: The 100 members of Egypt's revamped Constituent Assembly”, 12 June 2012, Al-Ahram. 
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Following the Parliament’s disband by the SCC, the SCAF issued another constitutional 
declaration in the exact day of the runoff between MB’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, and 
Ahmad Shafiq, an exponent of Mubarak’s clique. SCAF’s constitutional declaration of 
June 17 overcame the legal void following SCC’s rule by awarding the military council 
with the legislative power “until a new parliament is elected” (art. 56 B). Further, it 
empowered the SCAF with the prerogatives of forming a new constituent assembly “if 
the constituent assembly encounters an obstacle that would prevent it from completing its 
work” (art. 60 B) and of intervening in the process of constitution making if “the new 
constitution contains an article or more which conflict with the revolution's goals and its 
main principles or which conflict with any principle agreed upon in all of Egypt's former 
constitutions” (art. 60 B1). Finally, the SCAF secured its autonomy from civilian 
oversight (art. 53) and established its veto power over presidential decisions on national 
security (articles 53/1 and 53/2).  
Therefore, when Morsi won the Presidential race, he found himself in a battle on two 
fronts. On the one hand he had to confront with the fact that “the coalition undergirding 
the Mubarak regime had begun to regroup” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 
118), as emerged from its modest advantage (51.7%) toward Ahmed Shafik in the run 
off. On the other hand, following SCAF’s constitutional declaration of June 17, Morsi 
(who found himself with tied hands vis-à-vis the SCAF, unelected body), entered in 
competition with it for the governing power of the transition confident of its popular 
legitimacy. 
In order to confront with the challenges coming from both fronts, Morsi tried to gather 
the support from the left and secular field by “inviting dozens of national leaders from 
across Egypt’s political spectrum to a June 21 summit at Cairo’s Fairmont hotel, to 
‘discuss developments and changes in the political scene and the steps to be taken in the 
face of current challenges’” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 119). Eventually, 
the “Fairmont Accord” succeeded in securing oppositions’ allegiance with Morsi’s 
promises to form a government of national salvation led by and independent figure and 
to balance the composition of the Constituent Assembly in order to make it more 
representative of the different political souls present in the country (ibidem). Yet, the 
developments of Morsi’s attempt at wrestling power from the hands of the military and 
Mubarak’s clique led him to disregard such promises. 
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As first step as President of the Republic of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi tried to reinstate the 
Parliament elected in 2011/2012 and to convene new parliamentary elections two months 
after the approval by referendum of the country's new constitution and the adoption of a 
new law regulating the parliament36.  Unsurprisingly enough, such motion not only 
alarmed the judiciary and the military, who held meetings to figure out their next moves37, 
but also provoked harsh reactions from the political oppositions. Rifat al-Said, leader of 
the NPUP blamed such decision asserting that "in any decent and democratic country, a 
president cannot disrespect the judiciary" 38  and called for both the boycott of the 
parliamentary session and street protests. In addition, al-Baradei tweeted that "the 
executive decision to overrule the Constitutional Court is turning Egypt from a 
government of law into a government of men"39. Eventually the Supreme Constitutional 
Court overturned Morsi’s decree, and in a move he found himself politically isolated. To 
overcome his isolation, the newly elected President formed a cabinet of technocrats and 
left the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and the interior, in the hands of the 
professional bureaucracies that had controlled them in the Mubarak era (Brownlee, 
Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 120). However, the composition of the Morsi’s government 
is not the expression of his decision to acquiesce with the status quo. It was just the last 
tribute to political cohesion before the launch of a series of attacks aimed at dismantling 
the deep state, or at least to subtract it the control of the transition.   
With the pretext of Sinai’s disorders40, Morsi started to openly challenge the military rule. 
First, he removed of two prominent figures of the SCAF, namely those of Field Marshall 
Tantawi, replaced by al-Sisi, and of the army chief Sami Annan, replced by Sidki Sobhi. 
Further, and most importantly, he cancelled SCAF’s constitutional amendments of June 
17 and amended the constitutional declaration issued by SCAF on March 30, 2011. By so 
doing he granted himself with all the powers, including full executive and legislative 
                                                             
 
36 “Egypt's reinstated parliament to convene Tuesday”, 9 July 2012, Agence France Presse.   
37 “Egypt's ruling generals warn Morsi to respect the constitution”, 9 July 2012, The Guardian.  
38 “Egypt's reinstated parliament to convene Tuesday”, 9 July 2012, Agence France Presse.   
39 “Morsi orders Parliament to return”, 7 July 2012, St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota). 
40 “Egypt says 7 suspected militants killed in Sinai”, 12 August 2012, Associated Press.  
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authority, and the prerogative to decide on all public policies in Egypt and to sign 
international treaties41. 
In the absence of SCAF’s retaliation, Morsi then could turn to Mubarak’s judicial 
apparatus. He named Mahmud Makki, a former judge of the Court of Cassation and 
activist for judicial independence under Mubarak, as his vice president. Moved by the 
twofold aim of cherishing again the support of the political opposition and to shake the 
judiciary, Morsi attempted to remove the general attorney, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, 
accused of being too mild with the prosecution of those responsible of a violent episode 
occurred on February 2, during the Egyptian uprisings, by naming him ambassador to the 
Vatican42. Yet, Mahmoud refused to be reallocated and Morsi was obliged to rescind his 
decree by the Supreme Judicial Commission, the state body responsible for judicial 
appointments and promotion.  
Confronting with the obstructiveness of Mubarak’s judiciary and found himself almost 
isolated, Morsi shifted from a firm-handed to a “heavy handed” approach (Moustafa 
2012). On November 22, he issued a new Constitutional Declaration aimed at seizing 
power from SCAF’s hands while securing it from judicial interferences by stating that 
“previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he 
took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s 
Assembly is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any 
entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and 
brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled” (art. 2) and by 
extending such ‘untouchability’ also to the Shura Council preventing its dissolution from 
courts’ rulings as happened with the People’s Assembly (art. 5). Moreover, Morsi 
extended Constituent Assembly’s time limits and attempted to control the judiciary by 
appointing the prosecutor-general (art. 3). Finally, the declaration provided the president 
with the power of taking “the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and 
the goals of the revolution” (art. 6).  
                                                             
 
41 “Egypt’s President Morsi cancels SCAF's constitutional amendments”, 13 August 2012, Intellinews - 
MENA Today. 
42  “Egypt prosecutor-general to remain in office”, 13 October 2012, Al-Jazeera. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/10/20121013135626371129.html. Last access, 8 
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Even though such move was intended to bring the power back from the deep state against 
which many revolted to the newly elected bodies, “the effect was to further heighten 
opposition to the president, providing a focal point around which previously scattered 
liberals, leftists, and Mubarak supporters could coalesce” (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015, 122). The first signal of Morsi’s ability at unifying its enemies arrived 
two days after the Constitutional Declaration with the creation of the National Salvation 
Front. This was a coalition among a wide range of liberal, secular and leftist groups, such 
as the Egyptian Popular Current, the Constitution Party (al-Dustour), the NPUP, the Free 
Egyptians, the New Wafd, the Democratic Front, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 
Nasserist Democratic Party and the Conference Party43. Together, they were lead by 
prominent political figures with extremely different, if not opposite, backgrounds such as 
diplomat Nobel laureate ElBaradei; Amr Moussa, who served as minister of Foreign 
affairs with Mubarak and was president of the Arab League, and Hamdeen Sabahi, 
eminent figure of opposition to the authoritarian rule since the 1970s, founder of the 
Dignity Party and candidate in the 2011 Presidential race as exponent of the left44. The so 
formed National Salvation Front asked Morsi to rescind the Constitutional Declaration, 
to form a new and more plural Constituent Assembly, to carry through the measures of 
transitional justice and to form a new government of national salvation in line with the 
Fairmont Accord. Confronting with this organized protest, Morsi tried the way of the 
national dialogue to appease the tensions and to ensure the referendum approval of the 
Islamist-led constituent assembly’s draft constitution, but in vain. On December 8, he 
withdrew the controversial decree but confirmed the constitutional referendum to be held 
on 15th December45. This was only a partial concession to the requests of the National 
Salvation Front, and protests continued while pursuing a harsh campaign against the 
approval of the Constitution. Eventually the draft constitution was approved in a two steps 
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election at a rate of 64%, but the effect of the oppositions was evident in the participation 
whose turnout was as low as 33%46.  
In line with the transitional roadmap, the approval of the Constitution was followed by 
the attempts to organize a new Parliament that would have put Egypt on the rails of 
democratic stability, namely the draft, and the approval, of the Parliamentary law and of 
the electoral law. Yet, considerable uneasiness over unchecked presidential powers was 
stirring. In April, Tamarrod, a new grassroots movement protest saw the light and 
launched a petition campaign to ask Morsi to step down and allow for presidential 
elections to be held. Here, again, the initiative enjoyed the support of many and diverse 
social organizations and political parties such as the Kefaya Movement, the April 6 Youth 
Movement and Shayfeencom (three civil society organizations established in mid-2000s 
to protest against the authoritarian nature of the Mubarak regime), the National Salvation 
Front, but also of former members of Mubarak’s ruling party and religious groups ranging 
from the Jihadists to the moderates’ Strong Egypt Party. Maybe with the help of the 
Interior Ministry47, Tamarrod’s organizers announced that the petition reached 22 million 
signatures by the end of June48 and the mass demonstrations they organized for June 30 
proved to be a massive showdown. Millions of people took the streets of the major cities 
demanding Morsi’s step down and, in case, the intervention of the military to depose 
him49. Not waiting much, on 1st July Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 
launched an ultimatum to the incumbent president by giving him forty-eight hours to 
“respond people’s demands” or encounter SCAF’s intervention “due to its national and 
historic duties, out of respect for the demands of the great Egyptian people, to announce 
a roadmap and measures for the future”50. The following day on a televised speech Morsi 
rejected the ultimatum by insisting that “legitimacy is the only way to protect [the] 
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country and prevent bloodshed, to move to a new phase”51 well aware that this position 
would have probably cost him his life. In the meantime, the pro-Morsi National Alliance 
to Support Legitimacy called its supporters “to rally in defense of legitimacy and reject 
any attempt to overturn it"52. On July 3rd al-Sisi announced the deposition of the elected 
president, suspended the Constitution and appointed an interim government presided over 
by a senior jurist53. The two bastions of the authoritarian deep state, i.e. the military and 
the judges, finally came ‘back on horseback’, thus tuning off any hope of transition to 
democracy.     
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2 DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES OR AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE?  
 
One thing is to report different transitional paths; quite different thing is to account for 
them. Different readings have been offered to both categorize and explain these events. 
The preliminary question at stake is whether to label the Egyptian transition as a 
democratic breakdown, a failed transition or only an attempted transition. Out of this latter 
understanding, the events unfolding from 2011 to 2013 as only apparent changes in that 
the power remained in the hand of the SCAF. The first definition conceives the 2013 
military coup as subsequent to the completion of the democratic transition. The second, 
by contrast, locates it within the unfolding of the transition. Mubarak’s chute, followed 
by free and democratic elections of the Parliament entitled to elect a Constituent 
Assembly with the task of giving Egypt a democratic constitution makes the point for 
referring to the events between 2011 and 2013 as a transition. But was it complete when 
General Sisi deposed president Mursi? According to the mainstream definition: 
  
“[a] democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been 
reached about political procedures to produce and elected government, when 
a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular 
vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, 
and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new 
democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 3)   
Out of this understanding the centrality of the military, either as legislative and executive 
power, or as the “men on horseback” behind the scenes lead some to deny any completion 
(Hinnebusch 2015c; Stacher 2015), while others see this completion, even if “in only the 
thinnest, most formalistic of senses” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 170) in 
Mursi’s presidential decree entrusting himself, as elected body, all the executive and 
legislative powers.  
Both accounts fall nonetheless under the notion of democratization failure, yet, in line 
with the mainstream position, speaking of failed transition is more appropriate in that it 
better grasp the bulk of the question which is not much the centrality of non-elected 
bodies, but rather, as well be explained, the lack of any kind of agreement about some 
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sort of rules aimed at inaugurating a new course of politics. True enough, at some point 
Morsi succeeded in side lining the SCAF from the exercise of the governing power, but 
if terminus ad quem of any transition is the installation of another regime (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986), this ending point was simply missing. No elected or governing body 
was created according to the 2012 constitution, nor such constitution can be defined as an 
agreed compromise, as the 33% of turnout for its popular approval suggests.   
The analytical consequence of this definition is to delimit the search of possible 
explanations to the field of ‘transition maintenance’, namely the “persistence of 
[democratically elected] regimes in the face of challenges” (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015, 171). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, only Tunisia and Egypt 
managed to inaugurate a transition following the ousting of the previous dictator through 
founding elections with the aim of democratically selecting the representative bodies 
entitled to draft democratic constitutions thus inaugurating a new, and democratic, course 
of politics. As saw, this project succeeded in Tunisia but failed in Egypt. The proposed 
explanations to account for the different outcomes displayed by the two countries are all 
theoretically and methodologically influenced by the two contending paradigms 
underlying the study of the Arab Politics in the last decades, namely that of 
democratization studies and that of post-democratization ones, whose fortunes have been 
subjected to the ups and downs of political developments in the region. The paradigm of 
democratization studies has guided the research agenda from the discovery of the Arab 
Region at the end of World War II to the late 1990s, when the processes of national 
independence and the following processes of liberalization started in the 1970s were 
deemed to be conducive to democracy. The paradigm of post-democratization studies, 
that focuses on the causes of the authoritarian resilience, imposed itself since the early 
2000s following the entrenchment of Arab countries into the ‘grey zone’ of liberalized 
authoritarianism.  
In light of these two opposite orientations, the broader phenomenon of the Arab Spring is 
either appraised as process of democratization or as a process of authoritarian upgrading. 
Accordingly, the explanations accounting for the observed variations go from the analysis 
of the conditions fostering democracy to the structures and mechanisms allowing 
authoritarian regimes to survive. In the following all kind of explanations will be reported 
with an emphasis on the units of analysis, otherwise said the ‘arenas of democracy’ or 
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‘democratic dimensions’ (Linz and Stepan 1996; Morlino 2011), enlightened by the 
different contributions.  
 
 
2.1 THE PARADIGM OF DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES  
 
As Anderson (2006) remembers, contemporary political science discovered the Arab 
region at the end of the World War II. At that time, the Arab countries were newly 
independent and developing states still entrenched in the traditional structures of the pre-
modern state. At the same time, in the North of the world – remarkably US and Europe, 
the theory of modernization, which conceives democracy as endogenous to specific sets 
of conditions stemming from human development, was imposing itself in accounting for 
the rise of democracy in western states (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1959). It then followed 
that the attention of students of Arab politics was devoted to the search of those ‘social 
requisites’ for democracy to come about. Yet, interestingly enough, the appearance of 
The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, which represents the 
first and most comprehensive effort of to deal with the Arab Politics “by concentrating 
on the comparative analysis of changing internal politics” with the declared aim of 
grasping signals “not of Westernization, but of locally-rooted modernization” (Halpern 
1963), coincided with the building of the authoritarian system of rule which, at least until 
the Arab Spring, has characterized the political outlook of the MENA region with few 
exceptions, namely Israel and – to some extent – Turkey (Hinnebusch 2015a). During the 
late 1950s and 1960s, Arab incumbents scarified the subversive exigencies of 
democratization to those of state and nation building processes deemed to lead to 
economic development, and in turn to democracy. Because the central power at the core 
of newly independent states had to compete with other and alternative forces (Migdal 
1988), pluralism was regarded as a major threat. In 1952 Egypt, all political parties were 
disbanded and nearly three decades later the Parliament was dissolved for irresponsible 
oppositions. Since 1957, Jordan’s government was appointed by the King and the 
parliament lost any significance. In 1963, Tunisia inaugurated itself as a single party-
system and opposition parties started to be repressed. The following year, Algeria 
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witnessed the passage from and hegemonic party system to a single-party one wherein 
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was the only legal political party. From 1965, 
also the Moroccan monarchy aborted any pretension of being bounded by democratic 
constitutional limits. Gaddafi took over Libya through a military coup in 1969. Such 
regimes were nonetheless legitimated by a “populist social contract” whereby “the state 
was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy the basic needs of citizens, 
consolidate political independence, and achieve national aspirations (e.g. the Arab unity, 
the liberation of Palestine). In return, citizens were to forgo, at least for a while, the quest 
for liberal participatory politics” (Ibrahim 1995, 36). As far as the academic research was 
concerned, it seemed that the “developmentalist ethos”, i.e. Arabs’ internalization of the 
principles behind the authoritarian drive (Gelvin 2004), was spreading also among 
political scientists. Their shallow enthusiasm for the processes of national independence 
in the MENA region gave way to a silent waiting for development to come about as 
precondition for polyarchic institutions. 
The search of democracy in the area regained a new momentum at the end of the 1980s 
until the early 2000’s because of regional and international developments. Regionally, 
since 1967, the defeat of populist regimes at the hand of Israel, along with the evident 
inefficacy of socialist developmental plans, discredited the populist social contract 
underneath Arab incumbents’ legitimacy. This political and economic crisis lead to the 
introduction of measures of economic liberalization across the region inaugurated in 1974 
with the Egyptian’s infitah, that is the overture of the socialist planned economy to some 
measures of free market economy. Internationally, during the same years, the world was 
assisting to the reversal of autocracies across Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe initiated with the Portuguese revolution of 1974. Such Third Wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991) had a double effect. On the one hand, for its 
geographical spread, it instilled the wishful thinking that the world was irreversibly 
moving to democracy (Fukuyama 1989). On the other hand, the insights stemming from 
such events lead to the emergency of a new approach in the field of democratization 
studies, namely the one agency-based of transitology. Under this new understanding, 
democracy is conceived as the outcome stemming from actors’ strategic interactions, 
rather than something inevitable given a set of certain conditions and appeared thus more 
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easily applicable also in the MENA region (Anderson 1991) where such preconditions 
were scarce.  
The two resulting approaches grounding the study of democratization processes, namely 
the structuralist one at the base of the modernization theory and the agency-based one 
informing transitology never entered into conflict. Rather, because of their 
complementarity they inform a multifaceted and multidimensional theory of 
democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996; Morlino 2011; Welzel 2009). Hence, together 
they guide also the research agenda of democratization studies’ proponents in accounting 
for the different outcomes observed in Tunisia and Egypt following the Arab Spring.    
   
 
2.1.1 Processes 
 
The undisputed lesson drawn from transition studies is that processes of transition are 
characterized by uncertainty (Higley and Burton 1989; North and Weingast 1989; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). This comes from very 
definition of transition, that is “the interval between one regime and another” (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, 5). During it “the rules of the political game are not defined. Not 
only are they in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested; actors struggle 
not only to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom they 
purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will 
determine likely winners and losers in the future” (ibid.). Out of it, if follows that the 
process of transition itself, intended as the set of procedural decisions concerning its 
development and the way whereby such decisions are token, is essential in determining 
its outcome (Morlino 2011). Not only democracy is more likely to occur when the 
transitional roadmap is clearly defined, but also when those rules are considered as 
legitimate by mean of the process leading to their formulation (Szmolka 2015).   
Earlier contributions aimed at explaining the divergences in outcome between Tunisia 
and Egypt have focused precisely on this aspect taking into account both the broader 
institutional design aimed at ruling the transition and on the different electoral system 
chosen to form, directly or indirectly, the Constituent Assembly. For many scholars, 
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differences in the transitional outcome across Tunisia and Egypt are due to stark 
differences in such procedural aspects.  
 
 
2.1.1.1 The making of Transitional roadmaps 
 
From the previous chapter, it immediately comes out how the Tunisian transition 
followed an overall liner trajectory fulfilling the roadmap established already in early 
2011, despite the eventual delay in the adoption of the Constitution, while the Egyptian 
transition followed an irregular trajectory punctuated by twists and reversals. Therefore, 
if some scholars praise Tunisia’s transitional design for its inclusionary and consensual 
character following the establishment of Ben Achour’s commission (Driessen 2014; 
Stepan 2012; Szmolka 2015), others regard Egypt as “a case study in how not to initiate 
a constitution-writing process” (Moustafa 2012). The original sin, according to Brown, is 
that “Egypt’s transition was not badly designed; was not designed at all. Its original failing 
lay in a series of shortsighted decisions made by generally well-meaning but myopic 
actors who found themselves thrust into positions of limited authority in February and 
March 2011” (2013b, 53). In his view, SCAF’s control over the transition for no other 
reason that was the only power in the position to do so and nobody challenged it, and its 
subsequent decision to charge a tiny committee to amend the 1971 constitution, generated 
a twofold lack of inclusion and accountability. Given SCAF’s centrality, the other actors 
involved, remarkably divided between Islamists and secular, resolved their rivalries “by 
pressuring, nagging and bargains with the generals” instead of trying to coalesce for 
guarantee the civilian control over the transition (ibid.). “Had a process of broad and 
careful consultation been used to adjust the basic law, the results might have been made 
palatable. But the generals were predictably bad at consultation, and later the first freely 
elected president turned out to be even worse. So Egypt’s rulers took turns decreeing 
unilateral changes with ultimately disastrous results” (Brown 2013b, 54).  
Intimately related with the different degrees of inclusion in the establishment of the 
transitional roadmap is the content of the decisions taken at that time. Differences across 
the two countries concerning the rules for the elections of parliaments, the prerogatives 
assigned to each of them, the composition of the constituent assembly and the provisions 
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for finally adopting the stemming constitutions replicate patterns of exclusionary or 
consensual politics already triggered at this earlier phase thus further enhancing or 
undermining the overall process of transition.  
 
 
2.1.1.2 The choice of the electoral systems 
 
Already in 1954, Duverger showed how different political system impact on the party 
system by mean of two mechanisms. On the one hand, the degree of proportionality of 
the overall electoral system influences the number of parties finally embarking on the 
electoral race (strategic effect). The more the proportionality the higher the number of 
parties contesting the election moved by the expectation of entering into the parliament 
(strategic entry) and higher the probability that voters will vote for their preferred choice 
instead of voting the one with the greatest possibility of success (strategic vote). On the 
other hand, the electoral systems directly impact on the number of parties represented 
inside the elected body (mechanic effect). The more majoritarian the electoral system, the 
lesser the parties entering inside the representative institutions (Duverger 1954). This 
understanding, which remains basically unchallenged, grounds also several accounts 
aimed at explaining how the vote choice in Tunisia and Egypt has affected the overall 
transitional processes. Indeed, this is the case because the electoral system determines, 
first and foremost, the composition of the elected parliaments entrusted with constitution-
making prerogatives and the kind of relationship between MPs and their voters. 
Variations in these two dimensions have profoundly different implications for the 
constitution-making processes. 
The proportional closed-list electoral system associated with Hare’s quota formula with 
highest remainders (HQLR) chosen in Tunisia strongly concurred, according to some, at 
guaranteeing the installation of democracy acting on two levels. First, the closed-list 
electoral system encouraged parties’ discipline and organization in filing candidates in all 
the 33 Tunisian districts (Carey 2013). Second, inside the elected parliament the HQLR 
electoral formula encouraged the search for compromise and collaboration inasmuch as 
it drained seats bonuses from Ennadha, who managed to capture ‘only’ 41% of seats, to 
the smaller parties (Carey 2014). In simulating seats allocations out of the vote casted by 
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the Tunisian voters at the 2011 elections under different electoral formulas, Carey notices 
that the one chosen by the Higher Commission proved to be the more suitable for the 
founding elections for it magnified the political pluralism resulting from the ballot box 
while denying the first party the absolute majority inside the parliament, that other 
proportional formulas (such as the D’Hont) would have otherwise conceded (Carey 
2014).  
In Egypt, by contrast, the fuzziness surrounding the design of the transitional roadmap 
was reflected in a jumbled voting procedure. The military, as we saw, opted for a mixed 
electoral system: two thirds of each house were to be elected by closed-party lists, while 
the remaining third through individual candidacies. Districts differed from one system to 
the other and consultations were conducted in six rounds. As far as the strategical effects 
of this electoral system are concerned, the combinations of two symmetrically systems 
for the election of the same body “pulled [parties] in two different directions. On the one 
hand, individual districts incentivize parties to pool resources, negotiate certain districts, 
and come together on the basis of ideological affinity. [On the other hand], high district 
magnitudes in list districts encourage party proliferation and provide disincentives to 
coordination” (D. Tavana 2011, 563–64). Hence, the author rightly forecasted the 
emergence of three distinct ideological groups (the religious, the right/liberal and the 
leftist champ) with poor party discipline. Yet, parties’ off-shores in the aftermath of the 
founding elections is a phenomenon that also happened inside the Tunisian ANC. More 
likely is the possibility that individual districts penalized partisan mechanisms, such as 
ideological and issue affinity at the expense of mechanisms typical of Mubarak’s 
liberalized autocracy, namely networks of kinship, clintelism and so on (Masoud 2014), 
thus perverting the very nature of representation in occasion of the founding elections 
charged with electing the body that will, directly or indirectly, write the new constitution. 
Further, coming to the analysis of the mechanic effects, the Egyptian electoral formula 
has benefited major parties at the expenses of the smaller one thus magnifying the 
unbalance of power between the Islamists and their oppositions (Carey 2014).  
In light of these findings, it is evident that the electoral systems adopted by the two 
countries can accounts for the different outcomes observed (Morlino 2012). Nonetheless, 
it also evident that the strength of the Islamists in Egypt, i.e. the FJP and the Salafists, 
cannot be compared to that of the Tunisian ones, represented by the sole Ennadha which 
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proposes a moderate political Islam, nor can it be entirely attributed to the different 
electoral systems used by the two countries, as chapter five will show. Moreover, it may 
also be the case that the different methods to design the constituent assemblies have also 
played a role by providing the constitution-making with varying degree of legitimation.      
 
 
2.1.1.3 Elected bodies’ prerogatives 
 
Not only the choice of the electoral system to form the parliaments, but also choices 
regarding their prerogatives have been taken into account by scholars. In Tunisia, 
parliamentary elections nominated a 217 Constituent Assembly entrusted with legislative 
powers and in charge of writing a constitution, expressing a government and appointing 
an interim president. That guaranteed, according to prominent observers, the fulfilment 
of the democratic transition inasmuch as this provided full legitimacy to the decision-
making process (Stepan 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013). In Egypt, by contrast, SCAF’s 
decision of detaining the executive power hampered the prospects of democratic 
installation. Not only the parliament couldn’t express a government or enjoying full 
legislative powers, it was neither directly entitled to write the constitution. The choice of 
nominating a 100-members constituent assembly, according to Brown, “offered no 
guarantee that everyone would have a voice” (2013b, 55). Moreover, the choice of 
submitting the stemming constitution to popular referendum has been conceived as a 
further move away from procedural consensus because Islamists’ confidence on their 
electoral capabilities didn’t encourage them to compromise with the oppositions in the 
constitution-making process (ibid.). How actors behaved within the two transitions, and 
how their behavior accounts for the different outcomes observed will be debated in the 
following.  
 
 
2.1.2  Actors 
 
As happened with the process, also actors found room in accounting for the emergence 
of democracy. This is an analytical implication of the transitologist approach for it models 
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democratic transitions as a set of political elites’ strategic interactions. Under the widely 
shared cooperative reading, democracy is deemed to be more likely when actors’ strategic 
interactions assume the form of pact-making (Higley and Burton 1989; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). Under a non-cooperative one, 
democracy is more likely to be the imposition of committed democrats enjoying power 
advantage (McFaul 2002). In either cases, actors are deemed to be the key in order to 
understand the course of the transition because their ideology, their position within the 
polity, their interests, beliefs and so on concur the formation to their preferences 
underneath their moves, if the transition is framed in cooperative terms, or enlighten the 
prospects of a democratic imposition, if moving from a non-cooperative understanding.  
Drawing from these two lines of inquiry, the role of the military and the behavior of 
political party leaders “are two powerful, agent-centric, narratives advanced for Tunisia’s 
democratic continuity and Egypt’s military coup” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 
2015, 186). On the one hand, the difference of power advantage between the two national 
armies is deemed to account for the different outcomes. On the other hand, these two 
different outcomes observed are attributed to the different attitudes and results of political 
parties’ pact-making. In the first case, given the SCAF’s dominant position, much of 
efforts revolve around the investigation of the reasons why it should prefer autocracy over 
democracy. In the second case, scholarly attention is devoted to parse cross-countries 
differences in both religious parties’ democratic commitment and in party systems’ 
polarization, both crucial in enlightening the different conditions of pact-making in the 
two countries.  
 
 
2.1.2.1 The military  
 
Despite the fact that during the revolts the position of the military has been categorized 
both in Tunisia and Egypt as a stance of siding with protesters (Barany 2011), the role of 
the two armed forces greatly differs following the downfall of the incumbent dictator. In 
the Tunisian case the armed forces came back to the barracks while in the Egyptian one 
they controlled the transition. According to some, the simple difference in militaries’ 
positioning in the two processes of transition is sufficient to account for why Tunisia is 
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still on the road of democratization while Egypt abandoned it. For Said (2012) the fact 
that the SCAF controlled a political transition intended to be democratic has been seen as 
a twofold paradox and the main drawback of the Egyptian experience. On the one hand, 
“the army leaders can be seen as part of the ruling regime that the revolution was aimed 
at replacing” (ibid., 396). On the other hand, “an institution such as the military, which is 
based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience” (ibid.) – because “officers are 
socialized as military men, not as politicians” (Albrecht and Bishara 2011, 21)- is seen as 
intrinsically incompatible with the task of leading a transition to democracy. As a matter 
of fact, this argument suggesting a sure failure of military-controlled transitions from 
authoritarian rule is not entirely true. Records of democratization processes proved that 
this might apply in some cases but not in others, as the cases of 1985 Brazil and 1999 
Indonesia illustrate. To be sure, it is not much the centrality per se of armies during the 
transitions that determines their final outcome. Rather, whether they have incentives and 
opportunities to determine it (Bou Nassif 2017).  
A vast literature has explained why the armed forces defect from the ruling elite to support 
a regime change, as initially happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Internal splits within the 
ruling elite or the military itself and the preservation of strategic interests, be them of 
economic or institutional nature, are deemed to account for the armed forces’ choice to 
side with protesters of stand with the status quo (Geddes 1999; Haggard and Kaufinan 
1997; Lee 2009; Makara 2013; Taylor 2014). Drawing from this corpus, scholars have 
tried to enlighten the reasons of the different armies’ behavior in Tunisia and Egypt, with 
a particular focus on SCAF’s behavior within the 18 months of the Egyptian transitions. 
At the very beginning, it was thought that SCAF’s centrality, following its solidarity with 
protesters, was only a temporary measure justified by the fact that it was the sole 
organized and neutral body able to establish the transitional roadmap (Brown 2013b). At 
that time, only few questioned its commitment to democracy (as a remarkable execption 
see Albrecht and Bishara 2011). Out of this understanding, Salmi’s document was 
conceived as one of the many instances of transitional pact-making whereby deep-state 
actors try to “protect select interests of the outgoing regime in order to facilitate the 
transition to a new political order” (Moustafa 2012, 10). The SCAF “simply” asked for 
independence from civilian control as counterpart of a peaceful transition (ibid.). In the 
same line, SCAF’s moves exerting noxious effects – such as the decision to unilaterally 
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issue a constitutional declaration disregarding the verdict of the referendum in March 
2011, or to opt for the election of a National Assembly with limited powers – have been 
innocently referred to as “bad choices” (Brown 2013b). According to this reading, the 
SCAF was simply unprepared to occupy a central political position but was forced to 
because no other body could guarantee an orderly regime change in 2011. Its following 
decisions harming the transition were just the fruit of SCAF’s inexperience to run politics. 
Other accounts complement this reading by addressing more explicitly the dimension of 
strategic interests. Maintaining that SCAF’s control over the transition “happened at a 
moment of opportunity, despite a low degree of disposition on the side of the armed 
forces” (Albrecht and Bishara 2011, 17), some see it driven not by chance – or at least 
not entirely – but by the need to preserve its interests, “namely an early exit from direct 
political engagement, organizational cohesion, and the preservation of its economic 
privileges” (ibid., 22). In particular, the SCAF was deemed to return behind the scenes 
from where continuing to exert its political influence while avoiding internal ideological 
divisiveness and, of course, preserving its huge economic interests. The passage from 
SCAF’s “direct management” of country’s political affairs to its “institutionalization”, 
with the 30 March Constitutional Declaration, is thus seen as a function of such 
predefined priorities matching the absence of other viable alternatives to preserve them 
from behind the scenes (ibid.). Not only the SCAF was deemed to act out of mere 
corporate interests, according to some it did so on ideational grounds. Since the Free 
Officers’ Coup of 1952, the Egyptian army has been awarded with prestige and 
accountability, for which its intervention in national politics are welcomed – or at least 
not regarded as inappropriate. For some scholars, this historical and cultural heritage is 
self-evident in accounting for SCAF’s intervention (Hinnebusch 2015d; De Smet 2014). 
A recent study further shows how this has affected senior officers’ perceptions in the 
aftermath of Mubarak’s ousting. While conceiving the military as the only guarantor of 
national security, the great majority of interviewed officials perceive the MB as not loyal 
to Egypt, due to their appeal to the entire Islamic ‘umma and their relations with other 
Islamic organizations such as Hamas, and therefore as a threat to national security. 
Moreover, both the Islamic front and the secular oppositions are perceived as subject to 
foreign manipulation, but the latter are also seen as only concerned with narrow interests 
and not suitable to serve the national ones (Bou Nassif 2017). Therefore, SCAF’s 
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intervention responded to a twofold aim: that of preserving corporate interests and that of 
safeguarding the national security. By contrast, other readings conceive SCAF’s power 
institutionalization as a strategic interest itself and therefore appreciate its engagement in 
politics as a deliberate move to restore its lost standing within the polity, rather something 
SCAF forcefully underwent pushed by the events. Being the center of power following 
the 1952 coup that led to the establishment of the republic of Egypt, under Sadat military’s 
influence started to decline insofar as he started to distance the SCAF from direct 
involvement in politics (Stacher 2012b). Under Mubarak, and following a regional trend, 
the expansion of internal security forces (al-Mukhabarat) further threatened the position 
of prestige and the influence the military was used to occupy. Mubarak’s ousting then, 
furnished SCAF the occasion to restore, if not expand, its power within the political 
relevant elite (Kandil 2012a; Roll 2016; Stacher 2011, 2012a).  
In light of all these accounts, it emerges that the Egyptian army, despite its initial support 
for a regime change, found it hard to safeguard its corporate interests under the new 
political course. In particular, it couldn’t accept the ‘untrustworthy’ civilian oversight on 
the armed forces democracy implies and eventually opted for its sabotage. Yet, it is not 
clear whether this awareness matured on the eve on the military coup, when its 
intervention was also encouraged by the masses (Bou Nassif 2017; Taylor 2014) or even 
before (Albrecht and Bishara 2011; Roll 2016).  
The totally different historical background of the Tunisian army, which played no 
significant role in the anti-colonial struggle –the UGTT did (Ayubi 1995; Perkins 2004)- 
has always been marginal to the national polity and its lack of economic assets of the sort 
of the Egyptian one, deprived it of any ambition as far as involvement in transitional 
politics is concerned. In this regard, its opting-out (which was not really a decision in that 
the option to opt-in was never offered to it) reflects the fact that the Tunisian army had 
nothing to gain and anything to lose from any institutional change of the sort. Yet, even 
though a focus on the military in Tunisia and Egypt enlightens how differences in 
historical traditions, political engagement and economic resources drove the different 
appraisals of the transition by the two armies and why they should have preferences for 
one outcome another, it still leaves unexplored why the Egyptian army was offered the 
opportunity to take-over the transition even after national parliaments were freely elected. 
The only two successful military coups occurred within the ‘third wave’, namely those of 
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Nigeria and Sudan were triggered by the failure of the democratic institutions in 
producing a new and effective ‘rule of the game’ (Huntington 1991). This reading is also 
in line with the exploration of the possibilities leading the military intervention in Egypt, 
that are attributed to the failure of the political parties-led transitional politics (Bou Nassif 
2017; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). The next section will deal precisely at 
verifying this hypothesis by looking at the behavior of the democratically elected political 
elites enlightening cross-countries differences in the opportunity structures offered to 
military intervention. 
 
 
 
2.1.2.2 Political Parties   
 
Despite a somehow shared conviction about the irrelevance of political parties within the 
transitional set ups in Tunisia and Egypt (Collombier 2013; Eyadat 2015), the 
investigation of the role played by political parties’ elites in the two cases departs from 
the assumption that SCAF’s intervention in Egypt would have been far less likely had the 
political parties inside the elected parliament found a compromised agreement on the 
issues they were in charge to deal with for drafting a new social and political organization, 
as happened in Tunisia (Bou Nassif 2017; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). 
Beyond this, the case for focusing on political parties is also theoretically grounded. 
Democratization studies maintain that ‘political parties matter’ during such process, even 
if they might not have played any role in producing the transition - as is the case for 
Tunisia and Egypt (Cavatorta 2012; Collombier 2013; Storm and Cavatorta 2018) -, 
because they are deemed to channel the revolutionary claims into the governing action 
inside representative institutions (Merkel 1998; Morlino 2011). In so doing, while 
satisfying the various demands of their electorate, they guarantee the proper working of 
democratic institutions (Huntington 1991; Morlino 2005; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 
Schmitter 2010). More particularly, the role of political parties within transitions is 
conceived as being extremely crucial for the installation of democracy if, as is the case 
for Tunisia and Egypt, founding elections are held to create parliaments directly or 
indirectly charged with writing a new constitution (Elkins 2010; Elster 1995). In this case, 
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the more the ability of parties to reach a consensual compromise, the more the prospects 
for democracy (Cross and Sorens 2016; Elster 1995; Higley and Burton 1989; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Przeworski 2006).   
Out of this, some scholars focus on the role played by political parties in transitional 
settings, and more in particular, on the reasons that hampered or encouraged the dialogue 
among parliamentary political parties across Tunisia and Egypt.  
Central to such debate is the role of religious parties, who registered overwhelming 
electoral victories in both cases, and how they contribute to democratization. The 
analytical implications of this phenomenon are twofold. First, it reopens the debate about 
the compatibility of religion and democratization. Second, inasmuch as the resurgence of 
Islamist parties is accompanied with strong secular oppositions, it is deemed to reveal the 
presence of a strong identity cleavage that undermines Rustow’s background condition 
of national unity for democratic transitions to succeed (Rustow 1970). In light of this 
multifaceted implications, the approaches and methods to assess the role of political 
parties in Tunisia and Egpyt are varying. From culturalist to political approaches, the unit 
of analysis of these researches shifts from the study of single parties (i.e. the Islamists) to 
the analysis of the overall party system. On the one hand, lot of attention has been devoted 
to unveil differences in the commitment of democracy between Ennadha and the FJP by 
looking at their party’s structure and nature. On the other hand, the interactive nature of 
the constitution-making process induced scholars to focus on the differences in the party 
system as represented inside the elected parliaments.    
 
2.1.2.2.1 Credible commitment of religious parties  
 
The incredible success achieved by Islamists parties at the founding elections soon 
damped the early enthusiasms inflamed by the Arab Spring both within internal 
oppositions and within the international community of observers and scholars. The 
reasons for this disenchantment are rooted in the alleged difficulties in conciliating the 
political agenda of Islamist parties with the needs of democratization. To be sure this 
issue is not new at all but derives from the debate over the compatibility between religion, 
and particularly Islam, and democracy. This is so articulated and lively that an accurate 
account of it transcends the scope of this work. Nonetheless, according to a mere political 
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approach, the religious reference of Ennadha and the FJP (but also of other Salafists 
parties involved in politics), is deemed to be detrimental to democracy unless such parties 
are not able to display a credible commitment to it (L. Blaydes and Lo 2012; Kalyvas 
2000; A. Stepan and Linz 2013), either following a process of gradual secularization 
(Bokhari and Senzai 2013; Roy 1994) or out of a process of religiously-friendly 
democratization (Driessen 2014; Stepan 2000), or both.  
This tenet relies on both normative and empirical ground. On the one hand, the 
contradictory and conflictual relationship between democracy and this kind of parties is 
to be traced on their alleged structural incompatibility in that religious parties are 
conceived as bearer of an unchallenged divine truth based on a vertical relation between 
God and its believers who distinguish themselves from others, while democracy is based 
on a horizontal relationship between equal citizens, without distinctions of creed, race 
and the like, and their inclination to dialogue and compromise (Rawls 1993; Rosenblum 
2003; Strauss 1938). On the other hand, considering the historical records of Ennadha and 
the FJP it is actually hard to see how their recent political programs would forecast a 
democratic set up.  
Even though both parties trace their origins in late 1920s and 1930s with the foundation 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its subsequent exportation across all the Muslim 
world, their political engagement dates back to the 1970s. In those year, the entire Arab 
and Islamic region witnessed the rise of political Islam, that is the emergence of 
“movements drawing on Islamic referents – terms, symbols and events taken from the 
Muslim religious tradition – in order to articulate a distinct political agenda” (Bokhari 
and Senzai 2013, 18) aimed at “establish[ing] some kind of an Islamic order — a religious 
state, Sharia law and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities” (Bayat 2013, 
592). Initially, both movements – engaged in politics, but prevented to form as parties – 
advocated for the full implementation of the Islamic law while overtly rejecting pluralism 
and liberal democracy altogether. In Egypt, despite the political confrontation, and 
sometimes collaboration with other political forces against the regime over the years 
(Shehata 2010), “during the 1980s, the Brotherhood continued to push for the application 
of Shari’a” (Wickham 2015, 52). Even further steps toward the acceptance of pluralism 
during the mid-1990s, seemed to be narrower and limited than that recognized by liberal 
democracy “insofar as it presupposed a social consensus on the primacy of Shariʿa law” 
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(Wickham 2015, 69). In the same line is the evolution of Ennahda in Tunisia, which 
constituted as party in 1989 as the political branch of the Islamic Tunisian Movement 
(MTI, after its French acronym). Initially, it called for the implementation of Shari’a and 
rejected woman’s empowerment sanctioned in Bourguiba’s personal status code (Aldeeb 
Abu-Sahlieh 1994). Despite Ennahda’s journey to democratic values (Tamimi 2001), in 
the aftermath of Ben Ali’s ousting, one of its deputy, Souad Abderrahim, affirmed that 
“single mothers are a shame for Tunisia”54 and Gannouchi is still firmly convicted that 
there’s no need for secularism55.  
Even tough through the years both parties have nominally acknowledged the “necessity” 
of democracy and the values of pluralism, the question of how deeply and sincerely they 
endorse these values is deemed to be crucial for the aims of democratization in Muslim-
majority countries (Landolt and Kubicek 2014; Schwedler 2013a). This can be conceived 
as a religious declination of the commitment problem raised by rational choice theorists 
in the 1980s that poses that the survival of democratic institutions relies on the resolution 
of actors’ coordination problems and on the capability of new-born norms and institutions 
to trigger the ‘credible commitment’ of the actors involved - either by mean of “self-
enforcing pacts” or through the settlement of rules and institutions “that do not permit 
leeway for violating commitment” (North and Weingast 1989; Przeworski 1991, 2006; 
Przeworski et al. 2000; Weingast 1997). The question of credible commitment in 
democratization processes where religious parties are involved has been framed in 
Kalyvas’ seminal article as follow: 
 
“Democracy opens the political process to actors who are opposed to it. When 
powerful religious parties are set to win critical elections in emerging 
democracies, the future of new and fragile secular and liberal democratic 
institutions is put in question. These parties either intend to impose theocratic 
authoritarian institutions or are willing to forego their objectives and subject 
themselves to democratic control. In the first case the outcome is certain: 
                                                             
 
54  See: « Souad Abderrahim : les mères célibataires sont une infamie pour la société tunisienne”, 
Tuniscope, 9 November 2011. Available at  
http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/10155/actualites/tunisie/souad-184612#.UFIDFY3N9cQ, 
last access, 17 March 2017.  
55 Rachid Gannouchi, “Lecture on Secularism”, CSID, Tunis, 2 March 2012.  
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democratization fails, either through the full implementation of the religious 
party's program or through pre-emptive or reactive military action by its 
opponents. In the second case the outcome is uncertain: democratization may 
fail, but it may also succeed” (2000, 379).  
 
According to Kalyvas, in this latter case, following Przeworski’s modelling, in order to 
convince incumbents to open, challenging religious parties shall “signal that, once in 
power, they will behave moderately and will even guarantee the incumbents' material 
interests (property rights, rents)” (2000, 380). Nonetheless, departing from Przeworski’s 
original modelling, the issue arising when religious parties are at stake is that 
“challengers' credibility is further undermined by their reputation for ‘pious passions, 
strong beliefs, and inflexible values’ and their ideological principles, which include (or 
are plausibly seen to include) the rejection of liberal democracy as a principle. Yet for 
democratization to proceed it is necessary (though not sufficient) for religious challengers 
to solve their commitment problem” (2000, 380, emphasis is the author's), as Ozzano 
implicitly parallels in his typology of religiously oriented parties (Ozzano 2013) 
Out of it, it is widely hold that Ennadha’s alleged attachment to democracy has favored 
the transition to democracy in Tunisia, while FJP ambiguity towards democratic 
principles has been detrimental for Egypt to overcome the authoritarian status quo 
(Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Stepan and Linz 2013). Yet, different positions 
arise in identifying the causes of such attachment (or not) to democracy and its values. 
This debate is intimately related to the stream of studies falling under the research agenda 
of the ‘inclusion-moderation hypothesis’, from which it largely draws. Arose in the mid-
2000s, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis holds that Islamist parties moderate their 
political agenda, thus moving from preference over a theocratic state to call for liberal 
democracy, whenever they are included into the political arena (Schwedler 2001, 2013b; 
Somer 2014; Tepe 2013). Yet, scholars contributing to this literature differ when coming 
to pinpoint the causal mechanism driving such moderation. Some look at the strategical 
moderation which eventually alters the inner nature of Islamist parties leading them to 
espouse the values of liberal democracy (Ly Netterstrøm 2015; Wickham 2004). Other, 
by contrast point to ideological revision, resulting from a process of political learning 
(Clark 2006; Schwedler 2011; Turam 2007), as the driving force of moderation. 
Accordingly, differences in the commitment to democracy between Ennadha and the FJP 
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are explained by recurring to either their organizational structure, that is whether this suits 
strategical adaptation or not, or their ideology. Such distinction, as noted by others 
(Tezcur 2010; Wickham 2015), is rather fictional and the burdens between strategy and 
ideology at some point are blurred also in light of a third line of research that highlights 
how strategy and ideology are indeed entangled and highly context-dependent. 
For some observers, religious parties’ commitment to democratic values cannot be 
credible unless a profound ideological revision has occurred. Following this reading, 
Tunisia succeeded to achieve a democratic transition because Ennahda has eventually 
integrated democratic values in its ideology, while Egypt’s democratic breakdown is to 
be attributed to the inexistent ideological attachment to the values of pluralism and 
democracy from the part of the main religious parties, namely the FJP and Nour. This is 
what emerges for instance in Blaydes and Lo (2012). The authors develop Przeworki’s 
classic model of transition by introducing civil society’s preference for either democracy 
or theocracy. In their account, civil society’s preferences for a theocratic state, embodied 
in religious parties’ political agenda, might induce incumbents to not cede power to 
elected institutions in order to prevent the possible installation of a theocratic state, thus 
aborting the transition. Even though such account, by framing Muslim public’s 
orientation in either/or terms, disregards the real content of regional public preferences 
over the type of regime which are indeed more nuanced and complex but overall 
supportive for both democracy and the social recognition of the importance of Islam 
(Jamal and Tessler 2008; M. Tessler 2003, 2010), it nonetheless centers the problem of 
credible commitment of religious parties by framing it in ideological terms. This view is 
also shared by Schwedler who points out how democratization entails not a moderation 
in “relative terms”, but rather understood as “a substantive set of norms as well as 
procedures” (Schwedler 2013a, 15). Out of this reading, it can be affirmed that the 
Egyptian FJP had poorer credentials than the Tunisian Ennahda for it was still entrenched 
in old-fashioned programmatic positions hardly compatible with democracy. In this line, 
Bayat observes that the MB guiding the FJP is simply not in step with the times. In his 
account, the Arab Spring has unfolded the existence of religious movements and parties 
conceivable as bearers of post-Islamism, defined as “a critique of Islamism from within 
and without” that “hopes to mix religiosity and rights, faith and freedom (with varied 
66 
 
degrees), Islam and democracy” (2013, 592), with the exception of the Muslim Brothers. 
In his words,  
 
“[t]he Muslim Brothers (MB) are in the throes of a transformation, and remain 
in an ideological quandary. While the old guard still utters the language of 
Islamism and the Sharia — with some even subscribing to the ideas of the 
radical Sayyid Qutb — their political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, is 
officially committed to a civil state, and many of their youths embrace post-
Islamism of the AKP type” (2013, 593).    
 
This ‘ideological quandary’, which generates ideological divisions inside the MB, is 
deemed to be particularly salient also in the functioning of its political party, the FJP, and 
to the overall process of transition (Wickham 2011). That is, “the Brotherhood’s efforts 
to carve out a new role for itself in the post-Mubarak era are complicated by the 
conflicting interests and priorities of its individual members and factions” (2011, 217). 
Within the Egyptian Islamists, internal divisions arose already from the 1980s to reach its 
apex in 2011 when Mubarak’s ousting dramatically altered the political context offering 
new and varied opportunities of political engagement. In particular, according to the 
author, three factions contend for the control of the movement: the “da’wa faction”, which 
is made up of elderly members with conservative ideological position but well 
represented at the top level of the movement; the “pragmatic conservatives”, which mixed 
some vague notions of democracy and pluralism with the tenets of Islam; and the faction 
of “reformers” for whom Islam is just a normative reference and who call for the full 
implementation of democracy and pluralism both in the country and inside the 
Brotherhood itself. Even though the FJP is mainly made up of reformers and pragmatic 
conservatives, its close relationship with the movement – despite its declared 
independence- reflects such divisions on its functioning and on the public perceptions of 
it. On the one hand party members lack a common vision on the nature and mission of 
the party itself, which prevented the FJP to have a clear agenda thus making its moves in 
post-2011 Egypt extremely confused and incoherent. On the other hand, the public is not 
able to guess FJP’s program or essence, that is whether it envisages the implementation 
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of huddud, as in Ezzat’s56 words, or rather struggle to “build up an entire society”, as in 
Beltagui’s57 ones (Wickham 2011, 2015).  
Wickham’s reference to the consequences of ideological divisions on the internal 
structure of the MB, and, out of it, on the credibility of FJP’s democratic commitment, 
introduces the structural explanations accounting for the different moderation, and hence 
credible commitment, of the Islamists parties across Tunisia and Egypt. For Kalyvas, the 
resolution of commitment problems depends on the structure of the religious institutions. 
Centralized religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, are more suitable to help 
the party overcoming its commitment problems because, if deciding to recognize and 
embrace democracy, they furnish an official and authoritative line that won’t be 
challenged or put into question, as happened in late 1870s Belgium (Kalyvas 1996). By 
contrast, in religions lacking a centralized and supreme authority, religious parties 
encounter more difficulties in proving their commitment to democratic values, for they 
might be challenged both inside and outside by self-proclaimed religious leaders (Kalyvas 
2000). Paralleling this reading, the capability of Ennadha to present itself as somewhat 
moderate and FJP’s inability to overcome its commitment problems is deemed to be a 
function of their internal structures (Ly Netterstrøm 2015; Wickham 2011). By contrast, 
through the analysis of the Tunisian constitution-making, which has been possible 
through Ennahda’s concessions to oppositions on the field of the ‘civil state’, on the form 
of government and other religiously sensible issues such as gender equality and the sin of 
apostasy, Ly Netterstrøm cautions from reading such “Islamist compromise” as the result 
of Ennadha’s ideological evolution and conceives it as rather the result of strategical 
calculations made possible because of Ennadha’s internal structure (2015). In his account, 
party leaders were just interested to maintain political power thus preventing the return 
of persecutions toward their party and their sympathizers. The acceptance of pluralism, 
the call for the ‘civic state’ and the rejection of Shari’a resulting in the new constitution 
were just the price to not be ousted like the FJP in Egypt. Despite some Ennadha’s 
grassroots members and MPs opposed such compromise, the leadership succeeded in 
make them digest it because of its internal organization. Far from ideological revision and 
                                                             
 
56 Leader of the MB from August 2013 
57 FJP’s General Secretary  
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political moderation, key and causal factors of the “Islamist compromise” were 
Ennahda’s hierarchical structure and strong discipline stemming from decades operating 
underground (even though with the 2016 Party Congress structural changes occurred to 
make the party more open) combined with the presence of a leader, Rachid Gannouchi, 
who is at the same time a religious authority and a political leader. Confronting with this 
configuration, Ly Netterstrøm concludes that “in Tunisia, Islamists did not learn a new 
point of view; rather, their leaders decided to adopt a new view, and pressured members 
to do the same” (2015, 120). Such way was simply precluded in the case of the MB’s FJP 
which was divided along ideological leanings. Hence, much like appended in 1991 
Algeria, in 2011 Egypt there were simply too many voices from the FJP speaking in the 
name of the ‘true’ political and this prevented it to prove (or at least to simulate) its 
commitment to democracy. While the findings of this work will confirm the saliency of 
the different resolution of the commitment problems across Tunisia and Egypt, they also 
put forward that it has little to do with the parties’ internal structures. Hence, it might be 
the case for focusing on a more relational understanding of Islamists parties’ moderation 
that focus on the features of the whole party system.  
 
2.1.2.2.2 Polarization of the party system  
 
Debates and revisions of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis agree on the contextual 
nature of religious parties’ moderation and maintain that the overall political system 
influences both parties’ strategy and ideology, those latter being in a continuous interplay 
(Driessen 2014; Schwedler 2013a; Somer 2011). In particular, recent contributions 
underline the saliency of political institutions and the broader political context (Pahwa 
2017; Schwedler 2013a; Somer 2014; Tepe 2013). When coming to transition processes, 
characterized by institutional flux, Schwedler notes that “[t]he overall logic of moderation 
may prevail during elections and in the immediate moths that follow, when winning large 
blocks may require appealing to a wider constituency. But between elections, when 
debates over the role of the judiciary, the substance of the constitution, the independence 
of oversight institutions and so on are in full force, incentives for cooperation with other 
actors may be less than the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would imagine” (Schwedler 
2013a). In her reading, then, moderation does not necessary equate with democratization 
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unless this latter entail religious parties’ ideological revision leading to a genuine and 
deep commitment to democracy. Departing from such deterministic view, Driessen 
argues that democratization “in relatively homogeneous religious societies where 
opposition to liberal democracy has been casted in religious terms” (2014, 62) is more 
likely to occur at the presence of i) religiously friendly institutions – that is that favour 
religion, and ii) multiparty electoral politics. The former triggers religious elites’ support 
for democracy and incentivizes religious individuals to participate in elections. The 
second predicts the moderation of religious parties as theorized by the inclusion-
moderation hypothesis (ibid.). Driessen’s account recasts the inclusion-moderation 
hypothesis by identifying the institutional incentives outlined by the such stream of 
studies in Stepan’s “twin tolerations”, defined as “the minimal boundaries of freedom of 
action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious 
authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions” (2000, 
37). Yet, for an agreement to occur upon such “minimal boundaries” or the 
aforementioned “religiously-friendly institutions”, that can be conceived as a preliminary 
and integral part of the constitutional agreement, a process of approaching between the 
parties involved – that is Schwedler’s understanding of moderation or Linz and Stepan’s 
notion of “common ground” (2013) – is necessary inasmuch as ideological distance 
between them hampers any kind of agreed compromise (North and Weingast 1989; 
Tsebelis 2002).   
Out of this reading, instead of focusing on the varying resolutions of religious parties’ 
commitments problems, some scholars look instead on the differences in the polarization 
of the party systems, that is the ideological distance between the political parties (Sartori 
1976), in Tunisia and Egypt seeing in it the main causal explanations for the difference 
in the transition outcome. Even though political polarization might be rightly conceived 
as resulting from the absence of religious parties’ moderation (Tepe 2013), the focus of 
these analyses does not revolves on the investigation of religious parties’ adhesion to 
liberal democracy but rather on the ideological distance among parties concurring to the 
formation of national party systems and on the implications it has on the processes of 
transition.     
By examining the transitions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, Lesch observes that the major 
difference between the three cases accounting for different transitions path is the degree 
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of inclusiveness of the new government, which is conceived as the consequences of the 
degree of polarization among the political parties involved. Increasing levels of 
polarization are deemed to foster lower levels of transitional government inclusivity 
which pose a serious threat for its legitimacy and the prospects for democratization (Lesch 
2014). In her reading then, the presence of a coalition government in Tunisia is a signal 
of low ideological polarization and enhances the success of a transition to democracy. By 
contrast, Morsi’s heavy-handed government, entirely made up of Muslim Brothers, paved 
the way for popular discontent leading “Egypt [to veer] to the opposite extreme” (Lesch 
2014, 72), namely to the exclusion and the harsh of the Brotherhood, following the 
military coup, which nonetheless represents an important and consistent segment of the 
Egyptian society. Paralleling this argument, but transposing it within the constitution-
making process, Cross and Sorens (2016) conceive polarization as a predictor of 
constitution’s making style and content. In particular, the authors examine the level of 
inclusion within the drafting of the constitution and the constitutional provisions to limit 
(or not) the executive power. Both aspects are particularly telling about the prospects of 
democracy in transitional setting. Inclusion in the constitution making is deemed to 
predict the durability of the constitution itself, as constitutional provisions empowering 
or constraining the government affect the durability of the new democratic polity (Linz 
1990). Cross and Sorens’ study reveals that political polarization, measured in terms of 
presence of “extreme Islamist party of nontrivial size” (2016, 1297), is higher in Egypt 
than in Tunisia and such difference is at the heart of the different transitional outcomes 
observed. As a matter of fact, Tunisia was found to have the least ideological polarization 
and this fostered an inclusive constitution making whereby constitutional provisions 
related to the exercise of the governing authority pose limits on it. In Egypt, by contrast, 
high polarization due to the presence of the “more radical Muslim Brotherhood join[ing] 
with extreme Salafists” (Cross and Sorens 2016, 1302), is at the heart of an exclusive 
process of constitution making and of constitutional provisions imposed by such factions 
aimed empowering the government “to defend themselves against present and future 
political opponents” (2016, 1295).  
Differences in levels of political polarization between the two countries have been 
considered as salient also in Linz and Stepan’s account (2013). Yet, contrary to Cross and 
Sorens, in their account polarization is not much the result of the presence or absence of 
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the Salafist parties inside elected representative institutions, but rather, partially recalling 
Schwedler’s contributions, it is the result of the absence of dialogue between the FJP and 
its secular counterparts on the kind of those occurring among Ennadha and the other 
left/secular oppositions in the years preceding the Arab Spring. Instances of such common 
ground between Islamists and Secularists in Tunisia are the 2003 “Call for Tunis” and 
“2005 18 October Coalition for Right and Freedom” (Resta 2013; Stepan and Linz 2013).  
As this work will show, while having no clear effects on the party system’s polarization, 
these experiences proved incredibly precious in determining the success of the Tunisian 
transition. Why then, oppositions forces under Ben Ali managed to dialogue already 
before the transition, while this didn’t occur in Mubarak’s Egypt? Some answers to this 
question are provided below by introducing another stream of explanations that approach 
democratic transitions from a structuralist approach and will be further developed in the 
last chapter. 
  
 
2.1.3 Socio-economic determinants 
 
Modernization theory, which grounded the scholarly agenda of democratization studies 
before the advent of transitology, has also played a role in accounting for the transitional 
outcomes following the Arab Uprisings of 2011. Out of this reading, democracy is 
conceived not much as the accidental result of actors’ strategic interactions, but rather as 
an endogenous outcome to specific sets of conditions stemming from human 
development, i.e. modernization. In this reading, “economic development, involving 
industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the 
overall wealth of society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy” (Lipset 1959, 86). 
As another scholarship has helped to acknowledge, the causal link between economic 
development and democracy is mediated by changes produced within the fabric of society 
and its relationship with the state. These changes, measured through the structure of the 
economic system (North and Weingast 1989), the level of inequality (Kuznets 1995), the 
formation of a middle class (Lipset 1959), the level of education (Glaeser, Porta, and 
Shleifer 2004), the presence of intermediary organizations and institutions (Lipset 1959; 
Putnam 1993), the rise of a democratic culture (Putnam 1993) or as the sum of all these 
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(Cutright 1963; Przeworski et al. 2000), alters individual values and beliefs “which in 
turn lead to the growing public demands for civil and political liberties, gender equality, 
and responsive government, helping to establish and sustain the institutions best suited to 
maximize human choice – in a word, democracy” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
 In line with this understanding, some authors argue that the different transitions in 
Tunisia and Egypt are to be attributed to the different socio-economic structures present 
in those countries. Is do doing, each of such contributions focus on the “crucial 
intervening variables” that, when altered favorably by economic development, are 
deemed to “produce or facilitate democracy”, namely political culture, civil society class 
structure and state-society relations (L. Diamond 1992, 487).    
The varying effects of different levels of socio-economic development across the two 
countries on civil society and, as consequence, on the political system, are shown by 
Brownlee and others (2015). In their reading, the Egyptian democratic breakdown is not 
to be attributed to the “military centrality” - which in their account “is less an explanation 
for the coup of 2013 than (at best) an intermediate variable in a longer causal chain” 
(2015, 194). Rather, differences in transitions’ outcomes are to be attributed different 
levels of economic development. In particular, “urbanization and industrialization” are 
deemed to trigger the development of “associational infrastructures on which leftist 
parties are based” thus leading to a more articulated and pluralistic civil society which in 
turn expresses a seemingly plural political society (ibid.). The hypothesis presented relies 
in the attribution of different democracy-prone political orientations across the two 
countries, measured by the level of support for the enactment of the Islamic law, to 
different level of underdevelopment, measured as the percentage of population living in 
urban areas (ibid., 207-209). This argumentation expands the findings of a previous work 
of one of the authors, Masoud, who explained the Islamists dominion in post-2011 Egypt 
as a function of organizational advantages offered to them by underdevelopment (2014). 
This latter is conducive to the “Islamist dominion” trough two different but deeply 
entangled mechanisms. On the one hand, underdevelopment limits the ability of voters to 
choose by making them susceptible to vote buying, clientelism and patronage. On the one 
hand, underdevelopment, characterized by the “strong presence of agrarian workforce 
and informal sector” is also responsible for the fact “the associational landscape 
confronting Egyptian political parties at the end of Mubarak’s rule was one dominated by 
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traditional forms of collective life, rooted in the family and in the faith” (Masoud 2014, 
167). The stemming unbalance between Islamists and their opponents resulting in the 
transitional party system is the result of unbalanced organizational opportunities which 
made Islamists, who easily embedded in the pre-existent associational life described 
above, able to approach citizens in ways other parties couldn’t thus altering individuals’ 
perceptions about parties’ positioning on the real salient issue, that is the economic one. 
Therefore, even though Egyptian voters, as others with Masoud have shown (Çarkoğlu, 
Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013; M. Tessler 2011), are supportive for redistributive measures 
of the kind prompted by leftist parties but not by Islamists, they nonetheless voted for this 
latter for no other reason that these latter were able to reach them in way the left couldn’t, 
thus impairing the stemming party system by depriving it of genuine pluralism. 
As far as society’s class structure is concerned, economic development is deemed to bring 
to the fore two important democratizing social classes: the middle and the working class, 
even though there’s no agreement upon which of the two is the primary driver to 
democracy. For mainstream modernization theorists, the middle class is deemed to be 
crucial for democratization inasmuch as it is well-educated thus bearing democracy-prone 
attitudes and beliefs (Huntington 1991; Moore 1965). For other, it matters only inasmuch 
as it possesses a credible exit threat when incumbent’s survival derives from part of their 
revenues, of course in the form of taxation (North and Weingast 1989). Coming to the 
case of Tunisia and Egypt, middle classes are deemed to account for the crisis of the 
previous authoritarian regime (Diwan 2013; Hinnebusch 2015d; Kandil 2012b), yet little 
contributions are present in explaining how they matter in explaining the different 
outcomes of the transitions. If Anderson (2011) argued that Tunisia enjoyed a larger 
middle class than other countries from which the transition would have benefit, no 
account on how this happened was rather furnished. Merone (2015) addresses the salience 
of the middle class in bargain a new institutional change in Tunisia, but he sees it as a 
depart revolutionary claims. In line with Achcar (2013), in his reading, the compromise 
between Ennadha and its rivals was a way to include the Islamic middle-class within the 
ruling power that that nonetheless hijacked a proper democratization in that the lower 
classes that provoked the transition, were still left on the margins. Nonetheless, if the 
Tunisia transition succeeded, this was due to the ability of middle class to sideline the 
real bulk of change incarnated by the revolutionary youth and workers. 
74 
 
Quite on the opposite, Allinson (2015) explains the different outcomes across Tunisia and 
Egypt in terms of trade union’s strength inside each specific country during the entire 
process of transition. Drawing from Rueschemeyer et. al, according to which the working 
class is the more consistent force pushing for democracy for its social embedment and its 
organizational capacities make it the guarantor of inclusion within the poliarchy (1992), 
he investigates whether different balance of power between the working class and others 
can account for different transition paths in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. By so doing, he 
attributes the success of the Tunisian transition to the centrality of the working class and 
the failure of the Egyptian one to the relative weakness of organized labor movements 
vis-à-vis other forces. Such difference of power relies in the different economies of the 
two countries. While in Tunisia the UGTT was high in membership and widespread 
because socialism was followed by the “circuit of European Capital” (Allinson 2015, 
301), in Egypt the labor unions were ore marginal because “Egypt’s formally employed 
and organized working class is still a minority compared  to the informal sector and those 
in vulnerable employment” (ibid. 305). Hence, while the Egyptian organized labor was 
mashed between the remnants of the deep-state and the Islamists, UGTT’s social 
significance allowed it to mobilize protesters, purge the ruling party, call for the elections 
of the National Constituent Assembly, represents the interests of revolutionaries and 
broke the National Dialogue thus ensuring the success of the transition. 
Taken together, all these contributions seem to agree to modernization theory’s pillar that 
“the simple—and perhaps, discouraging—fact is that if one had wished at the Arab 
Spring’s outset to predict which of our […] cases of regime breakdown would become a 
democracy, mere reference to gross developmental indicators (such as per capita income) 
would probably have been sufficient” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 210). 
True enough, Tunisia enjoyed a better socio-economic environment than Egypt. Yet, 
luckily for richness of democratization studies, things are not always so deterministic in 
that democracy succeeded to be the only game in town also in cases modernization studies 
wouldn’t concede it. Countries like India, Benin, Costa Rica and partially also Muslim-
majority Indonesia, are examples of successful democratization despite poor showing in 
all relevant indicators, in some cases even poorer than Egypt. Then, not only the level of 
development cannot predict the feasibility of democracy, as already shown elsewhere 
(Beblawi 1987; L. Diamond 1992; Luciani 1995; Ross 1999), but there are also good 
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reasons to doubt the forecasting power of the democracy-‘favorable’ changes economic 
development is deemed to provoke. First, empirical studies have downsized the role of 
political culture in fostering democracy by showing that what scholars refer to as ‘civic 
culture’, intending for it a set of individual attitudes and beliefs conducive to democracy, 
indeed doesn’t exists, nor there is a univocal relationship between a democratic-prone 
political culture and democracy in that the former seems to be a consequence of the latter. 
Second, the so-called democratizing social classes have been put in question by Bellin 
who proved how “the capital and the labor are contingent democrats” (Bellin 2000, 178) 
intending that both the labor unions and the bourgeoisie support democracy only if they 
see in it a preservation of their interests. In this sense, it is not really determinant the level 
of economic development, but rather by whom, how, and in favor of whom this is 
managed.  
Only by enlightening these aspects will capital and labor’s interests be assessed. 
Economic and capitalist development in the Arab region, with no exception for Tunisia 
and Egypt, was driven – paraphrasing Smith – by the very visible hand of the incumbent 
dictators and used to reward some segments of the society while punishing others with 
the ultimate aim of preserve and consolidate their power. So, while economic 
development may have modified the fabric of the involved societies, as modernization 
theory holds, such changes won’t necessarily be those described by modernization theory, 
nor go in the direction it predicts (Allinson 2015; Angrist 2013; Cavatorta and Haugbølle 
2012; Hibou 2011; Kandil 2012b; Penner Angrist 1999). In particular, the economic 
liberalization started at the end of the 1970s has not been genuinely “paralleled by the 
expansion of civil society” (Bill and Springborg 1994, 450) tout court. Rather, it was 
coupled with the expansions of only those segments serving the maintenance of a changed 
ruling coalition by mean of a new ‘social pact’. While this aspect centers one of the crucial 
intervening variables identified by Diamond (1992), namely that of state-society 
relations, studies on this direction depart from the paradigm of democratization and 
constitute the bulk of a diametrically different understanding, namely the paradigm of the 
authoritarian resilience or, otherwise called, that of post-democratization.  
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2.2 THE PARADIGM OF POST-DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES  
 
As it happens with scientific revolutions, the paradigm of post-democratization studies 
was born out of the accumulations of explanations to the ‘Arab exceptionalism’ in 
resisting democracy despite the apparent introduction of political and economic 
liberalization. In spite of searching for what ought to be, as proponents of democratization 
studies did, these scholars rather accounted for what ‘in fact is’ (Albrecht and 
Schlumberger 2004).  
Truly enough, from the late 1970s and with new vigor in mid 1980s, the regimes of the 
MENA region underwent a series of structural adjustments that entailed an increase in 
the levels of inclusion and competition. Constitutional changes, new laws and organs 
were put in place with the declared aim of safeguarding democratic and liberal 
prerogatives. Remarkable in those years was the creation of Constitutional courts, the 
expansion of civil society and the call of regular and pluralistic elections. Yet such 
overtures entailed nonetheless a “net loss of liberties” (Allal 2009; Bianchi 1989; 
Maghraoui 2002; Perkins 2004; L. Sadiki 2002; Salloukh et al. 2015) and were in no case 
conducive to some kind of poliarchy. Constitutional guarantees were actually empty 
shells, manipulated from above or disbanded (Kienle 2000). The growth of civil society 
was maneuvered from above as part of a “new tactic of control” whereby incumbents 
“could reassert power and slake dissension by granting concession too mild to produce 
systemic change, but hefty enough to merit symbolic applause at home and abroad” (Yom 
2005, 23). Finally, on the same line is the introduction of plural elections. Through the 
“menu of manipulation” aimed at breaking the chain of democratic choice (Schedler 
2002), the appointment at the ballot box served to co-opt oppositions, provide information 
about the relative strength of the ruling party, and guarantee external legitimacy. On the 
one hand, party laws were majorly directed at excluding from competition the major 
opposition by denying them the right to constitute as a political party (Kienle 2000; Lust-
Okar 2005; Schedler 2002). On the other hand, “creative elections” were engineered to 
grant incumbents easy victories through gerrymandering, malapportionment, by 
enhancing the competitive advantages of the ruling party, and by recurring to corruption 
and violence at the ballot box means (Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Lust-Okar 2005; 
Posusney 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006; Shehata 2010). As last resort, in the case the 
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electoral engineering would not produce the expected outcome, electoral results were 
manipulated (Herb 2004; Schedler 2002), or the elected bodies overthrown as happened 
in 1989 Algeria. 
In light of these new findings, which were off the light of democratization studies, 
contrary to the “democracy-spotters” (Valbjørn 2012) post-democratization scholars 
don’t conceive this liberalization as intermediate step toward democracy. Rather they see 
it as part of the authoritarian upgrading to “respond aggressively to the triple threat of 
globalization, markets and democratization” (Heydemann 2007, 3). Out of this new 
understanding, the outcome of this upgrading has been called in several ways, such as 
upgraded authoritarianism (ibid.), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002) 
or electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006). As those definitions suggest, instead of 
apprehending the regimes in the “grey zone” (Carothers 2002) as defective democracies, 
such students emphasize their continuity with the authoritarian regimes defined by Linz 
as a “political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism […] without 
intensive nor extensive political mobilization […] and in which a leader (or occasionally 
a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite 
predictable ones” (1964: 297 in Bronwlee 2007: 26). The reason of this continuity is due 
to the fact that “Arab regimes, simply changed their co-optative strategies: they shifted 
from allocative to inclusionary co-optation […] with the aim of either widening a 
regime’s power base or directly controlling society” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 
383). Indeed, like full autocracies, these grey-zone regimes still rely on a sophisticated 
mix of “distributive-driven” legitimation and repression. Yet, differently from full 
autocracies, such hybrid regimes serve themselves of liberal institutions to pursue their 
survival in order to appease internal oppositional and please international oobservers.  
According to this understanding, the results produced by the Arab Spring – which only 
in Tunisia was conducive to democracy – have been understood in terms of regime’s 
capacities to resist the quest for democracy, by pointing to either the structural 
configuration or to the mechanisms underneath them. To be sure, such research interest 
is not that alien to democratization studies. Already some twenty years ago, Linz and 
Stepan noted that “the characteristics of the previous regimes have profound implications 
for the transition paths available and the tasks different countries face when they begin 
their struggle to develop consolidated democracies” (1996, emphasis in original). While 
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it is still too early to deal with how structures affect the consolidation in Tunisia, drawing 
from this lesson, and imbuing it with more historical institutionalism, exponents of post-
democratization studies agree that the characteristics of the previous regimes account for 
much of the variation of the transitional paths in the region by means of mechanisms of 
path dependency and social reproduction of previous norms. Out of such understanding, 
the centrality of the military, the capabilities of political parties to reach a compromised 
agreement over the rules of the game, are all functions –influencing each other- of the 
previous authoritarian regime’s structures. More precisely, the different role played by 
the military or political parties in Tunisia and Egypt accounted for as independent causal 
variables by proponents of democratization studies, is here presented as an intermediate 
variable within a longer causal chain. Yet explanations diverge depending on whether the 
focus of analysis falls on the structures or the mechanisms of the previous authoritarian 
regime and whether their effects are deemed to be direct or mediated by other factors. 
 
 
2.2.1 Degree and form of stateness  
 
More obviously, differences in the structures of the previous authoritarian regime, drawn 
from the paradigm of authoritarian resilience, have been more often invoked to explain 
differences of revolutionary outcomes. Facing the Arab Uprising, it was found that 
monarchies and/or rentier state were better positioned than the republics to survive. But 
how structures can account for the diverging path of the transitional republics?   
From mere configurational accounts, the answers to this question vary depending on 
wehther the focus is on the form or the degree of previous regimes’ stateness. The first 
aspect refers to the organization of regime’s structures; the second relates to their 
complexity, their expansion and their embeddedness within the state and the society 
(Brownlee 2007; Heydemann 2016; Migdal 1988; Schlumberger 2007).  
Taking in consideration the form of the previous regimes’ structures, Stacher (2011, 
2012a, 2015) furnishes an account of the role of the military that departs from an agency-
based approach and falls under an institutionalist one. In so doing, he ascribes SCAF’ 
intervention to institutional continuity made possible by the structural configuration of 
the Egyptian regime before 2011. In his reading, SCAF’s intervention was aimed at 
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“gaining veto power over the transition to ensure that no substantive change to Egypt’s 
system occurs” (2011). Hence, through Suleiman’s announcement of Mubarak’s 
deposition, far from initiating a process of democratic transition, “the military salvaged 
the regime” (Stacher 2012a, 158). If this could be the case, it was because the centralized 
lines of the executive authority constituting the governing power allowed changes in the 
ruling coalition thus producing “a structural change to the regime rather than a regime 
change” (Stacher 2012a, 160), which now relies on state violence more than ever (Stacher 
2015) in perfect line with what predicted by the scholarly tradition of authoritarian 
resilience. As a matter of fact, this argumentation adapts Brownlee’s (2002, 2007) 
findings accounting for the authoritarian persistence in the MENA region. Writing before 
the Arab Spring, he noticed that the structures supporting single-party regimes allowed 
the management of internal elite-conflicts and were able to absorb newcomers, thus 
securing regime’s survival. However, both Tunisia and Egypt were single-party regimes 
governed through a highly centralized executive authority, so this explanation cannot 
account for the variations observed in 2013. Nonetheless, Stacher’s finding is certainly 
true, yet is was not the centralization of power per se that allowed the SCAF to control 
the transition, but rather Egypt’s high level of bureaucratization. This is the suggestion 
stemming from studies concerned with the degree of stateness.  
If the aforementioned contributions conceive the military as an institution itself 
concurring to the regime set-up as whole, other accounts see it as a transitional actor 
whose strategies are influenced by its power position within the previous regime, which 
is an ultimate function of different levels of structural development. For Heydemann 
(2016), the SCAF in Egypt was one of the political elites engaged in a power struggle for 
the control of the state and the power itself, the same kind of conflict occurring in Tunisia. 
Following this premise, he argues that the political elite in Tunisia managed to 
compromise because “no single element of the PRE [political relevant elite] possessed 
the coercive or bureaucratic resources to govern on its own. All elements of the PRE 
preferred compromise that preserved the state and the potential for further 
democratization instead of defection, conflict and potential state collapse” (Heydemann 
2016, 198), while in Egypt, this possibility was precluded because the military, strong of 
its command over the “coercive and bureaucratic resources” (ibid.), preferred to defect 
from a ruling coalition with others political forces and impose the rules of the game by 
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itself (Kandil 2012b). Yet, SCAF’s power advantage deriving from its control over the 
coercive and bureaucratic resources would be insufficient for the control of the transition, 
if these were few. Indeed, it has also been argued that the regime survival is more likely 
where personal authority of the ousted dictator is relatively lower than regime’s 
bureaucratic capabilities (Andersen et al. 2014). In this regard Egypt outperforms Tunisia. 
In the former country the state apparatus, included the armed forces, was far more 
developed than in the latter. With particular regard to the armed forces, some link the 
saliency of the Egyptian military, both in terms of economic resources and popular 
prestige, to the process of state formation. Hinnebusch (2015b), for instance, goes back 
to the process of independence from the colonial rule. Even though both countries 
instantiated cases of national independence by revolution (Gelvin 2004), while the Free 
Officers’ revolutions of 1952 rendered the military a central player in the Egyptian polity 
and proposed it in common imaginary as an agent of change, the smoothed process of 
Tunisian independence led by Bourguiba left the army apart from the heroic national 
narrative and therefore more marginal to following polity. Therefore, following the 
departure of the previous dictators, the Egyptian army could count on an historical, 
popular and even economic prestige to – in case- propose itself as the guardian against 
the turmoil that lacked to the Tunisian one. It is indeed a shared conviction that the degree 
of elite conflicts, coupled with mass mobilization protests, was as high in Egypt as in 
Tunisia in the summer 2013. Yet, the presence of an army people and political elite can 
“count on” precipitated the things in Egypt, while its absence in Tunisia pushed the 
political elite to dialogue under the aegis of the UGTT that some, for its centrality, 
compared to the Egyptian army (Hinnebusch 2015a; De Smet 2014). In Hinnebusch 
words, “in Egypt the split between secular and Islamist civil/political society restored a 
certain capacity for the army-led ‘deep state’ to balance between them and position itself 
as the guardian of order appealing to a population tired of constant turmoil” (Hinnebusch 
2015a), while “the unpoliticised Tunisian military lacked the ambition to use the crises to 
assert dominance” (ibid.). 
Out of these findings, two considerations emerge. First, departing from a regime survival 
approach – which Heydemann and Hinnebusch himself contributed to affirm in the past 
(Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 2005) – in this kind of accounts a regime change is 
assumed. Therefore, the effects of structures are not as straightforward as Stacher and 
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other assume, but are rather indirect inasmuch as they influence actors’ strategic behavior 
in the aftermath of regime collapse, more in line with the transitology approach. Second, 
Hinnebusch’s contribution suggests that one thing is to speak about the presence or 
absence of the remnants of the deep state such as the military or the previous dictator-
friendly courts, for which these contributions account. Pretty different thing is 
investigating the reasons why transitional actors should activate them or giving them the 
chances to restore their role as arbiters or guardians of the political and public order, as 
happened Egypt in 2012, when PMs remitted to the court a political problem, or with the 
2013 military coup. To answer this question, attention should shift from the structures to 
the mechanisms underpinning the previous authoritarian regimes. 
 
 
2.2.2 Mechanisms underneath previous authoritarianisms   
 
In line with the aforementioned accounts, also for Brumberg (2013) the different 
outcomes observed in Tunisia are attributed to different degree of presence of the 
remnants of the authoritarian regime within the transition. Yet, these are here conceived 
as intervenient variables at the service of transitional actors’ tendency of reproducing, 
through their behavior, the mechanisms providing for the protection racket-politics on 
which all Arab regimes rely. This kind of politics consists in the deliberate use of state 
violence, political and economic exclusion, or the threat to, toward some groups of the 
civil society, while protecting others, to consolidate the authoritarian rule (Tilly 1985; 
Wilson 2015). Following the ousting of the incumbent dictator, transitional actors – be 
them elected party elites or minority groups – are more concerned to secure their 
protection, that means inclusion into the new political system, than establishing a 
democratic rule. This trend was more evident in the Egyptian case but was nonetheless 
observable in the Tunisian one. In the former, some scholars see it at work following the 
downfall of Mubarak, in the efforts of the varying political forces, MB and young 
revolutionaries included, to cherish a deal with the army whenever their political 
positioning or their vey prerogatives were not granted (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 
2015; De Smet 2014). In the latter, some see an instance of this replicative trend in the 
final agreement between Ennahda and Nidaa at conclusion of the 2013 National Dialogue. 
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Contrary to the wishful thinking surrounding the Tunisian experience, this “bargained 
competition” (Boubekeur 2016) was not aimed at giving the country a democratic 
governance but rather to secure the major competing forces, i.e. the Islamists and the 
remnants of the old ruling group represented by Nidaa, their mutual integration in the new 
political system. On the one hand, political rivalry was activated within electoral 
campaign to secure institutional integration. On the other hand, it “was downplayed in 
the name of consensus when it became a risk to inclusion” (ibid. 119). Even if doubts 
might arise upon the sufficiency of such kind of pacts for the sake of democracy (Achcar 
2013), it is nonetheless true that Tunisia is at least in possession of one necessary 
condition for the survival of democracy, while Egypt doesn’t.  
What accounts for the ability of Tunisian opposition forces to join forces to cast a 
compromised agreement on both a roadmap and on a democratic constitution, and the 
unwillingness of Egyptian opposing forces to the same? In Brumberg’s reading, the 
structural legacies of the authoritarian regime account as external incentives at 
compromise-making. As in other readings, in his account, deep-state exponents’ control 
over the transition in Egypt is deemed to be the consequence of the failure of previous 
opposing factions to compromise, due to the entrenchment of the previous racket-politics 
expressed by the extension and the complexity of the security system (Brownlee et al. 
2013; Brumberg 2013; Hinnebusch 2015a; Stepan and Linz 2013). Out of tautology, the 
more and more complex the security system of the ‘deep state’, the lesser the inclination 
of the political elite at staking a compromise to challenge it.  
So, what about the inner proneness of the transitional political elite to compromise? After 
all, the greater the proneness of transitional actors at compromise, the little the influence 
of external incentives. Even though the causal relationship pinpointed by Brumberg’s is 
not entirely satisfying, he nonetheless unfolds a central aspect that others overlook and 
that will be developed in this thesis, namely that the mechanisms through which the 
previous regimes secured their survival continue to exert their influence within 
transitional settings by means of political elite’s behavior. To better enlighten this facet, 
the theoretical framework proposed by Lust (2005) is particularly useful. In her account 
different patterns of government-oppositions relations not only affect the relationship 
between these two factions, but have also important consequences for the relationships 
between the various opposition groups. Interestingly enough, thus far no contribution 
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aimed at grasping the different outcomes of the Arab Spring draw from such theoretical 
framework to advance hypotheses or proposing possible explanations. This contribution 
tries to fulfill this gap by showing how different patterns of government-opposition 
relations determine the proneness of previous opposition groups at compromising in 
transitions from authoritarian rule thus influencing the prospects for democracy. 
 
 
2.3 BEYOND THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE 
 
With the aim of enlightening one particular aspect of the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt 
thus far overlooked, this research mixes two scholarly traditions deemed to be 
incompatible before 2011, but which are now gradually approaching. To be sure, the Arab 
Spring has initiated a process of ‘soul searching’ among the whole academic community 
because neither the at-that-time-silenced defenders of the democratization approach, nor 
the proponents of post-democratization studies predicted this event or reported signs of 
imminent change in the area. Yet, this is not a sufficient reason to get rid of both 
paradigms altogether, as some invite to do. Indeed, if many scholars propose a shallow 
mix between these extreme positions, others opt for a return to the year zero in the study 
of Arab politics. In this regard Valbjørn understands current developments in the region 
as a multi- dimensional re-politicization of Arab politics. In his opinion, the 
(re)emergence of political structures of mobilization, participation and representation, 
along with (re)emerging problems of statehood and nationhood should lead scholars to 
rediscover the classic debate and to reopen ‘old toolboxes’ in order to (re)investigate these 
grand themes of classical political science (Valbjørn 2015). Rightly enough, Valbjørn 
sees in the Arab uprisings an opportunity not only to synthetize and upgrade the two 
contending literatures, but also to exit the particularism of Arab studies, and in particular 
of post-democratization studies, by placing them into a “genuine science of politics” 
(Valbjørn 2015, 219). Yet, there is little reason to believe that this is achieved by coming 
back to the ‘basic questions’ of political science while dismissing the literature ‘reduced 
mainly to topics of democratization and authoritarian resilience’ (ibidem). Indeed, both 
approaches rely on such ‘basic questions’ and long-standing and consolidated traditions 
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of the ‘genuine’ (sic) political science. On the one hand, post-democratization studies deal 
with changes in the amount and dispersion of power to deal with political change in 
traditional polities. On the other hand, democratization studies deal with problems of 
political coordination and institutions-making. So the ‘basic questions’ are already there. 
In light of the precious and inalienable corpus of literature, the research agenda here 
proposed undertakes the “challenge of synthesis” (Brynen et al. 2012) invoked by most 
scholars of Arab politics.  
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3 DEMAND OF REPRESENTATION, POWER RESOURCES AND PARTIES’ 
AGENCY: POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION PROCESSES    
 
 
Despite the different patterns undertook by the transitional experiences in Tunisia and 
Egypt, it is unquestionable that the process of installation constitutes itself as a crossroad. 
This latter has been defined as the “devolution of power from a group of people to a set 
or rule” and represent the decisive step for democracy to come about. Its analytical 
discovery as an independent transitional sub-process is quite new but provides a useful 
starting point for the research of the factors accounting for the variations across the two 
countries. Within this phase, political parties appear as crucial actors but the concept of 
agency informing actor-centric explanations must be reappraised in order to fully account 
for their nature as ‘intermediate institutions’ between the governing apparatus and 
citizens. Political parties are at once the decision makers on the more salient issues 
regulating the exercise of power and the life of people, but they are also the incubators of 
political demands stemming from the civil society. In this regard, their functions are 
usually divided between the governing and the representative ones and the two are 
mutually influencing. Within transitions, when analyzing parties’ agency in the 
fulfillment of their governing functions, their representative agency should be accounted 
for as informing it. Simply put, the way political parties structure the political space, by 
politicizing pre-existent social divisions, highly determines what they can or cannot do 
once elected. From this reading, parties’ choice to cooperate or not with others to find an 
‘agreed compromised’ within the phase of installation is the result of the interplay among 
i) pre-existent social divisions; ii) their power resources and iii) their ideological 
positioning.  
Out of this acknowledgement, the structures and mechanisms underneath previous 
authoritarian regimes, enlightened by post-democratization studies, are extremely 
relevant for at least two reasons. On the one hand, they represent the context whereby the 
political learning of parties active in 2011-2013 occurred, which is at the base of their 
ideological positioning. On the other hand, they constituted the opportunity structures 
available to parties which are determinant for their power resources. This is not to say 
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that previous regimes do not have any role in casting the social divisions parties have to 
do with once they collapse. Quite on the contrary. Yet, for the shake of regime transitions, 
what ultimately counts is how these are politicized at the time of the founding elections, 
which is a function of parties’ signaling game on the base of their political learning.  
This formulation has a twofold advantage. First, it provides a consistent explanation to 
the research question of why transitions in Tunisia and Egypt followed different paths. 
Second, and more importantly, it combines the synergies stemming from the two 
competing paradigms of democratization and post-democratization studies into a unique 
account. 
   
 
3.1 TRANSITIONS AT CROSSROADS: DEFINING INSTALLATIONS  
 
 
3.1.1 The necessity of installations 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, scholars explain the different outcomes of the 
transition from authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt by alternatively pinpointing to 
actor-centric or structural factors. Nonetheless, as saw, independently from the kind of 
explanations, it is a fact that transitional patterns in Tunisia and Egypt took different 
directions during the ‘constitutive’ phase. In the first case, the elected political elite 
managed to find an agreed compromise. In the second case the ‘democratic maintenance’ 
has aborted under the inability of the elected representatives to find an agreed compromise 
upon the rules game. Without falling into the teleological determinism blamed on 
democratization studies (Anderson 2006), a review of recurring patterns and recurring 
mechanisms informing this specific sub process of the transition where Tunisia succeeded 
and Egypt failed, that is the installation phase, may unfold key analytical aspects allowing 
to strike a balance between competing explanations.  
In the mainstream scholarly understanding, the broad process of democratization is 
treated as the result of three distinct processes having different scopes and responding to 
diverse underlying mechanisms: transition, installation and consolidation. The first refers 
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to the interval between one political regime and another, the second denotes the 
introduction of democratic institutions and procedures, and the third is the process by 
which these are internalized and unchallenged. According to this conceptualization, 
installation only refers to the turning-point moment between the two other phases. The 
rare appearance of this term in the main treaties of democratization, where scholars 
prefers to speak of  ‘regime completion’, ‘democratization’ or ‘constitution’ instead (Linz 
and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), testifies the reported 
lack of analytical distinctiveness and autonomy imputed to installation. This 
understanding was the result of a (really successful) attempt of theory-building stemming 
from the empirics of transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin 
America, where  “installation [was] short ad very difficult to distinguish form transition” 
(Morlino 2015, 18). Even following findings stemming from democratization in Eastern 
Europe, wherein the sub process of installation was more articulated and the constitution-
making caught the attention of prominent scholars (Elster 1995; Geddes 1998; Reynolds 
2002), didn’t alter this theorization. By contrast, the different reappraising of the notion 
of installation is one of the major analytical implications stemming from the more recent 
processes of transitions in the Arab World.  
Already in 2010, Capoccia and Zimblatt expressed the need “to systematically analyze 
the historical episodes in which democratic institutions were created or substantially 
reshaped” (2010, 934; emphasis is in original). In their work, the lexicon of historical 
institutionalism – e.g. path dependence, sequencing and critical juncture – enters in the 
study of democratization. The stemming methodology, informed by Arab transitions’ 
empirics, is more attentive to the unfolding of the different sub-processes and their 
direction of causality requiring students to analyze episodes of institutional change in 
different arenas and shaped by historical legacies (Ahmed and Capoccia 2014). In the 
same lime, Morlino has recently proposed to conceive installations as “different, 
alternative or possibly subsequent process with respect to liberalization”, i.e. the initial 
moment of transition (Morlino 2011, 86). If the very definition of transition temporally 
and analytically expands from the fall of the previous regime, thus departing from its 
crises, to the settlement of another, the installation phase only refers to its sub process 
concerned with the building of new regimes’ structures, therefore relying on different 
actors and mechanisms from the other phases of democratization (Morlino 2011, 2015; 
88 
 
Przeworski 1991). More precisely, for Morlino it “involves the complete expansion and 
genuine recognition of civil and political rights; where necessary, the full civilianizing of 
society; the emergence of a number of parties and a party system, but also of collective 
interests’ groups such as unions and other organizations; and the drawing up and adoption 
of the principal democratic procedure and institutions that will characterize the regime” 
(2011, 86). However, for others  installation only coincides with the constitution-making 
process, or some sort of institutional arrangement of the kind, out of the acknowledgment 
that the establishment of structures and institutions characterizing the new regime has 
been often arranged among a small, and in some case non-elected, political elite while 
nonetheless bringing to successful democratizations, as the American case shows (Elster 
1995; Landau 2012; Merkel 1998). Indeed, while the complete expansion of full-fledged 
political and civil liberties, the organization of collective interests and the emergence of 
parties and party systems can be attained also within the subsequent phase of democratic 
consolidation, as many studies showed (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Merkel 1998), the 
establishment of the ‘rules of the game’, trough the drawing up and adoption of the 
principal democratic procedures and institutions that will characterize the new regime, is 
a sine qua non condition for installation to be achieved and a new regime to come about 
(Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 1998; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991) 
-  even if there is no doubt that the concomitant restructuring of the civil and the political 
society is relevant in accounting for the contextual factors within which the institutional 
settlement occurs, or the quality of the transitional process overall (Herbert Kitschelt et 
al. 1999; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). Out of this understanding, it then 
emerges not only that of installations shall regarded as processes, but also that their 
accomplishment is necessary (even though not sufficient) for a new (and hopefully 
democratic) regime to come about.  
Such processes, defined as “the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of 
rules” (Przeworski 1991, 14), can occur in a variety of ways. They can be the result of 
trial and errors over a long span of time seeing the involvement of the military, as 
happened in 1975-1982 Portugal, they can stem from a rapid process of bargain among a 
restricted political elite as happened in Spain, or they can coincide with the making of 
new constitution followed by elections, as happened in Eastern Europe and Tunisia. In 
this regard Morlino has pointed out several dimensions wherein installations can vary 
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(2011, 85–91). Despite the different configurations installations processes can display, 
political elites’ negotiations emerge as the ultimate constant and distinctive features of 
these processes. In all cases of regimes changes, or attempted ones, the introduction of 
new institutions stems from the arrangements of at-that-moment political relevant elite 
(Perthes 2004). Both the relevant political elite and the resulting institutional 
arrangements might vary depending on cases, as the variety of transitions from 
authoritarian rule and democracies testifies. Yet, the very content of pacts leading to 
democratic installation is invariably related to the settlement of institutions i) providing 
individuals with equal rights and freedoms ii) perceived by the majority of people as 
legitimate (Morlino 2011; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). The first aspect comes from 
the very definition of democracy (Dahl 1971; Morlino 2011; Sartori 1987), the second 
relates to its stability (Przeworski 1991, 2006). For such outcome, the institutions 
arranged during the installation shall display two features. On the one hand, they need to 
pose limit on the governing power; only in this way individuals are granted their freedoms 
and rights (Morlino 2011; Weingast 1997). On the other hand, in order to endure and 
become the veritable ‘game in town’, the agreed-upon institutions must be self-enforcing, 
in the sense that compliance with the institutional framework so defined shall “constitute 
the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all the relevant political forces” 
(Przeworski 1991, 26). These two features are deemed to follow the resolution of 
coordination problems among both the political elite and the citizenry, in that the settled 
institutions represent focal points able to trigger citizens and elite reactions vis-à-vis 
possible violations of individual and collective rights and freedom by whoever has the 
power to govern (Weingast 1997).  
Institutions so defined require that i) the political elites involved in the installation bargain 
arrive at an agreement among the aforementioned limits through pacts, defined “as […] 
explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement[s] among a select set 
of actors which seek to define (or better, redefine) rules governing the exercise of power 
on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 42) and that ii) these pacts find mass support through a 
process of attitudinal adaptation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 1998). While this latter 
aspect relates to the consolidation of democracy, the first constitutes precisely the bulk of 
the installation process. Here the relevant political elite is required to arrive to a shared 
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consensus about the rules and codes of political conduct (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 
Przeworski 1991; Rustow 1970). Historically this can be the result of adaptation whereby 
anti-system factions gradually abandon their ideological stances in order to compete for 
office following the rules established by ruling factions, or can be the result of ‘elite 
settlement’ following traumatic events such as the ousting of dictators occurred in Tunisia 
and Egypt  (Higley and Burton 1989). In this latter case, “warring elite factions suddenly 
and deliberately reorganize[e] their relations by negotiating compromises on their most 
basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and laying the basis for a stable 
democratic regime” (Higley and Burton 1989, 21). The experiences of transition from 
authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt differ precisely because the Tunisian experience 
instantiates a case of ‘elite settlement’, while in the Egyptian case the warring factions 
fell short in finding a shared set of rules and institutions to regulate the exercise of the 
governing power under a new course of politics. Because of the centrality of the actors 
within installation processes, the focus on them prompted by agency-based approaches 
appears as particularly suitable to understand the varying success of democratic 
installations.  
 
 
3.1.2 Determinants of installations  
 
Elite settlement within installation processes can be thought in once as substitute for 
violent revolutions, as catalyst for social integration and as incubators for the 
management of the reform agenda (Yeh and Chang 2009). In this regard then, because 
the stemming institutions influence the “distribution of economic, political and 
ideological resources” (Przeworski 1991, 81), they are reflective of actors’ power 
relationships (real or perceived), and their ideology at the moment of installation. 
Przeworski (1991) has been one of the first directly concerned with how power-
relationships among actors affect the phase of installation. In his account, there is no 
power distribution among actors really conducive to democracy in situations of complete 
information. In cases of uneven distribution of power, the dominant faction will surely 
profit the installation to consolidate the power advantage thus falling short in bringing 
about a legitimate and self-enforcing democratic set-up. Alternatively, if the distribution 
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of power is balanced, ‘anything can happen’ because all the factions involved won’t 
neither have particular incentives in negotiating their priorities with the other, nor to do 
the contrary. For the author, the only installation process conducive to democracy is that 
wherein all the actors involved do not actually known their relative power resources. Only 
in such way, he notices, the actors will convene on the establishment checks and balances. 
They do so by “counteract[ing] increasing return to power [while] provid[ing] insurances 
to the eventual losers” (ibid., 88). This hypothesis perfectly suits the understanding of 
democracy as a limited form of government, or ‘institutionalized uncertainty’. Yet, it 
nonetheless leaves unexplained a wide range of cases wherein knowledge over power 
distribution didn’t prevent actors to reach and enduring and democratic agreement.  
In this regard, many scholars tend to rather focus on the role of actors’ normative 
orientations to explain both the prospects and the outcome of installational bargaining 
processes (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009; Landau 2012; Negretto 1999). Consider 
for instance the cases of known and even relation of forces. As Przeworski notes, this is 
a typical case of coordination problem, that can nonetheless be solved recurring to focal 
points, i.e. “solutions that are readily available and are not seen as self-serving” (1991, 
85) furnished not only by traditions of foreign examples, as the author reports, but also 
by political learning. Further, not only the content of “motivations and motivational 
assumptions” (Elster 1995) matters in cases of known and even power relationships 
among the actors involved by serving as focal points, but also their configuration among 
the deciding political elite. In such cases, as long as probable political cleavages do not 
concentrate along the same dimension across all issues, the actors can coordinate on 
cooperative outcomes though bargain processes (Colomer 1995; Raiffa 1982). Departing 
from a cooperative understanding of installation processes, democracy in situations of 
uneven balance of power become a viable and stable solution if the dominant faction is 
normatively “committed to the democratic project” (McFaul 2002, 225).  
Drawing from this actors-centric understanding of processes of installations, it then 
emerges that the actors’ strategies are influenced by both their power resources and their 
normative orientation. In game theoretic terms it can simply be expresses by the following 
model:  
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Table 3.1: The installlation game 
  Player B 
  Cooperate Defect 
P
la
y
er
 A
 Cooperate i-p; i-p i-p; p-i 
Defect p-i; i-p p-i; p-i 
 
 
In this game, the utility of both actors is represented by i, that is the incentives of 
cooperation conceived as the benefices expected by collaboration and p, that is power 
maintenance, that stands for the expected gains deriving from a unilateral imposition. The 
first argument represents, for instance, the gains deriving from the avoidance of protracted 
conflict that can be detrimental for players’ survival, or the acknowledgment that 
collaborating is per se a value in that it entrusts the installation process with the required 
legitimacy. This can be conceived as a function of a given actor’s perceived ideological 
distance from the other player in that the more different the normative orientation or the 
policy preferences of actors, the lesser the gains from cooperation in terms of outcome 
(Lust-Okar 2005; Tsebelis 2002). The second argument, by contrast, represents the loss 
of power in terms of failed institutionalization of one’s power advantage. This latter can 
instead be conceived as function of actors’ power position in that the greater its power 
advantage, the greater the expected payoff from defection strategies (Przeworski 1991). 
Each and every player’s profile depends on the combination of i and p. Nonetheless, from 
the game it emerges that whenever i outweighs p the dominant strategy for both players 
is to cooperate. In line with the different contributions outlined above, this entails that 
either both actors share a common understanding about the nature of the future state (or 
are equally frightened by the prospect of a protracted stalemate), or that no party have 
huge positional advantages within the bargain process. Recent contributions aimed at 
grasping the differences between Tunisia and Egypt saw in the previous chapter are 
consistent with this understanding in that they explain the different outcomes by 
alternatively pinpointing to different degrees of polarization (Cross and Sorens 2016; 
Lesch 2014) and the different power relationship across the two party systems (Brownlee, 
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Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Carey 2014; Tavana 2012). Yet, when the actor involved in 
the bargain process are political parties, such strategy profiles are to be reappraised in 
order to account of their unique nature as intermediate institutions.   
 
 
 
3.2 A MODEL FOR PARTIES’ AGENCY WITHIN INSTALLATIONS  
 
The actors involved in the installation phase might vary. These can be non-elected 
exponents of the civil society and the ruling elite, or can be technocrats appointed by 
select commissions (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009). Nonetheless, when founding 
elections are held to express a constituent assembly, political parties become the key 
players of this sub process. Interestingly enough, the role of political parties in 
democratization studies has only been appreciated, receiving a great deal of attention 
indeed, only within the subsequent process of democratic consolidation, when the rules 
are already established (for a remarkable exception see Bermeo 1990). In this regard, the 
functioning of democracy is deemed to be enhanced at the pace of party systems’ 
institutionalization. Democracy, as we know it, is representative democracy wherein 
parties fulfil a set of vital functions for its working. They provide interests articulation 
and aggregation; they drop citizens’ costs of information, allowing them to take part in 
the public discourse; they guarantee popular control of the government trough the 
recruitment and selection of candidates; finally, they fulfil the task of organizing 
parliaments and governments. Out of this, the interest of extant researches is actually 
oriented toward the institutionalization of party systems, understood as sets of patterned 
interactions in the competition among parties, for only such an entrenchment within the 
polity enables democracy to consolidate and function (Huntington 1968, 397-461; Kuenzi 
and Lambright 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morlino 
1995; Randall and Svasand 2002; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Randall 2001; Yardimci-
Geyikci 2015). By contrast, the role of parties in contributing to the installations of the 
democratic rules has been often overlooked. The reasons for this gap is twofold. On the 
one hand, this gap is attributable to the aforementioned bias that has entrenched the 
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theoretical framework, and therefore the research agenda, on the experience of Latin 
countries where transition and installation were perceived as a unique process. On the 
other hand, this is due to the ‘tabula rasa’ understanding according to which political 
parties are understood as a result of political liberalization (Dahl 1971; Mainwaring 1998; 
Morlino 1995): how can they form and organize when there is no freedom of speech or 
association, as it is the case in authoritarian regimes? In principle this claim is certainly 
true. However, transitions do not occur in-between perfectly typified and binary 
categories of authoritarianism and democracy. Indeed, the empirical reality has shown us 
a great variety of hybrid regimes where elections – sham elections, to be sure - are not 
rare, for they serve a variety of goals, all attributable to regime survival, even in the 
context of authoritarian rule (Diamond 2002; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Geddes 2006; 
Schedler 2002b). As consequence, political parties, even though extremely weak and 
poorly organized, might be already present when undemocratic regimes collapse and/or 
organize in view of the founding elections.  
This is precisely what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Here, the political parties active 
and well-known even before the downfall of the authoritarian regime parties played the 
lion share within the process of installation (Hamid 2014; Storm 2014). Hence, 
understanding how they might have contributed to the different outcome observed is of 
paramount importance in light of their centrality in the process. Yet, the actor-centric 
model elaborated before fall short in accounting for the unique nature and functions of 
political parties. Differently from any other kind of actors, political parties are “central 
intermediate and intermediary structure[s] between society and the government” (Sartori 
1976, ix). Paralleling this view, in democratization processes, political parties are deemed 
to be ‘anchors of democracy’ in that they hook and bind the society to governmental 
institutions being at once part of the mobilized public and political relevant elite 
(Asseburg and Wimmen 2016; Morlino 2011; Perthes 2004). According to their dual 
nature, parties’ functions are commonly distinguished between governing and 
representative functions (Mair 2002). The first set refers to actions and decisions 
performed by political parties in their institutional capacities, such as organizing 
parliament and governments, or – as in the cases under investigation- deciding on “ground 
rules within which day-to-day legislation and government are to be conducted” (Elster, 
Offe, and Preuss 1998, 64). The second, by contrast, refers to all those functions fulfilled 
 
 
95 
 
by parties in organizing the political participation of citizens (Huntington 1968) such as 
aggregating dispersed interests and formulating policy options. Consolidated 
democracies display a great interplay between the two agencies meaning that the 
governing activity of political parties determines the dividing lines of the electoral 
competition and vice versa (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010). By contrast, in the 
aftermath of founding elections in emerging democracies - lacking any previous parties’ 
governmental commitment - it might be plausible to think the governing agency as a 
function of the representative one. This means that parties’ strategies in the exercise of 
their institutional functions, that in the case of democratic installations are cooperation or 
defection with their counterparts in searching an agreed compromise, are the result of (i) 
pre-existent social divides; (ii) the decision parties take when aggregating them in their 
electoral offer; and, of course (iii) their power position in term of seats within the 
representative institutions. Thus, specifying the actor-centric model above mentioned to 
account for the nature of political parties, party’s governing agency -so as influenced by 
their representative agency- within processes of installations appears as follow:   
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Political parties' installation game 
  Party B 
  Cooperate Defect 
P
a
rt
y
 A
 Cooperate (PI-SD)-P; (PI-SD)-P (PI -SD)-P; P-( PI -SD) 
Defect P-(SD-PI); (PI-SD)-P P-( PI -SD); P-( PI -SD) 
 
 
Very much like the previous model, also in this case the actors involved are confronted 
with incentives and costs of cooperation stemming from their power positions, P, and 
normative orientation. Yet, unlike the previous case, political parties normative 
orientation is the compounded result of given social divisions, SD, which is the ‘raw 
material political entrepreneurs work with” (Enyedi 2005, 700) and the decisions taken 
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by political entrepreneurs when formulating their political offer, PD. The former 
increases at pace of the number and/or depth of pre-existent social divisions. The latter 
can also be expressed as 1/(|PA – PB|) where PA and PB represent the positioning of parties 
A and B within the political space. PD, which is clearly the inverse of political 
polarization, can therefore be thought of as an index of centripetal drives present within 
the party system.  
Clearly, these three factors are not independently given. More than often, they are deeply 
correlated. For instance, deeply divided societies induce ideological polarization. It is so 
because, the parameters here considered are deeply entangled and mutually influencing, 
as the literature shows. Yet, attesting the primacy to one or the others in the determination 
of party systems’ outlook is an open debate. Nonetheless, in purely formal terms, the 
resolution of the present game allows for different Nash equilibria but suggests that 
cooperation is the dominant strategy under three different scenarios, each emphasizing 
one of the features alternatively pinpointed by scholars as responsible for party systems’ 
configuration, and – in turn – for the institutional decision-making outcomes.  
 
 
3.2.1 Pre-existent social divisions    
 
One possible formulation for solving the transition game (SD < PD – P) poses that 
cooperation is the dominant strategy when societal divisions are not so pronounced, so as 
parties’ power advantage, and easily outweighed by the incentives parties have in 
cooperation. In this case, the attention falls on the attributes society presents to which 
many scholars have devoted their works. Drawing from the political sociology tradition, 
according to which party systems  reflect and ‘freeze’ pre-existent social cleavages 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967), many scholars attribute the quality of parties’ governing 
process – and in particular the feasibility of the bargaining process – to the characteristics 
of the society underneath. Even though in consolidated democracies the paradigm of 
cleavage politics appears to be under revision (Franklin 1992), in emerging democracies, 
where “democratic elections create feedback loops of accountability and responsiveness 
that foster a certain convergence between the preferences of constituencies, as democratic 
principals, and their representatives, as legislative agents, and reward or punish the latter 
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for their contribution to the governance of the polity” (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 77), this 
aspect is deemed to be all the more relevant. New-born or reorganized parties tend indeed 
to secure their survival by acting as ‘satisficers’ to the demands of their constituencies 
(Frye 2010). Out of this, the presence of intense social divisions in transitional setting is 
regarded as a threat to the consensual politics needed to set new democratic institutions. 
This concern was already expressed by Rustow when he posed national unity as the 
background condition to democratic transition meaning for it that “the vast majority of 
citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which 
political community they belong to” (1970, 350). In this respect, the presence of 
identitarian or religious cleavages characterizing dividing societies makes the feasibility 
of democracy quite uncertain (Horowitz 1993). Transitions from the authoritarian rule in 
the MENA region display both kind of social divisions. Yet, while there is a widely shared 
agreement that tribal divisions are at the heart of the Libyan failure (Heydemann 2016; 
Shehata 2014), it is not clear how the religious divide emerged from the ashes of the 
previous regime can account for the Egyptian breakdown (Zartman 2015).   
 
 
3.2.2 Institutional incentives  
 
Yet, transitional societies are always divided along different and multiple fractures but 
such divisions are not always conducive to a polarized party system. What matters in this 
regard is how they are translated into the governing party systems. In this regard, the 
specific format and degree of polarization displayed by a given party system has been 
explained by pinpointing the role of state institutions in converting societal divisions in 
political divisions. The second asset conducive to cooperation (P < PD – SD), is when no 
party, in the absence of problems of related to excessive polarization of the party system, 
enjoys great power advantage. In this case, as a number of scholars have noticed, the 
predominance of one faction over the its rivals contribute to explain why certain 
transitions fail while others succeed. Central to these considerations is the role of the 
electoral systems in emphasizing or smoothing parties’ electoral strength inside the 
representative institutions (Carey 2014; Masoud 2014) and the consequences electoral 
system have on both the format (Duverger 1954) and the polarization (Sartori 1976) of 
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party systems and the decision-making process overall. Yet, as it will be showed, also the 
opportunity structures characterizing previous regimes account for explaining the 
distribution of power resources among the parties of a given party system.   
 
3.2.3 Choices parties define 
 
A third case scenario occurs when the incentives toward moderation outweigh the parties’ 
power advantage and the degree of societal division (PD > P + SD). This exactly the case 
wherein political parties successfully manage to act as “countervailing mechanisms” to 
social polarization described by the inclusion moderation hypothesis (Driessen 2014; 
Tepe 2013) and whenever problems of credible commitment are settled (Kalyvas 2000; 
Ly Netterstrøm 2015). Indeed, sociological and institutional accounts alone cannot fully 
account for the cleavages structure and the degree of polarization of a party system. On 
the one hand, political sociology falls short in explaining the sinusoidal relevance for the 
vote choice of certain divides that don’t reflect the actual socio/demographic composition 
of society, such as for instance the relevance of religion in modernized and secularized 
societies (Elff  2009; G. Evans and De Graaf 2013; Thomassen 2005). On the other hand, 
while the institutional asset, such as the electoral system and the form of government can 
account for the format of the party system, it cannot predict the dividing lines or the 
degree polarization of the emerging party system. Integrating these contributions with the 
role of parties’ agency represents indeed a fruitful research agenda. In this regard, the 
concept of agency refers to “significant elite actions in which the actors face a relatively 
high degree of choice” (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010, 695). Such field of studies 
focuses indeed on political entrepreneurs’ choices when aggregating and articulating 
social demands for the formulation public policy options. When doing so, political 
parties’ elites actually decide to what issues devote their attention, thus emphasizing 
issues’ salience; how to positioning with regard these issues; and how to combine them 
on programmatic platforms. This is part of the wider representative agency functions 
described by Mair (2002). Out of this understanding, the presence or absence of political 
polarization is in large part attributable to political entrepreneurs’ choices concerning the 
salience and their party’s positioning vis-à-vis some issues. Nonetheless, more attention 
should be devoted at investigating how such decisions are taken.  
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3.3 THE INVISIBLE HAND OF UPGRADED AUTOCRACIES ON PARTIES’ STRATEGIES  
 
Out of the above model, parties’ decisions to cooperate in establishing the rules of game 
are the result of pre-existent social divisions, their agency, and their power position inside 
the elected body. Because the parties entitled to take crucial decisions within the 
installation process are the same operating also under authoritarian rule, it might be the 
case that the structuring of competition under non-democratic rules determines parties’ 
strategies conducive to either democracy or failed transition.  
Numerous contributions by proponents of post-democratization studies rightly pinpoint 
to the role of structures. Yet, while being extremely enlightening, such accounts largely 
fail to contextualize the role of structures within the transition, which is the result of their 
‘normativity and theoretical rigidity’. By refusing to acknowledge the occurrence of the 
transition process – or by rejecting its analytical framing, these accounts fall short in 
explaining when and how such structures might have come into play. After all, both 
countries experienced the same kind of transition from authoritarian rule up to the 
moment elected political parties took step in the decision-making process. In light of this, 
the crucial question is how authoritarian structures can account for parties’ behavior.  
Scholars engaged to comprehend why Arab authoritarianisms appeared so resilient before 
the uprisings of 2011 – and also after, considering the “modest harvest” of the Arab 
Spring – showed that this was in large part to be attributed to the deliberate at-that-time 
incumbents’ strategies aimed at undermining seemingly pattern of democratization 
following the partial and fake overture of those regimes to democratic procedures. From 
the mid-1970s, Arab autocracies underwent a process of economic liberalization led by 
the IMF and the World Bank to recover from the failures of their socialist economic plans. 
To align with the democratic standard, as praised by the international community, these 
economic overtures were also accompanied by the introduction of measures of political 
liberalization. These novelties comported a major adjustment of the strategies and the 
structures providing for incumbents’ power maintenance shifting from allocative to 
inclusionary co-optation (Albrecht 2005; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Besides the 
introduction of nominal democratic procedures, such as the reopening of national 
parliament and the calling of elections, incumbent dictators, relied on a complex mix of 
formal and informal tools to secure their power. On the one hand, as Lust showed, they 
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created uneven structures of competition allowing some oppositions to compete for 
elections while banning others (Lust-Okar 2005). On the other hand, they arbitrarily 
recurred to more implicit forms of co-optation frauds, and to repressive means which 
often entailed a certain degree of violence. In this way, the dictators of the region could 
manipulate at their please the political space by directly intervening on inclusion and 
competition. 
All the political entrepreneurs involved in the process of transition developed their 
political learning in such context and almost all the relevant political parties, like 
Ennadha, the FJP, Ettakatol, Wasat and CPR, which handled power after the downfall of 
the previous regimes and were called to give their country a democratic constitution, 
started their process of institutionalization within this uneven structural set up. Therefore, 
it is plausible to think that while these structures served their purpose in that they altered 
the development of genuine patterns of competition and participation, they nonetheless 
are at the base of differences in parties’ power positioning and ideological polarization of 
the transitional party system once the dictator is gone.   
 
 
3.3.1 Previous opportunity structures and transitional party advantage  
 
Divisions characterizing upgraded authoritarianism between legal and illegal oppositions 
created different opportunities structures for partisan factions active during the autocratic 
era with seemingly consequences as far as the installation phase is concerned. Before the 
uprisings, legalized oppositions, who could run for elections and eventually joined the 
ruling party inside representative institutions, with the passing of the time ended up to 
collude with the authoritarian regime.  
Illegal opposition were equally prevented to join the electoral race, but the channels of 
mobilization available to them varied. Across the Arab region, the illegal oppositions 
comprehend both previously important leftist parties and Islamists movements. However, 
authoritarian repression didn’t damage them equally for reasons that relate to both 
dictator’s strategic calculation and movements’ organization. The harsh repression 
against leftist formations started in the late 1970s as a consequences of the incredible 
popular support they enjoyed in denouncing regime’s democratic and economic 
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deficiencies. This was indeed an easy task for the dictators because these formations 
relied all on well-known and traditional channels of leftist mobilization, such as workers 
and students’ associations or networks inside factories and poorer areas, which the state 
apparatus eventually infiltrated or crushed (Bianchi 1989; Hinnebusch 1981, 2005; 
Perkins 2004). In so doing, the regime propagandistically recurred to arguments related 
to the preservation of the national unity and stability needed to achieve economic and 
social development, but also to those of the defense of the values of religion from atheism. 
By contrast, when dealing with the repression of Islamic movements in mid-1980s, the 
regime used a double standard. On the one hand, as for leftist formations, political 
formations inspired to Islam were repressed whenever proved to be too strong to be 
cooptated. On the other hand, because such regime were nonetheless secular, they 
tolerated the presence and the proliferation of Islamic associations fearing to be regarded 
as offenders of religion and out of the conviction that these were easily controllable and 
innocuous (Bianchi 1989; Lust 2011; Wickham 2002).  
Out of this, with the advent of the first free, fair and democratic elections in 2011 and 
2012, some parties already enjoyed a mobilization advantage. As far as the front of 
previous legal oppositions, these, as expected, achieved only poor showings in that they 
were perceived as part of the previous authoritarian regimes, but also because by relying 
for their survival on regime’s benevolence they dismissed any kind of partisan 
infrastructure. Compared to the front of previous illegal oppositions, which are expected 
to be welcomed by the electorate for their real opposition to the previous regime, leftist 
parties found themselves without any kind of linkage with their possible constituencies 
for the regime had accurately dismantled them, while Islamist formations could rely 
instead on the extant religious networks which they exploited also during the authoritarian 
rule (Masoud 2014). It then follows that the P parameter in our model, which measures a 
given party’s power position through the number of party’s seats inside the elected 
parliament, is indeed much more influenced by previous patterns of uneven competition 
than thinking of it as a parameter of the effect of the electoral system, or as an index of 
parties’ real support, would allow. Possibly the Islamist dominion at the ballot box far 
from proving that Arab citizens want an Islamist rule, simply confirms that regime’s 
structures continues to exert their influence also when the regime itself collapse, and that, 
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for this reason, the development of a genuine party system takes time (Capoccia and 
Ziblatt 2010; Herbert Kitschelt 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Pierson 2004).  
 
 
3.3.2 Political learning and transitional party systems’ polarization   
 
The way dictators shape competition in the Arab region does not only affect, as it was 
easy to expect, parties’ power resources once they have been ousted. Equally importantly, 
they shape the nature and the degree of the ideological polarization emerging in the 
following process of transition. It is so because the promotion of particular discursive 
structures is a “signaling game” among the competing parties whereby past experiences 
of political learning determine the salience parties’ entrepreneurs will accord to certain 
issues and their positioning on them (Kitschelt 1995, 456). Hence, the way political 
competition and political participation were structured might account also in this case, 
but under a different light.  
Writing before the Arab Spring, Lust noticed that prolonged economic crises hitting the 
Arab countries was not conducive to the rise of popular protests or political reforms, as 
students of democratization expected, because the structures of competition settled by 
those regimes prevented the emergence of coalitions among all oppositions (Huntington 
1991; Lust-Okar 2005). While she missed to account for the incredible power of 
spontaneous mobilization led by the youth that eventually succeed to topple the regimes, 
her analyses upon the prospects for the organization of oppositions – who indeed never 
organized in a unique front against their regimes – offer punctual explanations to account 
for the nature and depth of political polarization emerged from the downfall of the 
previous regime by showing how divided structures of competition end up to magnify the 
differences and the political positioning between legal and illegal oppositions by altering 
actors’ cost of cooperation. Under these institutional assets and given founded reasons to 
voice against the status quo, excluded group would necessarily face higher cost in case of 
failure such as harsh repression, imprisonment and the like, and will tend to exploit 
possible mobilization initiatives prompted by legal oppositions. Yet, at the same time, 
legal opposition are discouraged from undergoing a confrontation with the regime in that 
they face not only the cost of possible repression, but also those of losing the privileges 
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acquired. Therefore, the status quo is hardly challenged. The interesting consequence of 
this kind of institutional arrangement is its tendency to polarize the oppositions: the 
excluded one continue to capitalize on popular discontent by increasing the saliency of 
critical issues thus expanding their mass support; the included will perceive those latter 
as a threat to their power position and will tend to align with the regime in opposing them.  
When the division between included and excluded groups overlaps with the division 
between secularists and Islamists opposition, and when the authoritarian regimes are 
secular in its institutional foundations and ideology, then the ideological evolution of 
those groups is subject to centrifugal pushes around the religious divide. Islamists illegal 
oppositions tend to radicalize their claims sometimes recurring to violence, while legal 
secularist oppositions, uncertain over the real strength of the illegal opposition and their 
true intentions, will tend to adopt an anti-Islamic propaganda in order to preserve their 
acquired privileges for they see them at risk in case of Islamists’ success (Lust 2011). By 
contrast, if Islamists oppositions are included into the electoral competition, then the 
ideological alignment of both groups is subject to centripetal pushes following what 
predicted by Somer’ inclusion-moderation hypothesis (2014). On the one hand, the 
electoral competition will force Islamists parties to reduce the salience and moderate their 
positioning about religious issues - gradually renouncing to the implementation of the 
shari’a, diminishing the reference to the  jihad, recognizing the rights of religious 
minorities and acknowledging women’s rights – to maximize their votes for entering state 
institutions (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010). On the other hand, secular opposition parties, 
facing such moderation, will mild their anti-Islamist propaganda and tend to compete with 
religious formations on other issues such as the economic ones.  
Tunisia and Egypt, since late 1970s, are both regarded as instances of secular regimes 
characterized by divided structures of competition overlapping the cleavage between 
secular, included in the political competition, and Islamists who are instead excluded 
(Lust 2011). At first glance this distinction approximates the real state of affairs, yet some 
precisions are needed. First, in both cases excluded groups comprehended also 
left/secular parties that had proved to be strong in the mid-1970s. Second, while in Tunisia 
the Islamists formations were excluded from political competition and occasionally 
repressed as associations, in Egypt they were tolerated as associational organization and, 
even though formally excluded from political competition, were allowed to field 
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independent candidates in parliamentary elections. Beside the effects of the formal 
structures of competition, is also plausible to think that the way dictators informally 
intervened in the party system has observable repercussions as well on its polarization at 
the time of the installation.    
Drawing from such background, it is plausible to expect that parties’ elite agency, our 
model parameter PD, will reflect different patterns of political learning due to different 
formal structures of competition and informal means of manipulation more or less 
conducive to political polarization.  
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4 HOMOGENEOUS VS. DIVIDED SOCIETIES? ANALYZING THE DEMAND 
OF REPRESENTATION 
 
 
From the model sketched in the previous chapter, one of the component determining 
political parties’ strategies is the degree of social divisions constituting the demand of 
representation for which they are deemed to account for. According to the literature, 
social divisions are particularly relevant as far their nature and depth are considered. This 
chapter is aimed at exploring both these dimensions by recurring to discrete choice 
modelling on the data furnished by the Arab Barometer project. By so doing, this analysis 
will unfold the determinants of vote choice for Islamist parties and their major secular 
competitors on the socio/economic, the organizational and the normative dimensions 
concurring to the formation of a cleavage. This proceeding allows to reveal which issues 
divide voting citizens at each level and whether there the conflicting lines overlap thus 
forming a ‘closure of social relationships’ which is deemed to be particularly detrimental 
for installation processes regardless the nature of such divisions.   
 
 
4.1 2011-2012 FOUNDING ELECTIONS: TRANSITIONAL CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM THE 
EMERGENCE OF TWO IMAGINED COMMUNITIES  
 
4.1.1 Islamists vs. Secularists and the need of a pre-constitutional consensus 
 
In 2009 Nader Hashemi wrote that “in societies where religion is a marker of identity, the 
road to liberal democracy , whatever other twists and turns it makes, cannot avoid passing 
through the gates of religious politics” (2009, 9). Hindsight, and quite surprisingly given 
the premises, such words sound like a prophecy. In the two cases where the mass protests 
of 2010 - led by young, leftist and secularized people -, ended up in the chute of the 
authoritarian regimes which gave way to free, fair and competitive elections, the Islamist 
parties appeared in both case as the initial leading political force contrasted by secular 
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parties. In Tunisia, at the occasion of the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Islamist party 
Ennadha, which alone monopolized all the representation of the political Islam, gained 
the 37% of expressed preferences thus securing 89 seats of 217. The other secular parties, 
namely the Congress for the Republic, al-Aridha, Ettakatol and the Democratic and 
Progressive Party were left far behind gaining respectively 8.71% (29 seats), 6.74 (26 
seats), 7.03% (20 seats) and 3.94% (16 seats) of expressed preferences. A broader victory 
for the Islamist faction had been registered also in Egypt at the election of the People’s 
assembly that took place in three rounds between late November 2011 and January 2011. 
Here, the political offer embodying the political Islam was fragmented into seventeen 
parties. Some of them are ascribable to the Muslim Brotherood, as the Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP) and Wasat. Others are expression of more radical religious readings, 
such as Nour and the Virtue party, of Salafist inspirations, or the Building and 
Development party, which traces its origin in the militant organization of the Islamic 
Group. Nonetheless, the FJP gained 36.6% of expressed preferences and 213 seats while 
the Islamist bloc, a coalition formed by more radical Islamist parties led by Nour that 
alone gained 107 seats, secured 27.8% of voted and 123 seats. Wafd, born from the split 
with the MB to express a secular and progressive religiously inspired party, positioned as 
the third party with 9.2% of votes and 41 seats. The remaining parties did not manage to 
secure more than 20 seats.  
These results not only seemed to reinvigorate the conventional wisdom according to 
which Muslim populations are inherently imbued with religion, they also portrait two 
polarized publics which are potentially dangerous for the processes of installation. This 
kind of processes, which largely coincide with the constitution-making, can be conceived 
at once as having an institutional and a foundational, or expressive, role. As saw in the 
previous chapter, the first refers to the establishment of the rules of the game underneath 
the functioning of the polity. The second refers to the definition of the political 
community such process entails, and in this respect the presence of two ‘imagined 
communities’ might represent a major obstacle for a compromise to see the light. It is a 
fact that constitutions always “identify and formalize the most fundamental beliefs, 
norms, values and aspirations of the political collectivity” (Lerner 2011, 26). This entails 
“the need for pre-constitutional societal consensus regarding shared norms and values 
that underpin the state” (ibid., 27). In literature, this has been referred to as alternatively 
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the national unity (Rustow 1970), some set of shared beliefs (Elster 1995; Higley and 
Burton 1989), or a shared political culture (Lipset 1959; Weingast 1997). In this regard, 
the fact that in Tunisia and Egypt the public appeared divided as far both identity and 
preferred political regime are concerned, poses some questions for the existence of such 
pre-constitutional consensus.  
 
 
4.1.2 Why does the religious divide matter? Substance vs. Form  
 
While the stemmed religious divide has unanimously considered as a threat for the 
feasibility of a democratic consensus, the focus of explanations has alternatively shifted 
from substance to form-related accounts. The first kind of explanations all pinpoint to the 
fact that the religious divide is particularly puzzling for the installation of a democratic 
polity (Bâli and Lerner 2017; Driessen 2014; Stepan 2000) in that religion is at once an 
“infungible identity” (Hashemi 2009) and a system of rules whose obedience often 
contrasts with the respect of rules underneath the democratic polity (Stepan 2000; Strauss 
1938). The second order of explanations consider the religious divide like any other kind 
of social division. In this regard, what matters is not the content of the divide but rather 
its capability of provoking the emergence of two divided societies, i.e. those societies 
characterized by “intense internal disagreements over the vision of the state” (Lerner 
2011, 29). Regardless the pretext, the emergence of some forms of “closure of social 
relationships”, that prevent the possibilities for cross-cutting alliances, represents a 
problem for the democratic installation because it hampers the feasibility for a democratic 
compromise (Driessen 2014; Landau 2012; Negretto 1999) leading to a zero-sum 
bargaining process thus undermining the legitimation of the stemming regime (Gunther 
and Mughan 1993; Negretto 1999). Out this understanding the focus shifts from the nature 
to the depth and the compositions of the observed divide (Chandra 2005; Chandra and 
Boulet 2003; Gunther and Mughan 1993; Horowitz 1993). While some scholars have 
recently accounted for the outcomes observed in Tunisia and Egypt by pinpointing to the 
need of a qualitatively different process of democratization from those known thus far 
because of the prominent role of disagreement over the role of religions (Blaydes and Lo 
2012; Brown 2017; Driessen 2014; Parolin 2013; Stepan and Linz 2013), other students 
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account for different patterns of transition in the two countries by investigating the depth 
and the composition of the religious divide. Yet, explanations of these latter kind largely 
differ in their results. For some, the religious divide is confined to identity politics and is 
more likely to be circumscribed within the middle class (Cavatorta and Wegner 2016; 
Merone 2015; Pellicer and Wegner 2014). For others, by contrast, the religious divide 
expresses a socio/economic differentiation between wealthier people included into the 
social and economic system – voting for secular parties – and the deprived strata of the 
society – voting for Islamist parties instead (Elsayyad and Hanafy 2014; Van Hamme, 
Gana, and Maher 2014). Marginalized people, are reported to vote for Islamist parties on 
the base of either their perceived priorities expressed through defined policy preferences 
(Berman and Nugent 2015; Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007) or because of the material 
benefits stemming from such kind of vote choice (Lisa Blaydes 2010; Clark 2004a, 
2004b; Ellen Lust 2009). Finally, another reading conceives the religious divide as a 
function of the channels of socialization available to citizens, and explains the Islamists 
dominion in terms of greater opportunities these enjoy to get in touch with potential voters 
(Masoud 2014).  
All these accounts, while shedding lights on the determinants of voting behaviour for 
Islamists parties, do not allow for a comprehensive understanding of the nature and the 
depth of the religious divide that characterized 2011-2012 elections in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Lot of these accounts are based on district levels data, others are only interested in 
grasping the determinants of the vote choice for Islamist parties (for a remarkable 
exception see: Wegner and Cavatorta 2016). In what do the constituencies of the major 
competing parties differentiate? Is it religious commitment relevant for the vote choice? 
Does it overlap with other socio-economic features? Is it really driven by different 
organizational opportunities? Does the ‘religious vote’ express anti-democratic posture 
per se, or it is rather the depth of the cleavage beneath it which undermines the feasibility 
for cross-cutting bargaining alliances? Such kind of answers can be better answered by 
means of vote choice modelling relying on the political sociology approach. On the one 
hand, the employment of vote choice modelling on the base of surveys’ answers allows 
to enlighten the characteristics of the voters of a specific party, thus entrusting with more 
precision the eventual findings. On the other hand, structuring such models on the 
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political sociology approach, which is centred on the concept of cleavage, enables to 
assess the depth of the observed divide. 
4.2 HYPOTHESIZING THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIST/SECULAR DIVIDE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTALLATIONS   
 
4.2.1 The political sociology approach  
 
As saw, the political sociological approach revolves around the idea that critical junctures 
shaping the history of nations produce several divisions within society that are 
subsequently politicized by political parties. This lead to the generation of political 
cleavages that structure the party system and the political competition altogether. Despite 
the fact that the majority of students referred to the apparent polarization along the 
Islamist/Secular axis with the term of cleavage, Bartolini and Mair’s well-known 
definition makes clear that a cleavage is not simply a division at the ideological or social 
level. Indeed, a cleavage encompasses the two of them passing through a set of values 
and beliefs that provides individuals with a sense of belonging to their social group and 
drives their political choices. For analytical purposes,  
 
“the concept of cleavage can be seen to incorporate three levels: an empirical 
element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we 
can define in social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of 
values and beliefs which yields a sense of identity and role to the empirical 
element, and which reflects the self-consciousness of the social group(s) 
involved; and an organizational/behavioural element, that is the set of 
individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political 
parties, which develop as part of the cleavage.” (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 
215).  
 
Hence, either the three elements overlap, or it should be better to speak of divisions or 
differences instead (Deegan-Krause 2006). In Withefiled’s words, to properly refer to a 
cleavage “it is necessary to show that social differentiation exists, that it has intelligible 
consequences for citizens’ ideological perspectives, and that these consequences are 
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important in shaping vote choice” (2002, 186)58. This precision is required not only for 
the sake of theoretical precision but, more importantly, for the consequences that such 
competing “form[s] of closure of social relationships” (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216) 
have on the constitution making process.   
According to the approach founded by Lipset and Rokkan, the divisions within society 
that will subsequently be politicized to form a cleavage derive from critical junctures, 
defined as moments in which the placement of “institutional arrangements on paths or 
trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter” occurs (Pierson 2004). In their model, 
the processes of creation of Nation States and the subsequent Industrial Revolution 
created dividing lines within the European society that were politicized with the advent 
of universal suffrage and democratization and that were eventually frozen in the structure 
of the party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).  
 
 
4.2.2 Post-independence state building strategies and national fractures  
 
Lipset and Rokkan’s reconstruction is based upon the experiences of Western European 
countries and is extremely specific to this reality. Hence, applications of this model 
outside its cradle might be problematic. Yet, as Randall points out, it still represents a 
useful analytical framework to investigate how divisions within society translate, or nor, 
into the party systems allowing also for cross-countries comparisons (Vicky Randall 
2001). In her seminal article, the author warns that the nature and the sequence of the 
occurrence of the critical junctures across Third World countries won’t necessarily fall 
under the predictions of the model and raises the question of the influence played by 
colonial experiences in fashioning political cleavages. The fight for independence, which 
availed itself of the nationalist ideology, prevented indeed the politicization of other social 
divisions (ibid.). However, new cleavages, be them identitarian or functional, might 
appear as consequences of post-independent strategies aimed at the formation and the 
consolidation of the new formed states. As Migdal illustrates, states’ ability to survive 
                                                             
 
58 For a different conceptualization of cleavage, see: Bornschier 2009.  
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largely relies on a series of factors among which mobilization emerges as the most 
important. Yet, at its origins, the state is just an organization among many others, 
sometimes in competition with them. To gain compliance, if not legitimation, state 
leaders must offer individuals a series of incentives that should result attractive.  
“Such packaging rests, of course, on the bedrock of material needs, but it also 
lends meaning to people’s behaviour as they meet those needs. A 
consciousness about social behaviour aims to tie actions together in some 
meaningful or purposeful way, to transcend trough action the specific act 
itself. These systems of meaning or symbolic configurations, whether 
ideology or beliefs or anything else, make manageable a universe, which could 
otherwise seem overwhelmingly threatening and impenetrable.” (ibid. 26).  
 
Post-independence Tunisia and Egypt exemplify this dynamic. Following the 
enfranchisement from foreign domination – which in Tunisia was embodied in the French 
protectorate while in Egypt in the influence exerted by the English crown through the 
Egyptian royal family even after the official end of the colony -, Habib Bourguiba, like 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, confronted themselves with the construction of a “viable, 
prosperous and modern state” (Perkins 2004, 130). The economic and social reforms put 
in place since the mid-50s constitute the policy packages to substantiate the newly 
acquired independence to attract the allegiance of their people while creating a unified 
nation, inexistent up to that moment (Gelvin 2004). On the one hand, a series of state-
driven economic plans of socialist inspiration were put in place to fight against 
underdevelopment. On the other hand, the transformation of the civil society was pursued 
through a series of policies aimed at undermining of the role Islam in the public sphere, 
supposed to hinder the new, and modern, esprit of those countries. It can thus be argued 
that Tunisia and Egypt, like many others third world countries and differently from 
western experiences, have only had one critical juncture – that is the national 
independence – that has created two fractures: an identitarian and a functional one. The 
first opposes those embracing secular and modern values against the nostalgic of the 
Islamic roots of the Tunisian and Egyptian cultures. The second has created a division 
between those who benefited from state economic policies (in terms of e.g. infrastructures 
and work opportunities) and those marginalized, if not exploited, by them.  
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As saw in the previous paragraph, these two lines of divisions may provide for the 
individuation of two different publics at both the empirical and the normative level of a 
cleavage. If there is covariance between them and the organizational level, then the 
Islamist/Secular divide can properly be defined as a cleavage. Yet, as Wegner and 
Cavatorta (2016) puts, it might by the case that only the normative level accounts for the 
vote choice. Alternatively, as Masoud (2014) argues, it can be the case that the divide 
stemming from the 2011-2012 ballot box has only to do with the organizational structures 
individuals are involved into, which are part of what students of electoral behaviour 
define “political intermediation”, namely “the varying channels and processes through 
which voters receive information about partisan politics” (Gunther et al. 2016, 2). These 
different readings lead to the formulation of competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis of organizational intermediation: the vote choice for Islamists and seculars at 
the 2011-2012 elections is driven by respectively mosque attendance and trade union 
membership.  
Hypothesis of identity politics: the vote choice for Islamists or seculars at the 2011-2012 
elections is only driven by identity issues, such as the role of religion in politics and the 
role of women within society.  
Hypothesis of cleavage politics: the vote choice for Islamists or seculars at the 2011-2012 
elections relies on the refusal or the acceptance of the entire ‘policy packaging’ on which 
autocrats were used to base their legitimacy. Out of it, personal piety, policy preferences 
for more room of religion in politics and poor socio/economic conditions drive the vote 
choice toward Islamist parties while wealthier people bearing secular worldviews vote 
for Secular parties.  
 
 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION, MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
The analysis conducted to test the aforementioned hypotheses avails itself of the data 
collected by the Arab Barometer project (hereafter AB). This is a survey dataset that 
gather individuals’ positioning on a series of social cultural and religious topics, opinions 
about institutions and political attitudes along with demographic information that fulfil 
the lack of data at the individual level in the MENA region. At the time of writing (March 
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2017), AB has conducted three waves of surveys thus progressively increasing the 
number of countries covered, and tracking the change of citizens’ attitudes and beliefs 
over time. For the purposes of the present research, only the Second Wave will be used 
(hereinafter ABII). This Wave has been conducted during the years 2010 and 2011. In 
Egypt face-to-face interviews have been conducted from June 16th to July 3rd, while in 
Tunisia from September 30th to October 15th 2011. This make these data more reliable 
as far as the questions on the vote intention are concerned for the Tunisian elections, 
which took place on October 23th, but a bit less for the Egyptian case, where elections 
started on November 28th and concluded on January 11th. The dataset counts as many as 
1219 observations in Egypt and 1196 in Tunisia. This latter has been subsequently self-
weighted for the probability of selection, moreover, post-stratification weights have been 
used in the present analysis to correct imbalances based on age and gender.  
In ascertaining the presence of a cleavages underneath the results of 2011 elections, I will 
recur to multinomial logistic models aimed at detecting possible correlation between the 
attributes of individuals and the vote choice. The dependent variable is the declared 
intention of vote here defined as a nominal variable with three categories: vote for 
Islamists, vote for their secular counterpart and vote for other parties. By so doing, it will 
be possible to grasp the differences in the determinants of vote choice between the two 
major electoral blocs emerging from the electoral consultations holding respondents that 
voted for other parties as the reference category. However, as table 4.1 shows, the 
stemming sample is really small for the low rate of respondents declaring to vote for a 
political party, 446 and 129 in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, due to indecisiveness (as 
is the case for Tunisia) or preference for an independent candidate (as is the case or 
Egypt).  
 
Table 4.1: Declared vote intention for the elections of the Constituent Assembly/Parliament 
 Tunisia Egypt 
Political party  466 129 
Independent candidates 102 822 
Don't know 585 189 
Declined to answer 42 1 
Do not participate/will see 1 78 
 1196 1219 
Source: ABII questions EG307 and T307. 
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Moreover, except for the case of Ennadha, gathering single parties into broader factions 
has been necessary to overcome problems of excessive disproportion among categories 
due to too small cells size. Table 4.2 reports the coding procedure. In Tunisia Ennadha 
party has been contrasted with other leftist secular parties, namely PDP, Ettakatol, CPR, 
PTT, Ettajdid, PS and PCOT. Hence, the dependent variable assumes value 1 if the vote 
choice is for Ennadha, 2 it the vote choice falls on one of the aforementioned leftist parties 
and 0 if respondents declared to vote for other parties. In Egypt, FJP party, Nour, Virtue 
Party, Building and Development Party and Wasat have been together considered as 
Islamist parties, with value 1 in the dependent variable, and contrasted against the 
Right/Secular front made up of the Free Egyptians, Wafd party and the Democratic front, 
for which the dependent variable assumes the value of 2. Also in this case, when 
respondents declare to vote for other parties than the above-enlisted, the dependent 
variable assumes the value of 0. In light of the small size of the present sample, due to the 
determination of the dependent variable, tests of representativeness will be presented at 
the end of the chapter to complement, and add further insights, the analysis of the 
multinomial models.     
 
Table 4.2: Dependent variable coding 
 Vote Islamist parties Vote Liberal/Secular Vote other parties 
Tunisia 240 75 151 
   Parties 
   included 
Ennadha (240) PDP (30) 
Ettakatol (15) 
CPR (18) 
PTT (2) 
Ettajdid (2) 
PS (1) 
PCOT (7) 
 
Egypt 40 37 52 
   Parties 
   included 
FJP (33) 
Nour (3) 
Virtue Party (1) 
BD (1) 
Wasat (2) 
Free Egyptians (26) 
Wafd (10) 
Democratic Front (1) 
 
Coding 1 2 0 
 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the amount of respondents declaring to vote for that specific party 
 
 
The independent variables are designed to account for each level of the cleavage. As far 
as socio-economic characteristics of individuals are concerned, these are here expressed 
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as self-reported house income, schooling years and area of residence aimed at capturing 
patterns of exclusion both at the national and at the regional level to test whether ‘material 
explanations’ hold. The first is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 4 where higher values 
indicate higher levels of respondents’ perceived wealth. Education is as well an ordinal 
variable constructed in accordance with UNESCO’s parameters59. Following them, each 
level of completed cycle of studies is here indicated in terms of schooling years, the 
minimum values is 0 denoting illiteracy while the maximum is 18 thus indicating at least 
the achievement of the MA degree. The others, urban/rural and area of residence, are 
dummy variables assuming value 1 for either rural or marginalized areas according to the 
regional pro capita consumption and unemployment rate of respondents’ governorate 
(Boughzala and Hamdi 2014). In order to have a measure of deprivation60 (Berman and 
Nugent 2015), a new variable has been created: it assumes value 1 if respondents 
simultaneously live in rural and marginalized areas, 0 in all the other cases, i.e. for all 
urban residents and rural residents in favoured areas. The normative level dimension is 
differentiated here among values and beliefs regarding identity and political attitudes 
towards policy issues that emerged during the transition. As far as identity issues are 
concerned, these are measured through self-definition of religiosity and cultural 
conservativism. The first is categorical variable assuming three values: not religious (1), 
somewhat religious (2) and religious (3). The other identity variable, cultural 
conservativism, is measured through an index reporting individuals’ positioning on 
gender issues. As saw in chapter two, some exponents and adherent of religious parties 
question gender equality by pinpointing to a conservative reading of the religious 
predicaments thus invoking the return to a traditional and patriarchal society, hence it 
might be probable that individual positioning on such issues will discriminate between 
Islamists and seculars voters (Zeghal 2013). Because the items included are ordinal 
categorical variables, this index has been constructed through an exploratory factor 
analysis on the polychoric correlation matrix of the items included (Choi, Peters, and 
                                                             
 
59 http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/DOcuments/isced-2011-en.pdf 
60  Theoretically speaking the presence of the variable ‘deprived areas’ would require a multilevel 
multinomial model in that it is not an individual-level variable for it reports context-level information. 
However, being it a dummy variable, it does not meet the formal criteria to proceed with multilevel 
modeling (Gelman 2005).  
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Mueller 2010; Vermunt and Magidson 2005). This procedure is particularly useful in that 
it allows for the identification of a latent variables also when working with ordinal 
variables by assuming these are obtained by categorizing a normally distributed 
unobserved variables and estimating the maximum-likelihood of their product moment 
correlation. In line with Kostenko et al. (2016) two latent factors emerge: one attributable 
to the public sphere and the other to the private one. Nonetheless, both need to be 
considered; therefore, a simple composite index has been created taking into account both 
spheres. The Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcient for a test scale based on the aforementioned 
items is 0.775 for Egypt and 0.804 for Tunisia, meaning that the resulting indexes have 
internal consistency and can be considered reliable measures of individuals’ standing 
toward gender issues, both in the public and in the private sphere. The variable so derived 
is a continuous one assuming values from 1 to 4, where higher values denote increasing 
oppositions to women’s empowerment in society. Individuals’ regime preferences have 
been operationalized as perceived suitability of democracy, preferred kind of regime, 
preferred source of law and trust towards the ‘deep state’ institutions. The first is a 
continuous limited variable ranging from 0 to 10, the higher the more suitable democracy 
appears to the respondent for its country. State preference is dummy variable indicating 
either support or a religious or a civil state. Two ordinal variables (ranging from 1 to 4) 
are indeed required for the preferred source of law, indicating increasing support for either 
the enforcement of laws according to Shari’s or according to the popular will. While most 
studies approach the religious divide in terms of preferences for more religious people in 
public offices (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007), or just preferences over the Shari’a 
(Berman and Nugent 2015), in this analysis both variables concerning the preferred 
source of law are included because these are weekly correlated (0.19) meaning that for 
most people Shari’a and popular will are not mutually exclusive as previously though 
(Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler 2015;  Tessler and Gao 2005). Keeping both of them is 
then aimed to account for pro or anti-democratic attitudes behind the vote choice that 
otherwise will be left overlooked. Trust toward deep state institution is also taken into 
account because many contributions suggest that the vote toward Islamist parties is 
largely attributable to the desire of a radical change with the past (Garcia-Rivero and 
Kotze 2007; Hashemi 2009). For the case of Egypt, an additive index has been created to 
account for trust toward the military and the judiciary while for the case of Tunisia, the 
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index grasp confidence towards the police and the judiciary. Finally, mosque attendance 
and trade unions membership are included to describe whether the link between possible 
social groups and their normative orientation is mediated by some sort of 
organizational/environmental component thus creating a veritable cleavage. Some 
authors also argue for the importance of this dimension by suggesting that in some case 
it is self-sufficient to explain individuals’ vote choice (Gunther et al. 2016; Masoud 2014). 
For instance, Pellicer and Wegner found that “in countries with large Islamist networks it 
is clear that Islamists do not differ demographically from voters of other parties” (Pellicer 
and Wegner 2015, 5). Given the law rate of respondents declaring to belong to a charitable 
association, only mosque attendance is here considered because of the associational 
networks orbiting around mosques that transcend worship functions (Masoud 2014). All 
these variables are controlled for (mean centred) age and sex. On the one hand, many 
studies suggest that older constituencies are less inclined to vote for an Islamist party than 
are the younger ones (Bașlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2005; Elsayyad and Hanafy 
2014). On the other hand, women are reportedly less inclined to vote for an Islamist party 
because of their opposition to gender equality (Cavatorta and Wagner 2017).  
 
4.4 HOW MUCH DIVIDED?   
 
In order to reconstruct the presence of a cleavage underneath voting behaviour, I first 
analyse each level separately though different multinomial models. This procedure allows 
to detect which factors are statistically significant within each level thus avoiding the risk 
of multicollinearity, that is the association between two (or more) explanatory variables. 
When this happen, only one of the involved variable appears as impacting significantly 
on the outcome variable. In our case, it might be possible that only normative variables 
appear to have a significant effect on the vote choice, even though individual political 
orientation might stem from predefined socio-economic conditions or organizational 
intermediaries. This circumstance is also to be expected because, out of Withefiled’s 
definition of cleavage, ideological perspectives might be thought as an intervening 
variable between social-differentiation and vote choice. 
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4.4.1 Egypt  
 
By contrasting the different categories of the dependent nominal variable within each 
level of the cleavage alone considered, few statistically significant differences between 
those voting for Islamist parties and those voting for their major competing faction 
emerge. As shown in table 4.3, on the empirical level only house income emerges as 
significantly associated with one category of the other of the dependent variable. This is 
positively correlated with the vote choice for an Islamist party and its log odds coefficient 
of 0.81 indicates that for a unit increase in individuals’ perceived wealth the probabilities 
to vote for an Islamist party than to vote for the residual parties enlisted in the reference 
category increase of 68%. However, the coefficients of the house income variable are not 
significantly different when contrasting the probabilities of voting for an Islamist party 
rather than one in the reference category against those of voting a Right/Secular parties 
rather than those in the base outcome. This means that while house income significantly 
discriminates Islamist voters against those voting parties in the reference category, it does 
not discriminate between Islamist and Right/Secular voters. The same applies to the 
variables age, deprived areas and schooling years. Even though they don’t emerge as 
statistically correlated with Islamist or Right/Secular voters against the base outcome, the 
direction of their impact differs across the two categories of the dependent variable here 
considered. Yet, in no case the coefficients of such variables associated with Islamist or 
secular voters differ. On the normative level (see the second column in table 4.3), as 
expected cultural conservativism is significantly positively correlated with the electoral 
preference for Islamist parties rather than those in the reference category in that a unitary 
increase in the index of cultural conservatism more than doubles (+245%) probabilities 
to vote them rather than others. However, the impact of this variable in determining this 
choice does not statistically differ form that behind the vote choice for secular parties 
(whose log odds coefficient is of 0.407). Similarly, the belief that popular will should be 
at the base of the legislation is negatively correlated with the religious vote. Yet, its 
coefficients (-0.494 and -0.225) are not statistically different across religious and secular 
voters vis-à-vis the other ones. On the same token, a unit increase in the agreement with 
the statement that the Shari’a should be enlisted among the sources of law more than 
doubles the relative probability of voting an Islamist party instead of one of those in the 
reference category and diminishes of 23% the probabilities of voting a right/secular 
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parties instead of one in the reference category. Moreover, as expected the two 
coefficients are statistically different across the two groups. Not really surprisingly (and 
cautioning from referring to political Islam and democracy in either/or terms), the belief 
that democracy is suitable for Egypt is significantly and positively correlated with both 
the vote choice for Islamist and Right/Secular parties rather than others. Both kinds of 
voters indeed, share the belief democracy is suitable for Egypt and, in so doing, they 
distinguish themselves from the voters of parties in the reference category. In total 
contradiction with other studies (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007), trust towards 
institutions is significantly and positively correlated with religious vote but negatively 
(even though not significantly) correlated with the Right/Secular vote, and such 
difference is statistically relevant. In this sense, there seems that the religious vote stands 
not for a protest vote, nor for a pious vote in that religiosity doesn’t have a meaningful 
impact in determining the vote choice or in distinguishing Islamic parties’ voters from all 
the others. From the analysis of the organizational level (see the third column in table 
4.3), both trade union membership and mosque attendance behave as expected. The first 
is positively correlated with the secular vote but negatively associated with the vote for 
Islamist parties. The second, by contrast, is positively related with the religious vote but 
has a negative relationship with the secular one. Yet, no one of the coefficients associated 
with these variable is significant in discriminating these choices from the base outcome, 
nor are they statistically different across the two groups of interest.   
When considering all the aforementioned variables (and therefore the three dimensions) 
into a unique model, the normative level emerges over the other dimensions previously 
analysed. As shown in table 4.4, while some variables account for the vote choice of 
Islamist parties or Right/Secular against the reference category, such as schooling years, 
house income, popular will, trade union membership and Islamic law, only this latter is 
also statistically significant in distinguishing religious against secular voters. Indeed, only 
in this case the coefficient associated with the vote choice for an Islamist party rather 
those in the reference category is different from that distinguishing the vote choice for a 
Right/Secular parties from the base outcome. In front of all these findings, the divide 
between Islamists and Seculars emerged in the occasion of the 2011-2012 elections is not 
a veritable cleavage. On the one hand, the three dimensions do not overlap. On the other 
hand, the empirical referent is totally missing in that there is not socio/economic 
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differentiation between the two groups of voters and there is not a veritable differentiation 
in the organizational intermediaries. What seems to emerge in Egypt is not even an 
identity divide as suggested elsewhere (Pellicer and Wegner 2014, 2015; Wegner and 
Cavatorta 2016), in that personal issues related to identity and to the definition of the 
society (exemplified by the variables religiosity and cultural conservativism) are not 
relevant in discriminating the voters of the two factions opposing each other during the 
transition. Rather, there appears to be a divide on the ‘rules of the game’ opposing those 
who want more room for religion into the bases of legislation against those opting for a 
secular law-making.  
Table 4.3: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Egypt 
 Socio/Economic Level Normative Level Organizational Level 
 Islamists Right/Secular Islamist Right/Secular Islamist  Right/Secular 
       
       
Age 0.00563 -0.0107     
 (0.0159) (0.0176)     
Female -0.238 -0.349     
 (0.481) (0.495)     
Deprived areas -0.290 0.0925     
 (0.478) (0.489)     
School years -0.00145 0.0512     
 (0.0404) (0.0444)     
House income 0.484* 0.289     
 (0.261) (0.271)     
       
Religiosity   0.354 -0.163   
   (0.461) (0.426)   
Cultural   1.181** 0.407   
  conservativism   (0.590) (0.472)   
Shari’a   0.804** -0.228   
   (0.404) (0.290)   
Popular will   -0.494* -0.255   
   (0.276) (0.258)   
Suitability of    0.226** 0.196*   
   democracy   (0.113) (0.106)   
Religious state   0.796 0.0558   
   (0.682) (0.749)   
Trust in institutions           0.717* -0.132   
  (0.399) (0.298)   
       
Trade union      -0.561 0.235 
   membership        (0.654) (0.572) 
Mosque     0.221 -0.126 
   attendance     (0.212) (0.184) 
Constant -1.017 -1.423* -9.397*** -0.229 -0.908 0.0464 
 (0.786) (0.844) (3.010) (2.170) (0.787) (0.654) 
       
Observations 126 126 120 120 127 127 
Pseudo R2 0.0348 0.1326 0.0153 
Prob > chi2 0.4794 0.0016 0.3737 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed 
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Table 4.4: Vote determinants in Egypt 
 Islamists Right/Secular 
   
Age 0.00702 0.00588 
 (0.0217) (0.0215) 
Female -0.276 -1.028 
 (0.795) (0.784) 
Deprived -0.345 0.137 
 (0.629) (0.571) 
School years 0.0287 0.0857* 
 (0.0507) (0.0521) 
House income 0.708** 0.120 
 (0.356) (0.310) 
Religiosity  0.0266 0.0131 
 (0.561) (0.495) 
Traditional index 1.009 0.295 
 (0.665) (0.535) 
Islamic law 0.933** -0.249 
 (0.450) (0.326) 
Popular will -0.609** -0.230 
 (0.306) (0.289) 
Suitability of democracy 0.119 0.249** 
 (0.124) (0.125) 
Religious State 0.945 -0.314 
 (0.786) (0.887) 
Trust in institutions 0.631 -0.176 
 (0.470) (0.331) 
Mosque attendance 0.104 -0.395 
 (0.329) (0.302) 
Trade unions membership -1.839* -1.092 
 (0.956) (0.810) 
Constant -9.004*** 0.0169 
 (3.452) (2.855) 
   
Observations 116 116 
Pseudo R2     0.1845  
Prob>chi2   0.0146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed 
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4.4.2 Tunisia  
 
Also in the case of Tunisia, the analysis will proceed stepwise. First, each component of 
cleavage politics is separately considered, then the focus will fall on the fully specified 
model. As far as the empirical level is concerned, socio-economic differences emerge in 
both countries. While age, gender and regional marginalization do not have an impact on 
the vote choice for one faction or the other, house income and education significantly 
impact on the final decision at the ballot box. As table 4.5 shows, the variable schooling 
years positively impacts on the vote choice for Left/Secular parties with respect to the 
reference category. In particular, the effect of one additional year of education is 
associated with a 0.25 increase in the relative log odds of being in vocation program vs. 
academic program, meaning that for each additional schooling years the probabilities to 
vote for Left/Secular parties increase of 11%. At the same time, this variable seems to not 
have any statistically significant impact on the vote choice for Ennadha with respect to 
the reference category, even though a negative impact is suggested (a decrease of 2% for 
each additional schooling year). Such different effect education has on the categories of 
interest, Ennadha and Left/Secular voters, is also statistically significant for we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with education are equal for the two 
categories via-à-vis the one of reference with a confidence of 99%. The same trend 
appears to be followed also by the variable house income. An increase in the perceived 
wealth increases of 29% the probabilities of vote for a Left/Secular party and decreases 
of 5% those for Ennadha. Even though this effect is not statistically significant in 
discriminating from the base outcome ‘vote for others’, it is significantly different when 
comparing the effect house income has in determining a Left/secular vote vs. the base 
outcome with that played in determining a vote for Ennadha vs. the base outcome. 
However, this does not imply that more educated and wealthier people have more 
probabilities to vote for a Left/Secular party instead of Ennadha. As a matter of fact, those 
with the highest slef-reported income have a probability as high as 41% of being Ennadha 
voters and 28% of being Left/Secular voters. On the same token, those in possess of a 
master degree or more have 37 and 33 percent of probabilities to vote for Ennadha or 
Left/Secular respectively. Coming to the normative level, religiosity, cultural 
conservativism, support for the Islamic law and preference for a religious state appear to 
discriminate the vote choice among the different groups of voters. Unsurprisingly, 
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increases in the self-definition of piety are correlated with an increase of 55 percent of 
the probabilities to vote for Ennadha and a decrease of the 27% of probabilities to vote 
for Let/Secular parties. Yet, even when people define themselves as ‘not religious’ there 
is a statistical significance in voting for one faction (39% of probabilities to vote Ennadha) 
or the other (23% to vote Left/Secular) vis-à-vis the reference group, meaning that 
religiosity impacts on the magnitude but not on the figure that Ennadha is the most voted 
party. In the same line, a unit increment in the agreement that the laws should be enacted 
in accordance with the Islamic law significantly increases of 68% of probabilities of a 
vote choice for a Ennadha while significantly decreases of 35% those for Left/Secular 
factions with respect to the reference category. Paralleling this figure, the probability of 
voting Ennadha are more than double (236%) for those preferring a religious state instead 
of a civic state. Finally, and quite surprisingly, support for gender equality while 
statistically increasing (of 78% for unit) the probability of vote for a Left/Secular party, 
has no relevance the propensity to vote for Ennadha vis-à-vis the reference category. 
Contrary to the expectations of finding a positive correlation between cultural 
conservativism (measured trough attitudes toward gender equality) and voting Ennadha, 
it has emerged that a unitary increase on this index is associated with a  little, even though 
not having statistically significance, decrease (4%) in the vote choice for Ennadha. The 
remaining variables, trust towards ‘deep state institutions’ and suitability of democracy 
do not have any statistically relevant effect in discriminating the vote choice for Ennadha 
or Left/Secular factions with respect to the reference category and even if they have 
different effects on the different categories of the dependent variable, such differences 
are not statistically significant, thus suggesting they are not helpful to discriminate the 
final vote choice. On the organizational level, the two selected variables mosques 
attendance and trade union membership have both a role in determining the vote choice. 
Mosque attendance is significantly correlated with voting Ennadha and Left/Secular 
parties but, as expected, the direction of this correlation is positive in the first case and 
negative in the second one. Trade union membership increases of 48% the vote choice 
for Left/Secular parties with respect to the reference category. Interestingly, even if not 
meaningful, this variable is positively associated also with the vote choice for Ennadha, 
partially confirming Waltz (19878) and Wickham’s (2004) findings that that Islamists are 
particularly successful in penetrating trade unions and professional syndicates – despite 
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the statistically difference between the effect trade union membership has in 
discriminating the two categories of interest (Ennadha and Left/Secular voter) against the 
base outcome.  
 
Table 4.5: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Tunisia 
 Socio/Economic Level Normative Level Organizational Level 
 Nahdha Left/Secular Nahdha Left/Secular Nahdha Left/Secular 
       
       
Age 0.00785 0.0107     
 (0.00807) (0.0114)     
Female 0.0976 0.436     
 (0.214) (0.295)     
Deprived areas 0.0543 0.0364     
 (0.299) (0.461)     
School years -0.0153 0.104***     
 (0.0217) (0.0325)     
House income -0.0468 0.255     
 (0.116) (0.159)     
Religiosity   0.441** -0.311   
   (0.210) (0.284)   
Cultural conservativism   -0.0367 -1.249***   
   (0.278) (0.386)   
Shari’a   0.519*** -0.417*   
   (0.186) (0.227)   
Popular will   0.0667 0.259   
   (0.179) (0.225)   
Suitability of democracy   0.0601 -0.0597   
   (0.0542) (0.0714)   
Religious state   0.860*** -0.375   
   (0.314) (0.524)   
Trust in institutions   -0.229 0.00238   
   (0.145) (0.194)   
Trade union      1.123 2.254*** 
   membership     (0.800) (0.856) 
Mosque     0.152** -0.196** 
   attendance     (0.0656) (0.0951) 
Constant 0.685** -2.592*** -2.103* 2.890** 0.0329 -0.289 
 (0.310) (0.510) (1.095) (1.384) (0.216) (0.271) 
       
Observations 464 464 355 355 457 457 
Pseudo R2  0.0376 
0.0001 
0.1233 
0.0000 
0.0279 
0.0000 Prob>Chi2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed 
 
When considering the full model integrating all three dimensions, much of what 
previously found still applies. As shown in table 4.6, education, house income, 
willingness to enlist the Shari’a among the sources of law and preference for a religious 
state appear statistically significant in discriminating the vote choice in the direction seen 
above, even with slightly different magnitude. For each additional year of schooling, the 
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probability of a Left/Secular vote increases of only the 7%, while unitary increments in 
the perceived wealth raise it to 54%. Preference for the Islamic Law ceases to be 
significantly correlated with a drop in the probabilities to vote for secular parties but 
remains highly significant in determining a rise (of 78% for each unit increase) in the 
probabilities to opt for Ennadha. Similarly, other things being equal, the relative 
probability of voting for Ennadha rather than parties in the reference category is more 
than double (+221%) for those preferring to live in a religious state. Even if those 
variables are statistically significant only when contrasting one of category of interest of 
the dependent variable with the base outcome (education and house income are 
statistically significant only for Left/Secular outcomes while preferred source of law and 
preference for a religious state are significant only when considering Ennadha voters), 
the trends these display are significantly different across Left/Secular and Ennadha voters. 
Nonetheless, the full model provides also for dissimilarities with the models examined 
before. First, cultural conservativism ceases to be significant for the Left/Secular outcome 
and its coefficient associated with Left/Secular and Ennadha voters are not statistically 
different. Second, the effects of the organizational predictors disappear. While the 
coefficients of mosque attendance still differ across the Ennadha and Left/Secular voters, 
this variable is no more significant in discriminating Ennadha voters from the base 
outcome. Moreover, trade union membership loses both statistically significance in 
discriminating the base category from the others considered and ceases to differ across 
Ennadha and Left/Secular voters. Compared to the case of Egypt, at first glance the 
Tunisian public seems more deeply divided in that the division around the role Shari’a 
should have within the new regime is accompanied by a divide in the socio/economic 
conditions due to the statistical difference of the coefficient related to education and house 
income. The next section will provide a series of robustness checks to attest the reliability 
of such findings.    
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Table 4.6: Vote determinants in Tunisia 
 Nahdha Left/Secular 
   
Age -0.00998 0.00976 
 (0.0107) (0.0146) 
Female 0.203 0.378 
 (0.326) (0.416) 
Deprived 0.518 -0.0589 
 (0.420) (0.627) 
School years -0.0158 0.0722* 
 (0.0291) (0.0429) 
House income -0.0305 0.435** 
 (0.148) (0.205) 
Religiosity  0.346 -0.415 
 (0.225) (0.310) 
Traditional index -0.132 -0.580 
 (0.319) (0.479) 
Islamic law 0.582*** -0.315 
 (0.193) (0.240) 
Popular will 0.0795 0.396 
 (0.187) (0.244) 
Suitability of democracy 0.0493 -0.0306 
 (0.0561) (0.0776) 
Religious State 0.795** -0.177 
 (0.325) (0.551) 
Trust in institutions -0.224 -0.0250 
 (0.152) (0.208) 
Mosque attendance 1.354 1.569 
 (0.850) (0.991) 
Trade unions membership 0.162 -0.221 
 (0.0990) (0.141) 
Constant -2.335* -0.547 
 (1.344) (1.851) 
   
Observations 349 349 
Pseudo R2   0.1663   
Prob>Chi2   0.0000   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed 
 
  
4.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES   
 
In order to assess the degree of reliability of the present findings, tests of robustness and 
representativeness are here conducted. The first kind of tests serves the purpose to 
ascertain whether the models used were suited to account for the vote choice in Tunisia 
and Egypt. The second ones are needed to assess whether the stemming findings account 
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for the entire population by controlling for possible selection bias due to the small size of 
the samples used. 
Above all we might want to know the overall meaingfulness of the predictors included in 
the models by looking at their variance across the different categories of the dependent 
variable. This can be done recurring to a Wald test for independent variables which 
verifies whether all the coefficients associated with the independent variables are 
statistically different form zero, which constitute the null hypothesis. The results of this 
test, reported in table 4.7, show that for most of the independent variables included in our 
models, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected – meaning that, from a formal point of 
view, those variables can be removed from the model for they add nothing to its goodness 
of fit. In Tunisia only religiosity, preference for Shari’a and an Islamic state and mosque 
attendance have non trivial effects on the dependent variable. In Egypt the same can be 
said only for the Islamic law variable.  
 
Table 4.7: Wald test for independent variables 
 Tunisia Egypt 
Vote choice Chi2 Df P>chi2 Chi2 Df P>chi2 
Age   2.031 2 0.362 0.569         2 0.752 
Female      0.917     2     0.632 2.335        2 0.311 
Deprived 1.861     2    0.394 0.495   2     0.781 
School years   4.244     2 0.120 3.397     2 0.183 
House income  5.662     2 0.059 5.160      2 0.076 
Religiosity        6.354     2    0.042 0.109    2     0.947 
Traditional index     1.467     2 20.480 2.237     2 20.327 
Islamic law  15.313     2    0.000 6.954       2 0.031 
Popular will     2.653     2     0.265 3.546    2     0.170 
Suitability of democracy 1.352     2   0.509 4.614         2 0.100 
State preference   7.792     2 0.020 2.491     2 0.288 
Trust in institutions     2.374     2 0.305 2.522     2 0.283 
Trade union membership 3.033     2 0.219 5.581       2 0.061 
Mosque attendance       7.966     2 0.019 1.989     2 0.370 
Constant  3.115     2 0.211 7.043         2 0.030 
 Note: The H0 hypothesis tested is that all coefficients associated with given variables are 0 
 
A similar test is also conducted on the dependent variables. In this case we want to know 
whether, in light of the predictors included into the model, different categories of the 
dependent variable can be combined. Indeed, if, as shown in table 4.7, only few variables 
affect the odds of the different outcomes of the dependent variable, it might be the case 
that the different categories of the dependent variable are indistinguishable with respect 
to the variable in the model. To ascertain whether this is the case another Wald test has 
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been conducted to test the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercepts 
associated with a given pair of alternatives are equal to 0. In Tunisia, no one of the 
categories identified should be collapsed, as table 4.8 shows. In Egypt, by contrast, all 
pairs of alternative can be collapsed into a unique one (see table 4.9), meaning that, there 
are not meaningful distinctions across the different groups of voters on the base of the 
independent variables identified.   
 
 
Table 4.8: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Tunisia) 
 Chi2 df P>chi2 
Others vs. Ennadha 39.575    14 0.000 
Others vs. Left/Secular 30.200    14 0.007 
Ennadha vs. 
Left/Secular 
60.025    14 0.000 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Egypt) 
 Chi2 df P>chi2 
Others vs. Islamists 23.104    14 0.059 
Others vs. Right/Secular 11.363    14 0.657 
Islamists vs. 
Right/Secular 
17.668    14 0.222 
 
 
It then emerges that the fully specified model works quite good for Tunisia, but not for 
Egypt. What about the step-wise modeling then? The same figure emerges also in this 
case, with the exception that, as expected, the normative model in the Egyptian case 
shows a significant distinction between Islamist voters and those opting for a party 
included in the reference category. Nonetheless, by making a comparison of the goodness 
of fit between the model with only the socio-economic determinants and the model with 
only the organizational factors, it emerges that the variables related to individuals’ 
associational life better account for the vote choice than the socio-economic ones. This is 
what emerges by looking at two particular measures of goodness of fit, namely the AIC 
(Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion). Both measures 
provide information about the fit of the estimated model with the observed data by 
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weighing model’s likelihood functions for its parameters (and in the case of BIC, also the 
sample size is taken into account). The recourse to these measures is particularly suited 
to compare competing theories expressed by different models, and the one with lower 
scores on both AIC and BIC is to be preferred (Burnham and Anderson 2004). As table 
4.10 shows, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the organizational model outperforms the 
socio/economic one in both measure, thus corroborating network theories for vote choice.  
 
 
Table 4.10: Measures of fit for multivariate models 
 Tunisia Egypt 
 Organizational 
model 
Socio/Economic 
Model 
Difference 
Organizational 
model 
Socio/Economic 
Model 
Difference 
N:                               457 464 -7 127 126 1 
LR: 25.331(4) 38.487(12) 
-13.156 
(-8) 
4.247(4) 9.566(10) 
-5.319 
(-6) 
Prob>LR:                      0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.374 0.479 -0.106 
McFaden 's 
Adj R2:              
0.008 -0.004 0.012 -0.050 -0.096 0.046 
AIC:   1.972 2.006 -0.034 2.287 2.391 -0.104 
BIC:                        -1860.673 -1831.179 -14.725 -299.166 -257.066 -42.100 
 
Negative differences between the organizational and the socio/economic model in both 
AIC and BIC suggest that the first of the two model is to be preferred for it better fits the 
observed data controlling for the number of the parameters included. Nonetheless, the 
difference of -14.725 observed in the BIC values for Tunisia suggests that the 
organizational model is far better than the other one in accounting for the vote choice. 
The same goes for Egypt, even though none of the two models is deemed to be reliable 
for we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is in fact no effect of the independent 
variables, taken together, on the dependent variable (Prob>LR is greater than 0.05). Yet, 
the organizational model seems the less evil.  
As far as the representativeness of these findings is concerned, a test has been conducted 
by comparing the means of the independent variables between the sample constituted by 
those voting for a political party and all other respondents. By looking at the results in 
tables 4.11 and 4.12, it emerges that while the variables accounting for individual beliefs 
and political preferences do not vary across the two groups, much of variation is at stake 
as far as the socio/economic and organizational variables are concerned. It is to because 
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the probability that the means of those variable differ across the two groups is higher than 
95%.  
 
Table 4.11:  T-test results on two independent samples, Egypt 
Variable  Party voters  Others Pr(|T| > |t|)  
age (mean) 37.42636 39.75413 0.0735 
female (mean) .3100775 .5183486 0.0000 
deprived (mean) .4418605 .5798165 0.0028 
schooling years (mean) 10.33333 8.623853 0.0037 
house income (mean) 2.206349 1.836111 0.0000 
self-reported religiosity (mean)  2.338583 2.363383 0.6106 
traditional index (mean) 2.54080 2.608265 0.2254 
mosque attendance (mean) 3.425197 3.127679  0.0101 
trade union member (mean) .1472868 .093578 0.0538 
preference for Shari’a  (mean) 3.232558 3.232537 0.9998 
Suitability democracy (mean) 6.897638 6.819139 0.7146 
 
 
 
Table 4.12: T-test results on two independent samples, Tunisia 
Variable  Party voters  Others Pr(|T| > |t|)  
age (mean) 37.42918 41.81096 0.0000 
female (mean) 0.4270386  0.5410959 0.0001 
deprived (mean) .1523605 .2589041 0.0000 
schooling years (mean) 9,381974 7.224658 0.0000 
house income (mean) 2.172414 1.859944 0.0000 
self-reported religiosity (mean) 1.995633 1.956764 0.3108 
mosque attendance (mean) 2.886214 2.443515 0.0000 
trade union member (mean) .0429185 .0219178 0.0382 
preference for Shari’a  (mean) 2.770642 2.717822 0.2627   
Suitability democracy (mean) 5.926606 6.043831 0.4415 
 
In particular, in both countries respondents declaring to vote for a political parties tend to 
be younger, male and are socially and economically well integrated. They are indeed more 
affluent than the rest of the sample, more educated, do not reside in deprived areas and 
are more probably than others trade union members or mosque attendants. This picture 
enlightens that while individuals’ political preferences are equally distributed across the 
party voters and the rest of the sample, individuals’ reaction to elections, e.g. deciding 
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whether to participate or not, vote for an independent candidate or a party, or being 
undecided, relies on their socio/economic background and their organizational newtorks. 
In light of this, while political preferences regarding the role of religion in politics – i.e. 
Shair’a as source of law and preference for a religious state - are the primary drivers 
accounting for the electoral preference between Islamist and their secular counterparts, 
socio/economic and organizational variables are relevant in accounting for how this 
preference is expressed and the degree of political conscience underneath.  
The present findings reveal that indeed no remarkable differences emerge in the two 
national patterns of vote choice. In both cases, the divide appears to be confined to the 
role of religion in politics as the result of individuals’ proximity to particular networks. 
Yet, while these findings are sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that deep and stratified 
social divisions have played a role in the two processes of transitions, it is not sufficient 
to dismiss the hypothesis that the religious divide alone can be perceived as a threat to the 
achievement of any kind of compromised agreement upon the future of the constituendum 
political regime and its nation. In both cases, preferences for more religion in politics 
predict the vote for religious parties while its rejection is positively correlated to the 
electoral preference for their competitors. But was Islam the real and major concern of 
North African people? The next chapter will answer this question thus enlightening why 
Islamists dominated the ballot boxes.  
 
 
  
132 
 
  
 
 
133 
 
5 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND TRANSITIONAL PARTIES’ 
POWER RESOURCES 
 
Intriguingly, the emergence of a religious cleavage limited to the normative sphere, 
occurs shortly after mass protests articulated by claims historically prompted by leftist 
parties, which were dominant in the 1970s but performed incredibly poor in the 
subsequent decades and in the 2011-2012 elections as well. According to Hinnebusch 
(1981), the causes of the emergence of some parties and the rollback of others are to be 
attributed either to the social environment or to the structures of the state, or both. After 
ascertaining that society seem particularly receptive to Leftists’ messages, this part is 
dedicated to the investigation of the institutional determinants behind different parties’ 
power resources which, accordingly to the model exposed in chapter three, contribute to 
the formation of parties’ strategy profile within processes of democratic installation. This 
disproportion of power, expressed in terms of parties’ share of seats inside the elected 
assemblies, discourages cooperative strategies from the part of bigger parties thus 
undermining the prospects of a democratic installation. While in Tunisia the strength of 
Ennadha was rather contained, that was not the case for the Islamist faction in Egypt. 
While it is certainly true that the different electoral systems for the founding elections in 
Tunisia and Egypt contribute to explain for eventual misrepresentations and the possible 
creation of governing coalitions, it appears that the disproportion between the great 
victories of Islamist formations and the poor records displayed by the leftist ones has 
deeper roots. In line with a regional trend, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the cooptation, 
manipulation and repression of oppositions within the previous authoritarian regimes 
have contributed to the electoral successes of the Islamists parties while determining the 
irrelevance of the leftist ones, thus undermining the prospect for a democratic installation. 
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5.1 FROM LEFTIST PROTESTS TO THE ISLAMIST DOMINION: THE GAP OF THE FOUNDING 
ELECTIONS  
 
The uprisings of 2010-2011 are often accounted for as unorganized spontaneous 
movements of protests led by young people and a-political in their contents (Cavatorta 
2012). It is so because “no party, no union, no politician gave the impetus for this popular 
uprising nor were they in any way involved” (Ben Yahmed 2011). The upheavals 
occurred “outside the expected parameters of civil activism” (Cavatorta 2012, 78). They 
didn’t have any recognizable leaders, nor they were imbued with clearly recognizable 
ideologies. Moreover, long standing opposition groups, such as the Islamists and the lefts 
were caught by surprise by these uprisings in the same way of the incumbent dictators 
and foreign observers. Remarkably enough, in 2011 the protesters rejected any partisan 
affiliations, nor were they known for previous political or trade unionist engagement. Out 
of this, much of ink has flowed to account for the role of the social media as substitutes 
for coordination functions, which are usually ascribed to political parties and to the formal 
structures of social activism, “in spreading protest messages, driving coverage by 
mainstream broadcasters, connecting frustrated citizens with one another, and helping 
them to realize that they could take shared action regarding shared grievances” (Howard 
and Hussain 2011, 41), too often overlooking the real content of these grievances. 
Contrasting this narrative recounting the deeds of ‘the people’ as a revolutionary actor 
triggered by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the young man who set himself 
on fire on December 17th 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, some scholars locate these uprisings in a 
broader contest of class struggle. Writing before the popular uprisings of 2010-2011, Allal 
(2009, 2010) and Al-Mahdi (2011) account for a sustained activity of contentious politics 
brought about by the workers in Tunisia and Egypt respectively since the mid-2000s. In 
both cases, the working class, which was the hardcore constituency of post-independence 
populist regimes, started to organize itself beyond the established corporative structures 
to protest against the erosion of the social pact underpinning those regimes before the 
introduction of neo-liberal measures of political economy. In line with these 
contributions, for Zemni et al., the Arab Spring is a step toward “political and social 
emancipation of the masses from domination and exploitation” (Zemni, De Smet, and 
Bogaert 2013, 18) brought about by the capitalist economy. In their reading, the 
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organization of the labor movement had spillover effects on the entire civil society. 
Drawing from Luxemburg, according to which “the economic struggle is the transmitter 
from one political center to another; the political struggle is the periodic fertilization of 
the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change places ... ” 
(1906, 145 cited in Zemni et al. 2013), the economic grievances naturally arrived to 
question the very political choices of incumbents and the nature of their regimes. In this 
way, those not falling into the categories of workers, but belonging instead to the educated 
middle classes of favored areas translated such economic claims into political grievances. 
In a very similar way, Achcar conceives the Arab Spring as a “as a protracted or long-
term revolutionary process” (Achcar 2013, 17) not really against neo-liberalism tout 
court, but rather against its specific regional variant imbued with rentierism and/or 
patrimonialism.  
While it is not the scope of this chapter to investigate whether the Arab Spring was 
actually a revolution against neo-capitalistic liberal regimes led by leftist-inspired forces, 
it is nonetheless true that the uprisings across the region, and particularly in Tunisia and 
Egypt, spoke a leftist jargon resumed in the revolutionary claims “change, freedom and 
social justice” or “bread, jobs and dignity” (Chomiak and Entelis 2011). In this regard, 
the recourse to the ABII data allows to capture personal orientations regarding some 
values that correspond to the tenets of the Left, namely the need for pluralism, secularism, 
women rights, and economic redistribution (for the construction of variables see the 
annex). The data show that when the previous regime was toppled and a new one was yet 
to build, north African citizens of Tunisia and Egypt were majorly concerned by the 
economic environment.  
As figure 5.1 shows, precisely 69.34% and 82,79% of Tunisians and Egyptians 
respectively perceived unemployment and poverty as the major challenges of their 
country despite the precarious institutional and political conditions. Indeed, concerns over 
regime stability and internal security are regarded as the major challenge only by 7,36% 
of Tunisians and 6,97% of Egyptians, coming after the desire to fight administrative and 
financial corruption. 
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Figure 5.1: Perceived priorities in Tunisia and Egypt, 2011 
  
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II 
 
 
Finally, and from a broader perspective, in the immediate aftermath of the regimes’ 
downfall and right before the call for the elections, the majority of surveyed people 
believed that a parliamentary system, wherein all parties can compete in elections, would 
be appropriate for their country. Even though this is not a uniquely leftist claim, leftist 
parties have nonetheless championed the introduction of a genuine parliamentary system 
and political pluralism (see figure 5.2). At the same time, the majority of respondents 
believed that religion should be disentangled from social and the political life (see figure 
5.3), and that women should have the same opportunities and rights as men (see figure 
5.4). The variables used to grasp these personal orientations toward these issues are all 
ordinal categorical variables ranging from 1 (total detachment) to 4 (complete 
attachment). Interestingly, in no cases such political values are put under discussion in 
that the means in both countries are always beyond the 2 score threshold. Moreover, these 
figures are in line with a regional trend whereby Arab public’s social and political 
 
 
137 
 
orientations are gradually shifting toward more modern, pluralist and secular stances 
(Resta 2018).  
 
Figure 5.2: Suitabiltity of a Parliamentary system wherein all parties can contest elections, 2011 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.  
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Figure 5. 3: Index of secularism, 2011 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.  
Figure 5. 4: Support for gender equality 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.  
 
Yet, these findings sound like a paradox in that the rise (or the discovery) of a society 
supportive of redistributive measures and progressive values corresponds to the 
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resurgence of Islamist parties both in terms of mass support and parliamentary 
representation within transitional regimes. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary claims 
and the normative orientations of surveyed respondents would have predicted a massive 
Left vote in both Tunisia and Egypt instead of an ‘Islamist dominion’. The reasons of this 
electoral gap, expressed through the lack of political representation of this new Arab 
public (Achcar 2013), have been framed in terms of ‘bad choices’ as far as the transitional 
electoral systems are concerned. Yet, it might be the case to also consider to frame them 
in terms of uneven patterns competition resulting in an unbalanced power resources 
among the competing parties to the benefit of the Islamists one. In the following the 
validity of each account will be considered.  
 
 
5.2 BLAME ON THE FOUNDING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS?  
 
The electoral systems used for the founding elections are naturally the prime suspects 
regarded as accountable for the gap observed between people’s orientations and the 
results produced by the ballot boxes. The impact of the electoral systems on the political 
life of a given country has been a majorly debated theme in political science but their 
effect are all the more salient at the time of founding elections in cases where the transition 
from non-democracy is rapid and dramatic (Carey 2014).  
Depending on the decisions around the three constitutive elements of an electoral system, 
namely the electoral formula, the structure of the vote and the dimension of electoral 
districts, it is possible to arrive to different kinds of electoral systems depending on their 
simplicity, their effects on inclusiveness, distortion, incentives in building coalitions and 
individual accountability – aspects electoral reformers in founding elections are deemed 
to purse as goals (Carey and Reynolds 2011). In this perspective, as has been reported by 
many, different kinds of electoral systems can favor or hinder a democratic transition by 
determining the relative power positioning of competing parties and by conceding room 
to manipulations and frauds. Out these considerations, the Tunisian electoral system has 
been often presented as the poster case for its positive impact on the Constituent 
Assembly, while the Egyptian one has been repeatedly pointed to as one of the principal 
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causes of the failed transition. Yet, as the remaining part of this section will show, while 
the electoral systems can account for relative differences in single parties’ representation, 
displaying more or less distortive effects, they fall short in accounting for the regional 
(beyond Tunisia and Egypt) success of Islamic formations and the concomitant rollback 
of leftist parties which, from the above survey data, appear as the natural vehicles for the 
realization of north African people’s political ambitions. 
 
 
5.2.1 The Tunisian electoral system      
 
The electoral system choice made by Ben Ashour’s commission has deemed to be 
particularly fortunate by many observers (Carey and Reynolds 2011; Carey 2013; Stepan 
and Linz 2013). It is so because the provisions around its constitutive element assured 
“high scores on almost all key markers” (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 40) mentioned above. 
As far as the structure of vote is concerned, the closed-list vote providing for the gender 
quota has had good effects on inclusiveness but noxious effects on individual 
accountability. On the one hand, the provision of lists with alternated representation of 
men and women had the undoubtable effect of including in the circuit of passive 
electorate also women otherwise possibly left at the margins. On the other hand, this has 
deprived citizens with the possibility of choosing their own candidates – whereas party 
did – thus reducing MPs’ accountability in front of their electorates. This effect appears 
in all its evidence by looking at the parties’ outflows inside the ANC in the months 
following the elections. Coming further to the most substantive features, the recourse to 
the Hare electoral formula with largest remainders (HQLR), which is the most 
proportional electoral system among those available, was enhanced by the district 
magnitude. Indeed, at the time of elections, the 33 electoral districts were to elect the 
members of the constituent assembly (for a total of 217) in proportion to their population. 
Out of this, districts’ magnitude ranged from 1 to 10, but often districts were entrusted 
with the election of 5 or 7 MPs. In the absence of a legal threshold, this moderate 
magnitude allowed the representation of also small parties. It is so because under the 
HQLR formula, seats are allocated by dividing the total number of casted votes in each 
district for the seats assigned by it. This is the electoral quota, alternatively known as the 
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price parties pay to automatically receive one seat. The more the seats at stake in a given 
constituency the lesser the number of votes needed to gain a seat. Moreover, possible 
remaining seats are further assigned to those parties with the largest remainders. The 
combined effect of the HQLR with the size of the district allowed even smaller parties to 
compete for votes with the concrete hope of acceding to the parliament (Duverger 1954). 
In this way, as Carey notes,  
“the HQLR method awarded Ennahda 41% of the seats in the 
Assembly, or 4% above its vote share. It is noteworthy that, despite 
dominating the field of parties, Ennahda’s seat bonus was not the 
largest. The bonuses of much smaller alliances were as large – and in 
one case, even larger – than Ennahda’s in absolute terms, and many 
times larger in relative terms. Together, these seat bonuses for small 
alliances determined that Ennahda fell well short of a majority of the 
seats in the Constituent Assembly and, consequently, had to negotiate 
with other alliances in the process of drafting a constitution. By 
contrast, had Tunisia chosen differently – for example, had it chosen 
the other most common PR formula for converting votes to seats, the 
d’Hondt Divisor (DHD) method – Ennahda would have won 69% of 
the Assembly seats and been in a position to impose a new constitution 
unilaterally” (Carey 2014, 10). 
 
 
5.2.2 The Egyptian Electoral System  
 
As saw in the second chapter, the transitional roadmap settled in Egypt to oversee the 
passage from SCAF’s control to a civilian rule has been reported as an example of how 
to not conduct a transition. In the same line, the electoral system adopted for the founding 
elections has been described as “headed for failure” (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 39) for 
the purposes of democratic transition.  
The SCAF envisaged for the founding elections a complex electoral system whereby one 
third of the Parliament would have been elected trough individual candidacies, while the 
remaining two third according to a closed-list system. As far as the elections of 
individuals was concerned, for the People Assembly and the Shura Council, the law 
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provided the disposition of respectively 83 and 30 two-member districts. Coming to the 
closed-list part, 46 districts were to elect 332 members of the People Assembly, while 30 
districts were designed to assign a total of 120 seats. The electoral formula to convert 
votes in seats for closed-list districts was, as in Tunisia, the HQLR, and a legal threshold 
was also provided as low as 0,5% of the nationwide vote. To make things more complex, 
each branch of the parliament was elected in six separate rounds across three distinct 
regions for a total of twelve election days. The rationale behind this decision was that of 
overcoming the lack of personnel to supervise the correct conduct of elections. Yet, this 
has open the room to frauds, manipulation of the electoral results and strategic vote 
following the announcement of previous results.  
Individual candidacies are deemed to assure the accountability between principals 
(electors) and agents (elected). Yet, this structure of vote recalls the electoral system 
adopted in the same Egypt before 1984 and 1990 that “increased the importance of money 
in elections” (Carey and Shugart 1995; Masoud 2014, 68) and paved the way for the 
reassertion of patronage practices, networks of kinship and vote-buying over policy 
programs. Masoud (2014) indeed, described that system as a ‘death knell’ for parties other 
than the ruling RCD and the Islamists.  
Besides the effects of a spaced out vote, it is indeed quite difficult to assess the overall 
impact of such complex system, wherein two symmetrically different kind of vote 
(majoritarian and proportional) coexists, on the phase of installation. On the one hand, 
Masoud (2014) welcomed this system because, in his opinion, the combined effect of 
large district size for the majoritarian vote and the PR part, would have brought politics 
back in allowing even smaller parties to compete on the base of their political platforms. 
On the other hand, other scholars, emphasized the distortive effects of the majoritarian 
vote and point to the fact that lot of proportional districts are “too small to offer voice to 
fledging parties outside the dominant players” (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 38). In the 
same line, but emphasizing the fuzziness of the entire electoral system, and the fact that 
it proceeded along separate steps, others downplayed the fairness of elections, seeing 
them too prone to manipulation and conducive to excessive distortions (Morlino 2012). 
Tavana (2011), by contrast, is more cautious in praising or condemning the Egyptian 
electoral system in that he highlights two opposite effects it eventually produced. On the 
one hand, the individual candidacies in large districts pushed parties to band together to 
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increase their probability of success. On the other hand, the high magnitude of the 
proportional districts encouraged parties’ proliferation, because the threshold for 
acceding Parliament was really low. Overall, as he noticed, “although parties will 
coalesce into three distinct ideological groups, they will be both weak and loosely 
organized” (D. Tavana 2011, 564).  
 
 
5.2.3 Comparing the effects of the electoral systems 
 
By comparing the number of list registered and contesting the elections, it emerges that 
the Tunisian electoral system incentivized parties’ competition and inclusion more than 
the Egyptian one. As a matter of fact, in Tunisia around 560 lists were registered, 154 of 
those presented themselves in at least one district and 4 of them run in all the districts. By 
contrast, in Egypt, something like 40 lists applied to contest elections, 29 of them in at 
least one district but only one presented in all of them. However, the degree of inclusion 
of a given electoral system is not to confound with its degree of distortion. If Tunisia’s 
electoral system choice has been praised for its suitability to the exigencies of democratic 
installations, the same cannot be said for the Egyptian one by mean of the majoritarian 
vote and by mean of how the voting procedures took place.   
In this sense, the electoral system – as expected- is for sure responsible for the creation 
of an unbalanced power distribution allowing the Egyptian Islamists to rule all alone thus 
nullifying the incentives to seek for bargain and compromise, as was forced to do 
Ennadha. But, going backward, why did Islamists arrived at gaining so much vote 
nonetheless? Why did they perform so well both under the proportional rule, which 
emphasizes ‘politics’, and under the majorities one, which stresses on the importance of 
candidates’ popularity? And why this was the case in both the countries here considered, 
but also in other? 
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5.3 THE DOUBLE STANDARD: PATTERNS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN LEFTISTS AND ISLAMISTS 
BEFORE THE ARAB SPRING  
 
As already mentioned, the power advantage of Islamists parties, enlightened by the results 
of the ballot boxes, appears like a paradox (Cavatorta and Storm forthcoming) and having 
deep roots in both countries. Dominant oppositions forces in the 1970s, leftist parties have 
consistently lost appeal across the Arab world while political Islam has imposed itself as 
a major political force. More intriguingly, the Arab Spring seemingly unveiled the 
existence of a rather progressive society in line with the values and policies of the Left. 
Yet, in post-uprising democratic elections in Tunisia and Egypt, Left parties have been 
largely marginalized by the success of their competitors: the Islamist parties. Drawing 
from Hinnebusch, political parties in the Middle East, as their counterparts in western 
consolidated democracies, can be considered as barometers of “the nature and the 
development of politics in the region” (Hinnebusch 2005, 335). In particular, parties are 
deemed to: i) reflect the inherited societal tradition, and with it the power of sub-national 
and trans-national identities; ii) reflect societal change, in terms of composition, 
ideologies, and organizational capacit[ies]; and to iii) reflect and affect the process of 
state formation (ibid., italics in original). Out of this theoretical framework, the very 
reasons for the decline of Leftist parties and the concomitant resurgence of the Islamists 
are to be found within the society, intended as its inner characteristics and its perception 
of political changes, and within the national polities. It might then be the case that either 
leftism did not chime any longer with mass aspirations, while Islamism did, or that the 
evolution of the North African regimes here considered has been detrimental to leftist 
parties but not to Islamists. Indeed, each of the explanations attributed to the decline of 
Leftist parties falls within one of these two referent environments, namely the social and 
the institutional. As for the former, some have argued that the importance of trans-national 
identities the Left embodied, namely Communism, Socialism and Nasserism, lost their 
attractiveness because of the failure of the URSS and of the Nasserist socio-economic and 
political experiments (Hilal 2014; Graham 2004; Murphy and Ehteshami 1996). Others 
see in the organizational rigidity of leftist parties a problematic Soviet importation that 
undermined the capacity of the Arab Left to accommodate social dynamism (Yacoub 
2014). By contrast, others point to the reliance of leftist parties in the charisma of their 
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leaders, thus reflecting the regional praxis of the personalization of politics (Shteiwi 
2014). Along similar lines, the decline of Leftist parties has been attributed to their poor 
institutionalization (Hilal 2014; Storm 2014). This goes hand in hand with the claim that 
leftist parties were too elitist and too concerned with the intellectual work to develop any 
meaningful link with their societies (Guessoumi 2014). Although all these accounts 
enhance our comprehension of the phenomenon under investigation, a reappraisal is 
needed.  
On the one hand, arguing that Leftism has lost appeal because its past failures might be 
misleading. Firstly, as Masoud puts brilliantly, “such arguments assume that the Egyptian 
peasant or the Yemeni tribesman (or the American political science professor) decide 
whom to vote for by weighting the historical records of alternative worldviews” (2014, 
57). Indeed, Latin American countries prove that Leftist politics has not been buried under 
the ruins of the URSS. Secondly, these readings completely disregard the fact that many 
people in the Arab World self-place on the left side of the political spectrum (Tessler 
2011; Masoud 2014) and that their personal orientations support Leftist agendas, as our 
data confirm. On the other hand, conceiving the decline of Leftist parties as a result of 
their organizational deficiencies that translate into their detachment from the public might 
be myopic. Considering the mobilization capacities these parties have enjoyed up to the 
late 1970s, such accounts confound the causes with the effects of other intervening 
variables. And this leads to the introduction of institutional explanations. 
Both state gained their independence from foreign domination through revolutions 
inspired by leftist ideology, whose fight against the oppression of the capital was 
translated into a fight against the oppression of colonization. Since the 1960s all people 
and political elite gathered around the princes of those revolution, still galvanized by the 
common cause of independence and the big challenges ahead for the shake of nation and 
state building. Yet, from that moment, signals of uneasiness with the incumbent rule, 
namely power concentration and economic policies, started to surface finding political 
expression. As has been showed, when the single party rule seemed not being enough to 
secure the power of the incumbent rulers, authoritarian regimes started to actively 
manipulate the structures of competition giving this strategy a semblance of political 
liberalization (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2007). From this moment 
on, both Tunisia and Egypt’s authoritarian regimes survived through a mix of repression 
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and cooptation that has, intentionally or not, advantages the Islamists parties. In both 
countries, while leftist and moderate conservative parties were fragmented between co-
opted factions and illegal ones, the Islamists were invariably enlisted among illegal 
opposition forces. Yet, the repression targeting illegal groups was by far more efficient 
in destroying left parties, which relied on easily recognizable and traditional channels of 
mobilization, but for several reasons was quite ineffective in equally silencing the Islamist 
factions. The remaining part of this chapter will show how it did happen and what are the 
consequences of such uneven competition in terms of parties’ power resources in the 
aftermath of the downfall of the authoritarian regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali.  
 
 
5.3.1 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Tunisia 
 
The problem of oppositions’ management arose in all its salience in Bourguiba’s Tunisia 
only in the late ‘60s. From 1956 – years of independence – to that moment, “politics was 
dominated by the Neo-Destour’s evolution from a mass-based nationalist movement into 
an authoritarian ruling party” (Alexander 2016, 34). Not that in this period political 
opposition was absent, but was rather confined within the Néo-Destour, the ruling party, 
and silenced through the personalization of politics. As observed, “part of Bourguiba’s 
genius lay in his ability to play competing factions and personalities off against one 
another and to use promotions to pull people under his thumb” (ibid. 38). Wouldn’t this 
suffice, individual expulsion (as happened to Ben Youssef and Ben Salah) or physical 
elimination (as happened to Ben Youssef) of opponents followed (Vandewalle 1980). The 
only opposition party present and active at that time was the Tunisian Communist Party 
(PCT). Present since the 1920s, it was then banned in 1963, the same year wherein the 
fusion between Buorguiba’s party and state was sanctioned with the Bizerte Congress. 
Functional to the one-party regime was then the fusion of Bourguiba’s party with the 
Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).   
Political opposition outside the ruling party, from 1964 named Socialist Destourian Party 
(PSD, out of it French acronym) in the attempt to host the dissident voices from the left 
(Perkins 2004), emerged as the economic management of the country proved ruinous and 
the democratic overtures promised by Bourguiba, both inside the party and in the country, 
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remained unattained. Popular discontent found expressions in the mass protests of 1968, 
while discontent internal to the PSD paved the way for outflows. In that same year, 
Ahmed Mestiri, a minister of the state and a leading figure inside the party was expelled 
by the PSD after denouncing the failure of the economic plan engineered by Bourguiba 
and Ben Salah. He was then reintegrated two years later and expelled again 1972 for 
having expressed the desire of more internal democracy within the PSD. This time, the 
distancing from the ruling party was definitive and, along with other dissidents, Mestiri 
created the Mouvement of Socialist Demorats (MDS). The party, along with other 
political formations, remarkably the PCT and Salah’s Popular Unity Movement (MUP) 
remained illegal until 1981.  
The rise of other political voices from outside the PSD calling for democracy and social 
justice found fertile grounds. Bourguiba’s reform of education produced a 
“unprecedented numbers of a young people [who] received secondary and university 
educations at home or in Europe” (Alexander 2016, 43) which was more politicized and 
inclined to protest as the distribution of wealth proceeded unbalanced and as the 
Bourguiba’s grip on the country grew tighter culminating in the 1974 Congress of 
Monastir which designated him President for life. In 1978, mass protests spread around 
the country with unparalleled participation and violence. These events, pushed the 
Islamists, which up to that moment were only concerned in pure intellectual debate and 
preaching, to undertake political activity (Tamimi 2001). Because they were totally 
stranger to the facts and opposed the uprising of January 26th, the government initially 
perceived the Islamists as a potential ally to contrast the left (Allani 2009). While hardly 
repressing the left behind the protests, the central government closed an eye on Islamists 
which in turn profited from the crackdown on workers’ unions to enlarge their following 
(Achcar 2013; Allani 2009; Tamimi 2001).  
With so many political movements beyond the PSD dispersed in the society, and in need 
of restoring its lost ascendancy, Bourguiba accepted the popular demand for more 
democracy by calling the first contested elections in 1981. However, this doesn’t mean 
that political parties other than PSD became legal. Indeed, this would have followed only 
if they would have obtained at least 5% of nationwide votes (Alexander 2016). 
Encouraged by this overture, the Islamists decided to go public by constituting in that 
same year the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) to participate in the political life of the 
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state. Nonetheless, frightened by the great following the Movement was displaying, the 
government organized mass arrests toward its members and the MTI was banned. By 
contrast, MDS, MUP and the PCT run for elections hoping this would be conducive to 
legal recognition. However, multiparty elections were not mean to give the way to more 
inclusion and competition, but only to calm the protests and have the pulse of oppositions’ 
strength. Preoccupied by the possibility that those elections would be conducive to 
government alternation, Bourguiba intervened by “manipulate[ing] the voter rolls, 
intimidate[ing] oppositions observers at polling places and falsify[ing] the vote count” 
(Alexander 2016, 45). At the end, a plebiscitary victory was constructed for the PSD while 
the others didn’t manage to reach the 5% of national vote. Tunisia then ended its 
pluralistic experiment and Bourguiba’s power continue to rely on a single-party system. 
Out of this, those not absorbed by this structure were easily outlawed and repressed. In 
this latter regard, great efforts were devoted to annihilate both Islamists and leftists. On 
the hand, despite signs of overture toward the MTI in 1984 by the at-that-time prime 
Minister Muhammed Mzali (Allani 2009), a harsh repression hit the movement in 1987 
after Islamists students’ strikes (Boulby 1988). On the other hand, left parties continued 
to be banned and the fusion between the PSD and the Tunisian General Labor Union 
(UGTT) engineered though the 1960s and 1970s, along with the suppression and the 
control of other independent trade unions and professional associations, closed them any 
possibility of mass mobilization making them the expression of upper class and 
intellectuals’ frustrations (Gessoumi 2014).  
Ben Ali’s “medical coup” in 1987 seemed to inaugurate a new beginning characterized 
by democratic overtures both in terms of political competition and in terms of political 
and civil rights. This was at least what resulted from the 1987 Declaration and, more 
importantly, from the National Pact of the following year. While the Declaration, 
pronounced in the day of Ben Ali’s takeover meant to sign a clear rupture with the 
hegemonic and paternalistic management of power61, the National Pact wanted to be 
                                                             
 
61 The most salient passage reads “Our people has reached a degree of responsibility and maturity where 
every individual and group is in a position to constructively contribute to the running of its affairs, in 
conformity with the republican idea which gives institutions their full scope and guarantees the conditions 
for a responsible democracy, fully respecting the sovereignty of the people as written into the Constitution. 
This Constitution needs urgent revision. The times in which we live can no longer admit of life presidency 
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programmatic document establishing government orientation within the four salient fields 
of national identity, the political regime, economic development, and foreign policy 
agreed upon also by the oppositions. The project provided for both the accommodation 
of Islam in society and the settlement of the democratic polity “Tunisians deserv[ed]” 
(Ben Ali’s words from the National Pact). Indeed, sixteen among opposition parties and 
civil society organizations signed the 1988 Pact under the auspices this would have led to 
a relaxation of relations with the governing power and to a pluralistic society. As a matter 
of fact, beyond the pact there were good reasons to believe to this new beginning (Angrist 
1999).  In the days following Ben Ali’s accession to power, men closed to Bourguiba 
were removed from key power positions and the party name changed into National 
Constitutional Rally (RCD) to mark the distance with the single-party regime. More than 
5,000 political prisoners –including chiefs of the oppositions – were released from prison 
and exiles were invite to come back in their country. Further, the UN Convention against 
Torture was ratified to prevent the reiteration of common practices under Bourguiba. On 
the plan of the institutional reforms, on December 15 1987 a Constitutional Council was 
created – albeit with a merely consultative role - and life presidency came to an end62.  
On the plan of political liberties, political parties were allowed to form and operate 
enjoying new freedoms of expressions and association63, which now seemed to dialogue 
with the power. The MTI, for instance, established a student union, the General Union of 
Tunisian Students (UGET) and was allowed to publish its journal (Allani 2009). 
All the premises for a new beginning seemed to be there and the 1989 infused great 
expectations (Anderson 1991). However, the envisaged majoritarian electoral system 
“worked a tremendous hardship on small, new parties that did not have national 
organizations” (Alexander 2016, 53). Hence, Ben Ali proposed to the parties signing the 
National Pact to run jointly with the RCD and eventually divide the stemming spoils. This 
solution was certainly a win-win situation. On the one hand, it would allow the RCD to 
control the majority of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, given the electoral system, 
                                                             
 
or automatic succession, from which the people is excluded. Our people deserves an advanced and 
institutionalized political life, truly based on the plurality of parties and mass organizations” 
62 See Constitutional Law n. 88-88, 25th July 1988. 
63 See Organic Law 89-90, 2th August 1988 which modifies and completed law n. 59-154 of 
November 7th 1959. 
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it constituted the only way for opposition parties to enter representative institutions. 
However, this project collapsed after Mestiri’s decision to run alone. Given his decision 
to detach its front from the ruling party, all other opposition parties understood that their 
credibility would have been really mined if they would have run with the RCD. 
Nonetheless, these latter were furious against Mestiri and all oppositions run under 
separate lists. Aborted Ben Ali’s initiative, also the MTI, now named Ennadha decided to 
run alone. Still lacking the legal recognition, it had nonetheless obtained the permission 
to file its candidates as independents. Hence, those elections saw a unified Islamist camp 
and a disunified left competing against the ruling party. The disaster of the latter was 
sound, the MDS – the major competing party to the dominant RCD – gained only 4% of 
votes losing the right for legal recognition, while the success of the former was 
impressive. As a matter of fact, Ennadha candidates won the 14% of nationwide votes, 
reaching a peak of 30% in some urban areas (Alexander 2016).  That was simply too 
much for the pluralism Ben Ali had in mind. A new wave of harsh repression hit again 
the Islamists. In this way the 1989 elections proved that the hegemony of the oppositions 
champ shifted from the left to Islamists and that Ben Ali’s regime was not more inclined 
than the previous one in allowing genuine pluralism (Hibou 2011; Khiari and Lamloum 
1999; Sadiki 2002).  
From this moment on, the Islamists continued to operate underground until the 2011 
revolution. Toward them, the regime alternated periods of tolerance with persecutions (as 
happened after the adoption of laws against terrorism following September 11, 2001), but 
they have been always prevented to contest elections, even as independents. By contrast, 
a bunch of leftist parties - namely MDS, Ettajdid, Unionist Democratic Union and the 
Party of People Unity, from the 1994 elections have been allowed to participate in the 
political and institutional life of the countries, but always within the boundaries 
established by the regime. By so doing, these parties moderated their oppositional stances 
and their electoral support, thus augmenting their dependency upon regime’s benevolence 
for their survival. This journey to irrelevance is also the result of regime’s success in 
closing to the left its natural channel of mass mobilization and electoral support. While 
trade unions were coopted or annihilated and professional associations easily infiltrated, 
the poor areas of the country, which would have support left’s redistributive policy 
programs, relied on practices of vote-buying and electoral patronage (as the success of 
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the RCD in those areas prove).  As consequences, leftist opposition from the 2000s found 
expression in a series of urban civil society’s initiatives which nonetheless refused any 
kind of partisan and ideological affiliation. Instances of this trend are the Palestinian 
Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation and the Tunisian League for 
Human Rights (LTDH), already active since 1977 but which gained new momentum in 
those years.   
 
 
5.3.2 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Egypt  
 
Like Bourguiba in Tunisia, also Nasser, in the aftermath of the Free Officers’ revolution 
in 1952, spent much of effort in creating a consensual environment suitable for the one-
person rule. Like in Tunisia, the period going from 1952 to mid-1960s witnessed the 
creation of a single party-system - namely the Liberation Rally (LR) after named Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 - merged with state institutions (Brownlee 2007). This 
took place through the control, co-optation, repression of real or possible oppositions and 
the depoliticization of the polity. As Lust-Okar notes,  
 
“a new constitution, put to a referendum in 1956, created a presidency 
with vast powers. The 1956 “Law on the Exercise of Political Rights” 
established state control over all forms of political participation; the 
1958 Law no. 162 confirmed the president’s right to declare and 
terminate states of emergency; the 1960 Law no. 156 nationalized the 
media, effectively eliminating freedom of the press; a 1963 law 
stipulated that union leaders must be members of the ASU; and the 1964 
law no. 32 allowed the government to prohibit organizations that 
threatened ‘morality’ and the ‘interest of the republic’” (Lust-Okar 
2005, 61).  
Further, paralleling Bourguiba’s co-optation and fusion of the UGTT with its party, Nasir 
in 1961 merged pre-existent trade unions (already under state control) into the Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), falling under the direct control of the government 
(Posusney 1997). Together with the abolition of all pre-existent political parties, included 
the Communist Party, in 1953, the harsh repression against the Muslim Brotherhood 
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(MB), present in Egypt since 1928, and the Emergency Law active since 1967, all these 
measures seemed at first glance to have fulfill their scope and society appeared under 
control.  
Much like would later happen with Ben Ali’s takeover, Sadat’s accession to power 
following Nasser’s death in 1970 witnessed major changes. Sadat presented himself as 
the man of a new – and more open - political era. He adjusted Egypt’s international 
position by approaching to the Western sphere of influence and in so doing he apparently 
opened the door to political liberalization. Major adjustments occurred both within the 
centers of power and in the overall polity to depart from the inherited set-up. On the one 
hand, to pursue its ambitious agenda, he reorganized the cabinet; appointed key 
governors; purged both the National Assembly and the security forces; reformed the 
ASU’s top organization and established a committee to write a new constitution. On the 
other hand, he relaxed the grip of the regime on the political organization and participation 
of oppositions with a special eye on the Muslim Brotherhood. In his mind, the MB was 
an important ally to “counterweigh the combined opposition to his regime (mounted by 
Nasserite and leftist elements)” (Ibrahim 1982, 76). From this moment on, Islamists 
leaders “reemerged from prisons” (Brown 2012, 87) or made return from abroad to revive 
their organization under Sadat’s tolerance, “if not outright blessing” (Ibrahim 1982, 76).  
By 1976, times appeared then mature for the emergence of (limited) pluralism and 
multipartitism. In that year, the National Progressive Union Party (NPUP), also known as 
Tagammu, and the Liberal Socialist Union saw the light as ASU’s outflows under the 
impulse of Sadat to introduce a semblance of political liberalization (Hinnebusch 1981) 
and the first multiparty elections were held. As expected, the ASU gained the 
overwhelming majority of seats, while its competitors achieved only modest gains (15 
and 3 seats for the Liberal Socialist Union and Tagammu respectively) and independents, 
majorly composed by MB’s exponents, gained 47 seats. This kind of results will 
constitute Sadat’s regency till his death, but not without efforts to contain the left, 
represented by the NPUP, through repression and the by encouraging the expansion of 
the MB.  
Because of the circumstance surrounding its creation, the NPUP –up to now the more 
long-lived in some moment also the more vibrant leftist opposition- was initially regarded 
with ambiguity. Soon after though, the party’s involvement in 1977 bread riots signed a 
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clear rupture with the regime and its position as opposition party was reinforced. Thus, 
its following went far beyond an already politicized constituency and the party obtained 
the support of the wider working class, the middle class, progressive intellectuals and 
professionals. In particular, the NPUP seemed to have strongholds among the working 
class in the major districts of al Cairo and Alexandria. As Hendriks reports,  
 
“Of approximately one hundred eighty registered party members in one 
Cairo qism (district), thirty-one percent were workers, forty-one percent 
were muwazzafìn [clerks, rev], and the remaining twenty-eight percent 
were students. The official figures underestimate actual workers' 
support. In this district, one worker, who was a member of the local 
leadership group (lejnat el qism), collected membership fees from 
thirty-one colleagues, many of whom did not want to register officially. 
Given the risk of being known as a Tajammu'awi for people who feel 
more vulnerable vis-a-vis the authorities than do educated muwazzaf, it 
is probable that this underenumeration occurs elsewhere as well”. 
(1983, 267)   
 
In a relatively short period of time, the party had succeeded in developing a complex 
organizational structure and in penetrating trade unions - despite government 
interferences -  the professional association of journalists, the bar and also made inroads 
the countryside (Hendriks 1983). This made the NPUP “(with the possible exception of 
the Ikhwan) […] the only political force in Egypt which possesse[d] cadres and basic 
units on a serious scale” (Hinnebusch 1981, 338). However, this increasing appeal drew 
Sadat’s attention. In his mind, the party had simply crossed the fence. In September 1978 
a wave of repression began against NPUP members and the party was virtually banned64, 
while a tame leftist alternative to the NPUP, the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), was created. 
Finally, in 1980 the “law of Shame” stated that anyone trying to corrupt the youth by 
denying religious values or criticize state policy could be punished in the Court of Values. 
This law empowered Islamists appeal while undermining Nasserist elements and the 
                                                             
 
64 In 1979, the Parliament was dissolved because of “irresponsible oppositions”. 
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NPUP, for their secular ideology, portrayed as a “denial of divine laws”, and for its 
oppositional stance, depicted as “disloyalty to the nation”65.  
At the same time, legitimized by regime’s ideological revision on more pious stances, the 
Islamist organizational machine continued to grow despite, or thank to, the fact that it was 
still a formation lacking legal recognition. University activism shifted from leftist venues 
to Islamist ones without triggering regime’s reaction (Wickham 2002). Islamists were 
also highly successful in penetrating civil society organizations, often having a “religious 
coloration” (Brown 2012, 88; Masoud 2014), establishing new ones (Wickham 2002) or 
entering into professional associations. In line with their mobilization strategies, 
characterized by incredible flexibility and opportunism, MB exponents also run the 
elections by filing independent candidates on the ranks of other lists, such as that of the 
Socialist Labor Party in 1979.  
The advent of Mubarak to power in 1981 after Sadat’s assassination by the hand of an 
extremist Islamic group, at first seemed to have rebalanced the organizational 
opportunities among the opposition factions. Initially, the new president eased, at least at 
first glance, the pressure upon the NPUP but, probably because of fear of following the 
sort his predecessor, didn’t intervened much on the Islamists champ. As Albrecht and 
Wegner (2006) note, Mubarak adopted toward it a double standard. On the one hand, it 
used heavy-handed pressure toward the more radical groups such as Jihad and Jama’a 
Islamiyya. On the other hand, he left untouched moderates’ prerogative to be a player in 
formal political institutions allowing them to participate in the elections of the parliament 
and professional syndicates as independent candidates. Following Sadat’s politics, the 
relation between Mubarak and the Brotherhood during the 1980 has been described as a 
“political honeymoon”. This environment had the effect of encouraging MB’s political 
ambitions and resulted in the presentation of the Islamic Alliance list at the 1987 elections 
formed by the MB (still not a legal party) and other Islamist associations, the Liberal 
Socialist Party and the Socialist Labor party gaining as much as 60 seats.  
On the other side of the opposition front, the left represented by the sole NPUP continued 
to decline irredeemably for significant obstacles concerning both the channels of 
mobilization available to it and access to parliament. On the hand, the electoral dynamics 
                                                             
 
65 See Law 95/1980. 
 
 
155 
 
of the authoritarian regime under Mubarak were particularly detrimental to the NPUP 
despite changes in the electoral system. From 1984 to 1987, Egypt used a proportional 
system with closed list. Even though priority was given to parties, the NPUP was badly 
defeated, gaining no seats in both elections due to its inability to compete with the ruling 
party in terms of both political and economic resources. The situation worsened for the 
NPUP when, from 1990, Egypt returned to a majoritarian system that for opposition 
parties was “something close to a death knell” (Masoud 2014, 68). The influence of 
political parties declined due to the influx of local notables and businessman who had 
more economic resources to meet the demands of voters. In addition, as in the past, there 
was a resurgence of networks of patronage and kinship – networks that were also 
detrimental to the NPUP’s hope of expanding beyond its cradle-districts (Masoud 2014). 
On the other hand, the left’s natural channels of mobilization, such as trade unions, 
professional syndicates and deprived areas were distributed beetween the Islamists and 
the regime. This latter in particular managed to secure the allegiance of the poor people 
through vote-buying and patronage practices and completely colonized the trade unions 
(Posusney 1997). Serving as channel of mobilization under Nasser, these became, under 
Sadat and Mubarak, channels of demobilization to control the working class. This strategy 
of demobilization reached its apex in 1995 with the trade union law, which prevented 
workers employed on temporary contracts to vote in union elections thereby easing the 
re-election of incumbent union leaders (Kienle 2001; Posusney 1997; Shehata 2010).  
Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, the regime was not even so well disposed neither 
towards the MB. The escalation of violence in the first years of the 1990s by the hand of 
radical and armed Islamists groups generated mistrust toward the MB, accused to be the 
“front organization for armed Islamist groups” (Kienle 1998, 229). With the pretext of 
fighting violence, but with the deliberate purpose of silence mass protest following the 
economic crisis of the mid-80s and the failure of market-oriented reforms, Mubarak put 
in place a series of measures conducive to a ‘net loss of positive and negative liberties’ 
(Kienle 2000). In 2005, however, things appeared to have changed, elections occurred in 
‘an unprecedented international spotlight” (Brown 2012, 92) after the pressures for 
moving toward a genuine liberalization and to pose an end to the persecutions under the 
ban of the ‘war on terror’ that knew new vigor after the 9-11. In that occasion, the left, 
represented by the NPUP only gained 2 seats signaling its impossibility of reaching the 
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masses. By contrast, the MB –who also in that occasion run filing independent candidates 
– gained as many as 88 seats. As happened in 1989 Tunisia, MB’s strength test alerted 
the regime who responded with violence and forced the group to operate underground 
until the uprisings. Yet, the party nonetheless managed to equally develop at the margins 
of the state control. During the same years, also the partisan left further demobilized. This 
opened the space for the creation of acephalous issued- based movements that while 
promoting leftist claims and fighting leftist battles always rejected any explicit political 
affiliation of formal organization. In light of past experiences showing the costs of so 
doing, they simply conceived such already experienced form of participation as 
counterproductive. 
 
 
 
5.4 ISLAMISTS’ SUPREMACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANTAGES AND 
REPUTATION  
 
The political developments of Tunisia and Egypt from independence to the Arab Spring 
follows a similar dynamic that is crucial for understanding parties’ power resources at the 
time of the founding elections, which – as emerged from the above investigation of 
people’s beliefs and political convictions – is in no way reflective of Tunisians and 
Egyptians’ policy preferences and political aspirations. In both countries, the growth of 
the political attractiveness of Islamism parallels the rollback of Left parties, which in the 
1960s and 1970s were really strong both in terms of mass support and ideological appeal 
and thus constituted the major opposition force. By the beginning of the new millennium, 
in both countries the Left displayed all the symptoms Tarrow (1998) attributes to decline 
of the collective actions, namely withdrawal, fractionalization and institutionalization. By 
contrast, the Islamist champ was sound and well.  
Out of the analysis on the evolution of the political systems in both countries, and in line 
with other contributions (Heydemann 2007; Lust-Okar 2005; Masoud 2014), it is here 
argued that such disparity -which is also at the heart of the electoral results of the founding 
elections- is to be attributed to the mix of co-optation and repression with which previous 
dictators structured the political conflict for the sake of power maintenance. On the one 
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hand, divided structures of competition created by discriminating oppositions between 
legal and illegal groups has harmed the once legal oppositions, mainly of the Left, while 
awarding the illegal ones, notably the Islamists, with reputation in that they were 
considered as really independent and alternative to the regime. On the other hand, the 
recourse to repression has weakened differently the organizational resources of the 
oppositions both because it was directed toward different groups with different resolve 
and because it was differently effective depending on the organizational structures the 
targeted oppositions relied. These two effects are in turn responsible for i) the 
inconsistency of the electoral offer and ii) individuals’ misperception of the electoral offer 
leading to the representativeness gap emerged in occasion of the 2011 founding elections. 
 
 
5.4.1 Authoritarian repression and transitional parties’ organizational advantages     
 
With the term ‘repression’ it is here intended not only the recourse of violent and other 
undemocratic means to silence opposition, but also the control and the cooptation of 
potential mobilization channels engineered to jeopardize any political initiative beyond 
the perimeter of rulers’ will. Differently from the inclusion of some parties into the 
institutional sphere of a given regime, which falls under the uncontested notion of co-
optation as well, these kind of measures, like other forms of repression, act at grassroots 
level exerting their effects on the organization capabilities of the various groups operating 
under upgraded authoritarianisms (Heydemann 2007). In both countries, patterns of state 
formations and power maintenance have undermined Leftist formations more than the 
Islamist ones by depriving them the access to its key constituencies, especially the labor 
classes and the poor living deprived areas, because Leftists’ organizational structures 
overlapped in many instances with those the regime occupied to sustain its power, and 
also because these were more easily identifiable than those of Islamists. 
In Tunisia and Egypt, one of the first measures in the construction of the single-party 
regime, lasting until the 1970s, has been that of repressing the left opposition which had 
nonetheless partake and fought for the cause of national independence. This was the sort 
of the Communist parties, present since the 1920s, but also of prominent figures initially 
closed to Bourguiba and Nasser, who were eventually expelled from the party. Beside 
158 
 
this, in both countries the rulers secured their grip on critical social sections by blending 
their party with the established trade unions. This development is actually in line with the 
regional trend pushing scholars to speak of these regimes as authoritarian populist (and 
after post-populist) corporatism (Ayubi 1995; Hinnebusch 2005, 2010). Initially, trade 
unions were subordinated to the state which sought to include the different social forces 
and make class conflict irrelevant for the sake of state-building and regime stability 
(Ehteshami and Murphy 1996; Hinnebusch 2010; Murphy 1999). In this regard, the ruling 
party functioned as the intermediary between the state and corporate groups by co-opting 
all other intermediary associations (Murphy 1999). Further, following the introduction of 
measures of economic liberalization, trade unions, and all other intermediate associations 
were allowed to function to accommodate growing demands of representation, thus 
serving as means of demobilization and social control (Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 
2010; Posusney 1997). This was for instance the case of the creation of leftist parties like 
the NPUP in Egypt or MDS’s participation at the 1981 elections in Tunisia and the 
reorganization of state labor-relations in both countries. As saw, from the 1980s, the 
“formalistic interpenetration of state, party and union” (Feltrin 2016, 13) was in varying 
degrees substituted with less visible means of co-optations through legal restrictions on 
the civils and political liberties, clientelistic relations and, as ultimate ratio, repression.  
From national independence to the Arab Spring then, important sectors of the workforce 
were under the direct, even though unveiled or not, control of the ruling elite. Trade 
unions leaders were indeed selected by top cadres of the state apparatus and the base knew 
important restrictions on its freedom of self-organization and demonstration, even though 
in some cases it found its way to denounce this system, as the 2008 Gafsa protests in 
Tunisia prove. Given this set-up, Leftist parties, when legalized, faced insurmountable 
obstacles to penetrate this key constituency like the NPUP succeeded to do in late 1970s 
before being harshly repressed. Another important key constituency represented by the 
poor, who would naturally favored Leftists’ claims for redistribution and social justice, 
was by contrast controlled by the ruling party through patronage and clientelistic practices 
(Schedler 2002, 2006). In this respect, the Left couldn’t compete with regimes’ economic 
resources needed to secure the vote of this constituency (Hinnebusch 1981; Masoud 
2014).  
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By contrast, a totally different history regards the mobilization opportunities of Islamist 
formations. From being simple communities of pray and theological debates, these groups 
grew by creeping in the pre-constituted associational networks, such as charitable 
associations and youth organizations all revolving around the mosques. At first, a many 
authors note, such expansion was even encouraged by the incumbent dictators, namely 
Sadat and Ben Ali, to counterbalance the power of Leftists opposition at a time of radical 
changes in the national political economy from state planning toward the free market. But 
when the expansion of the “parallel Islamic sector” bypassed the boundaries of regimes’ 
toleration, it was just too complex and too heterogeneous to be effectively dismantled. In 
Egypt it entailed “private mosques; Islamic voluntary associations, including welfare 
societies, cultural organization, health clinics; and Islamic-profit commercial and 
business enterprises, such as Islamic banks, investment companies, manufacturing firms, 
and publishing houses” (Wickham 2002, 97). The reasons for this spread are due to both 
the will of the incumbent rulers and to the intrinsic features of the Islamic appeal. On the 
one hand, Ben Ali, Sadat and Mubarak, who first saw in the Islamists an ally in the 
containment of the left, when confronted with the problem of containing the Islamists 
themselves opted for a policy of selective accommodation (Bianchi 1989). In this way, 
lacking the legitimacy of their predecessors, they repressed more radical Islamist groups 
and closed an eye on the moderate ones, which effectively benefited from the political 
liberalization inaugurated in the 1970s (Wickham 2002), fearing to be regarded as religion 
offenders by their populations. This kind of policy was more evident in Mubarak’s Egypt 
then in Tunisia where Ben Ali intermittently targeted moderates as well. On the other 
hand, since late 1980s, Islamists policy programs proposed some vague form of 
democracy grounded on religion as guarantor of the national moral integrity with no clear 
plan on economic issues (Pahwa 2013). Contrary to the case of the Leftist parties, whose 
political and economic program is naturally oriented toward just some segments of 
society (the same the state wanted under its control) Islamist were therefore more 
naturally inclined to reach the different segments of society through different means, from 
those taking advantage of the services provided by charitable associations to those 
benefiting from profit-oriented commercial enterprises. 
For Masoud (2014) and Cammet (2014), this organizational advantage is at the heart of 
the Islamist strength and the concomitant weakness of the left sanctioned by the ballot 
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boxes in occasion of the founding elections. This reading is also in line the findings 
presented in chapter four where the explicative power of the organizational models 
outweighs that of the socio-economic ones in both countries. In this regard, if the 
argument about the irrelevance of political parties within transitions grounding on the 
observation that the previous political system did not allow their genuine proliferation 
(Collombier 2013; Eyadat 2015) is to be dismissed, it is nonetheless true that some of the 
tenets grounding this position explain why this organizational advantage has been crucial 
in 2011-2012 Tunisia and Egypt. At the time of founding elections following decades of 
authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism, voters are required to choice across a 
multitude of parties, which are new or however distant from voters after the strict 
conditions under the previous regime. In such cases, it is too naïf to believe that voters 
will cast their preference by picking the party which best suits their policy preferences 
for they simply lack the time to develop the required knowledge of the entire spectrum 
constituting the electoral offer (Dalton and Weldon 2007). Instead, it is arguable to think 
that voters’ choice will be influenced by agents of political intermediation (Dalton and 
Klingemann 2007). This recent field of studies holds that the “varying channels and 
processes through which voters receive information about partisan politics” influence the 
voting behavior itself (Gunther et al. 2016, 3). For the founding elections in Tunisia and 
Egypt this claimed is further confirmed by the fact that voters were not able to properly 
locate parties on a policy space (Masoud 2014) and that, out of it, there was no correlation 
between parties-voters convergence on salient issues and the final vote choice (Çarkoğlu, 
Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013).  
Not being able to rightly appraise different political alternatives, voter simply choose the 
only party they probably really came in touch with after the ousting of the left from its 
natural channels of mobilization in parallel with the accommodation of Islamist 
associations. In Masoud’s words, “though the majority of poor Egyptian voters prefer 
significant redistribution and a large welfare state, they are unable to connect these 
preferences with parties that most espouse them [i.e. the Left parties], voting instead for 
Islamist politicians who, by virtue of their embeddedness in dense networks of religious 
organization, are able to speak to voters in way that leftists are not” (Masoud 2014, 181). 
In this regard, Islamists’ advantage was more remarked in Egypt than in Tunisia. The 
assets controlled by Ennadha are in no way comparable to those of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood. Nonetheless, it just sufficed to walk into Tunisian parties’ headquarters and 
regional offices in 2011-2012 to understand that there was not play for Ennadha’s 
competitors.     
 
 
5.4.2 Divided structures of competition and transitional parties’ reputation 
 
Beyond the arbitrary recourse to repression, the other tool underpinning the survival of 
authoritarian rulers was the division between legal and illegal opposition. This had the 
scope to prevent the unification of oppositions asking for change which could threaten 
regime stability, but also to “commit those who are permitted entrance into the formal 
political sphere to maintaining the rules of the game” (Lust-Okar 2005, 38) by simply 
accepting to play by them.  
In authoritarian Tunisia and Egypt, legal opposition were mainly constituted by Leftist 
parties: MDS and lately the Ettajdid (the once PCOT) in Tunisia, and the NPUP in Egypt, 
just to name the most long-lived that in the past have been able to mobilize mass protests. 
Islamists, by contrast, under authoritarian rule have never been legalized even though 
were allowed to develop organizational networks and to participate in elections as 
independent. This distinction has created great unbalances in political parties’ reputation 
awarding the Islamists but disadvantaging the Lefts. While the latter were perceived as 
part of the system, formers’ alleged extraneity to the authoritarian machine allowed them 
to present themselves as the true alternative to the previous regime able to grant citizens 
a new beginning once it collapsed.  
Drawing from Dahl (1971), Lust-Okar (2005) notes that the entrance into the formal 
political competition, for very different reasons (Cavatorta 2007) in context of mixed 
political systems (wherein some groups are included but not others) is subordinated to the 
acceptance of limits upon both the political participation and the competition. Even 
though this might not be always explicit, it is always the product of playing by the 
established rules. In order to enter into the legal political space and its governing 
institutions, opposition parties renounced to their more extreme claims and to their 
ambition of provoking an alternation of government altogether. This pushed legalized 
parties into a vicious circle. By moderating their stances, they started losing their political 
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relevance in terms of programmatic platform, and as consequence, in terms of electoral 
support that made their survival more dependent on regime benevolence which in turn 
lead them to further align with the regime and loosing further voters. The effects of such 
mechanism are all the more evident at the beginning of the 2000s. The new millennium 
brought with it the creation of new Leftist parties and organizations, and, more 
importantly, a shift of balance within the Arab Left between political parties and civic 
associations in favor of the latter as far as genuine opposition to the regime was 
concerned. In light of the inefficacy of partisan engagement, the new generation of leftist 
activists chose the path of engagement in the civil society. This trend led to the emergence 
of movements such as the “Kifaya”, the Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership 
and Rights Activation in Egypt and the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH). 
Despite their Leftist leanings, these new activists do not describe themselves as Leftist, 
finding it useless to have partisan or ideological affiliations (Langohr 2004; Cavatorta 
2012). New Leftist parties however also arose. They barely represented the working 
classes – thus acknowledging the rupture with their natural constituencies that occurred 
during the eighties and nineties- and focused instead on the wider themes of 
democratization, social justice and human rights. The creation of the Congrès pour la 
République (CPR) in Tunisia, the emergence of the Al Karama in Egypt are instances of 
this evolution. 
 Islamist formations, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, while operating at the 
grassroots level of social activism and participating in the election as independents, were 
never legalized, and their ‘brand’ was never approached to the regime and they continued 
to perceived as an effective vehicle of change and the real alternative to the status quo.  
 
 
5.5 SHAPE AND REASONS OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL GAP AWARDING ISLAMIST PARTIES 
 
True enough, during the 2010 uprisings and in the following months, the North African 
public appeared open, if not cherishing, to the installation of a civic state able to recover 
those lands from uneven economic development and unfair redistribution. Even though 
many observers expected Islamists to have a role in the transition process, nobody 
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forecasted their eventual dominion. After surveying citizens’ political orientations and 
beliefs, this account confirms the presence of a gap of representativeness in that what 
people appeared to wanted was far from what they voted for. This discrepancy is at the 
heart of stunning disparities in parties’ power which concur to the formation of their 
strategy profile at the time of installation. Indeed, the more the seats controlled inside the 
deciding body, the lesser the payoff from compromise with the other political forces. And 
this is a piece of the puzzle accounting for the different transition’s outcome in Tunisia 
and Egypt. In the first case, Islamists had the relative majority of seats but needed the 
cooperation of other parties in order to pass any kind of legislative provision. In the 
second case, Islamists together controlled the absolute majority of seats and didn’t need 
to negotiate with oppositions.  
The reasons of the electoral gap conducive to the uneven distribution of power among the 
decision-making actors are twofold. The varying degree of distortion produced by the 
different electoral systems adopted in Tunisia and Egypt can account for cross-countries 
differences in the distribution of power among the political parties involved in the 
‘constitutive phase’. Therefore the electoral systems are to be enlisted in the immediate 
cause of the Egyptian failure and the Tunisian success. Yet, this explanation falls short in 
accounting for the dominant role of Islamists across the region and for the different 
strength they had across the two countries considered. Structural explanations shows how 
authoritarian regime favored the proliferation of Islamists at the expense of the Left thus 
provoking an electoral gap at the time of the 2011 founding elections.  
On the one hand, the cooptation of Left parties through their legalization, combined with 
their eradication from common leftist mobilization channels, has undermined their 
effectiveness. At the end, those parties were reduced to empty shells and leftist political 
opposition fragmented in an uncountable numbers of organization. The leftist electoral 
offer in 2011 was then absolutely inconsistent for it was dispersed across a series of new 
parties. This effect was remarkable in Tunisia were the sum of left votes amounted to 
around fifty percent but the first leftist party positioned around 8%. By contrast, Islamists 
status of illegality has allowed them to maintain a certain independence form the regime. 
In this way, their capabilities of being a true alternative to it have never been put in 
question (despite MB’s members figured among the MPs) and their ‘brand’ never knew 
reputation crises.  
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On the other hand, regimes’ repression has jeopardized the left while passively allowing 
the growth the Islamic parallel sector. Such disparity is at the base of the misperception 
of the political offer, our second component of the aforementioned electoral gap. Indeed, 
people with the political inclinations showed before ‘voted for jobs, not Islam’ (Robbins 
and Tessler 2011). The very circumstance that voters identified Islamist parties as more 
redistributive than the leftist ones (Çarkoğlu, Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013; Masoud 
2014)is due to the fact that the former could enjoy on much more channels to arrive to 
people than the latter one. This effect was particularly pronounced in Egypt where 
Islamists structures and networks eventually constituted a veritable ‘parallel sector’.   
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6 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND THE POLARIZATION OF 
TRANSITIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS   
 
Out of the theoretical model sketched in the third chapter to analyze parties’ behavior 
within transitions, the last aspect to take into consideration, after the demand of social 
representation and parties power resources, is the ideological positioning of parties 
themselves. The model showed indeed that whenever centripetal trends (derived from a 
shared understanding of the political and social outlook of the future regime or from the 
fear of a protracted stalemate) outweigh the centrifugal pushes stemming from the extant 
social divisions and parties’ power advantage, then parties’ temptation to unilaterally 
impose their will (or defect altogether, depending on power resources), gives up the step 
to cooperation, which becomes the dominant strategy thus fostering a consensual 
constitution-making. Such centripetal trends are usually conceived in terms of 
polarization resulting from parties’ positioning on the policy space. While in the past this 
was deemed to be the result of the demand of representation, more recent studies have 
indeed brought to the fore the active role parties have in shaping the polarization of the 
party system in which they operate. This aspect becomes particularly intriguing in light 
of the results from chapter four which show that indeed Tunisia and Egypt do not 
substantially differ in the nature and depth of social divisions. Drawing from both the 
inclusion-moderation literature and post-democratization studies, this chapter will show 
that the ‘choices parties define’ reflects the cost of cooperation under authoritarian rule.  
 
 
6.1 THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE AND POLARIZATION PARTIES WORK OUT  
 
6.1.1 The pernicious effects of polarization within installations 
 
Concerns about the nature and kind of social divisions, so as those related to the 
institutional and the structural sphere informing transitional parties’ resource distribution, 
acquire relevance inasmuch as they account for the conditions fostering a consensual 
166 
 
mode of transition suitable for democratic installation. On the same guise, ideological 
distance among the actors involved might comprise the such process.  
Thus far, it seems that the outcome of the transitions from authoritarian rule is to be 
attributed to different distributions of power within the two party systems. While in 
Tunisia Ennadha won the relative majority of sets, in Egypt the Islamist parties 
represented by FJP and Nour controlled the absolute majority of seats. The eventual 
failure of Egypt in engineering a self-enforcing democracy is therefore in line with 
Przeworski’s claim that in cases of known and uneven power distribution the ‘constitutive 
phase’ will only be aimed to consolidate winners’ power advantage and not a self-
enforcing democracy (1991). However, previous records of transitions from authoritarian 
rule prove that enduring democracy can be a possible outcome also in such kind of assets, 
and various explanations have been set forth. Some scholars look at the ideological 
orientation of the winning coalition searching for ‘committed democrats’ (McFaul 2002; 
Ozzano 2013). Others pinpoint to the ideological distance between the actors involved in 
the installation phase. While these two research strategies in some points overlap (Clark 
2006; Schwedler 2013a), the rationale underneath them varies considerably. The first 
moves from the idea that democracy can be one factions’ unilateral imposition; the 
second, by contrast, conceives democracy as a win-win solution for all the parties 
involved stemming from their cooperation. This latter understanding will be here 
privileged for three entangled reasons. First, it is more in line with both the procedural 
and the substantive definition of democracy by acknowledging the presence of a minority 
whose vital interests should be nonetheless safeguarded. Second, it also allows to better 
ground the research of its genesis (Higley and Burton 1989). Third, by stressing on the 
importance of bargain and inclusion, which is conducive to regime’s legitimation, it 
guides the researcher not on the conditions favoring the emerge of whatsoever democratic 
agreement, but a self-enforcing one (Weingast 1997). 
As saw in the previous chapters, the rise of democracy, i.e. a limited form of democracy 
that institutionalizes uncertainty while granting the vital interests of all the factions 
involved, is all about a coordination game entailing the resolution of the commitment 
problems. These latter become particularly relevant when religious parties previously 
holding anti-democratic stances are involved in the ‘constitutive phase’ (Haynes and Ben-
Porat 2013; Higley and Burton 1989; Kalyvas 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 
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Ozzano 2013; Ozzano and Cavatorta 2013; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). The actors 
taking part into the installation process are deemed to agree on a set of rules grounding 
the institutional set up of their countries and sometimes, as in the cases of Tunisia and 
Egypt, also on a shared definition national identity (Zeghal 2013). Actors’ interests, 
values and beliefs play a central role in fostering the search for focal points, i.e. a set of 
norms to which everybody accept to be bounded by, if not constituting themselves as 
such. In this regard, the level of political polarization, here simply defined as the 
ideological distance among the actors involved (Russell J Dalton 2008; Sartori 1976) 
becomes a fruitful indicator about the viability of such compromise.  
 
 
6.1.2 Parties as countervailing mechanisms to polarization?  
 
Instead of thinking of polarization as the mere result of mass’ orientations, or as the result 
of the number of parties allowed by electoral systems, recent contributions have more or 
less explicitly pinpointed to the active role political parties play in determining the degree 
of polarization within democratization processes. Contrary to what assumed by the 
political sociology, political parties are not mere incubators of pre-existent political 
demands residing in the civil society. Nor is their behavior entirely and straightforwardly 
driven by given electoral systems. Rather, in order to maximize their power position, they 
act as combiners of pre-political life experiences (Enyedi 2005; Kitschelt et al. 1999).  
Therefore, their saliency within the transition is not only the result of the decisions they 
take in their governmental capacities during the installation phase (Katz 2014; Mair 
2002), but also of their hitherto organization of the interplay between pre-existent social 
and political divisions and political institutions (Kitschelt et al. 1999) by mean of their 
representative agency (Mair 2002). In Enyedi words:    
 
“In their attempt to mold the political landscape, parties face 
institutional and social constraints and adjust their appeal accordingly, 
but they also invent, facilitate and destroy political identities, underplay 
social divisions and shift group boundaries. The clusters of pre-political 
life-experiences and dispositions present both opportunities and 
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constraints for politicians. They can mobilize these structural and 
attitudinal differences, but they can also identify symbols that unite 
various groups by tapping what is common in them. The potential room 
for maneuver is considerable since individual interests and values can 
be combined with other values/interests in a large number of ways”. 
(Enyedi 2005, 700)  
 
Out of this understanding, political parties not only play an active role in determining 
which cleavages will be politically represented within the party system by brokering 
among disperse allegiances, values and interests (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010; 
Enyedi 2005, 2008; G. Evans and De Graaf 2013; Raymond 2014), but in so doing they 
also have an active and decisive role in fostering party systems’ polarization (Bermeo 
1990; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Tepe 2013). Political entrepreneurs’ decisions about the 
salience to attribute to certain issues (offered by national critical junctures or simple 
political developments) and the position to take about them determine the nature of party 
alignments and the programmatic competition at the base of different kinds of 
representation. In this latter regard, parties may decide to reduce the political distance, as 
emphasized by earlier transitologists (Bermeo 1990; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) or 
to increase it, thus affecting considerably, in a way or another, the prospects for a 
democratic agreement to come about.  
 
 
6.2 POLARIZATION PARTIES DEFINE: THE POLITICAL SPACE IN 2011 TUNISIA AND EGYPT 
 
6.2.1 Locating parties on a political space 
 
The decisions parties take in structuring the political space are primarily embodied into 
their party manifestos. Through these document, they make clear their political program 
to voters and other parties as well. By so doing they emphasize the relevance of certain 
issues and also take a position on them, thus defining the boundaries of the political space, 
which is the degree of polarization. For this reason, students of political science have 
started to infer the degree of party systems’ polarization from such documents.   
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The interest on parties’ platform has recently born out of the exigency of locating them 
on a political space guided by different research questions. To this end, and in alternative 
to voters’ survey, four main techniques have been developed relying on both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. As far as the former are concerned, they constitute the first 
attempts at locating parties on a traditional left-right continuum, which basically 
constitutes the one-dimensional division of party systems across western consolidated 
democracies. To do so, earlier studies thus recurred to expert surveys whereby prominent 
scholars were asked to assign a score indicating the positioning on the aforementioned 
dimension of their countries’ parties on specific issues (Herbert Kitschelt et al. 1999). 
The same rationale is also at the base of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which 
up to now constitutes the major comparative effort to detect the structure and the 
development of party systems across time and space covering all free, democratic 
elections since 1945 in more than 50 countries (mostly OECD ones). Also in this case, 
parties are assigned a score locating them on the left-right continuum. Yet, such score 
stems directly from parties’ manifestos. In so doing, each of such texts is first divided in 
quasi-sentences, through the process of “unitizing”, with the aim of grasping a particular 
message that will fall into particular predefined categories on the base of what is supposed 
to be “left” or “right”. In such a way each party is located within the political space 
according to the ratio of rightist and leftist sentences contained in its political program66 
(Budge and Klingemann 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987). For its broadness and 
its drive toward more quantitative-friendly approach, the CMP has stimulated more 
quantitative and computer-assisted techniques for inferring parties’ positions from texts. 
The two most popular at the time of writing are Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 
2003) and Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 2008). Both methods use ‘words’ as data, but in 
a slightly different way. Without entering into complex technicalities, which are beyond 
the scope of this review, in the first case parties are assigned a political position depending 
on the usage of words compared to reference texts. In the second case, parties’ final 
placement depends on the frequency and the distribution of words across their manifestos.  
Each of the aforementioned techniques have strength and shortcomings, and, as the 
literature debate shows, no one is better than others. Expert surveys outperform as far as 
                                                             
 
66 More precisely, the RILE score (right-left index score) is calculated as: [(R-L)/(R+L)]%. 
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reliability is concerned, but their validity is affected from respondents’ bias (Curini 2010; 
Volkens 2007). CMP is a suited tool for comparisons, but while leaving room for human 
classification errors (Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012) its reference categories are not 
applicable outside its cradle countries nor seem to bode well neither there because of their 
outdating (Mölder 2016). Wordscores allows for automated controlled parties positioning 
but it nonetheless requires the identification of appropriate reference texts and the 
assignment of reference values to them while posing scaling problems and time-series 
comparison (Lowe 2008; Slapin and Proksch 2008). Wordfish largely fills these gaps but 
leaves the researcher with the hard task of interpreting the substantive meaning of the 
stemming political dimensions (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).   
 
 
6.2.2 The case for an unsupervised approach  
 
The different techniques aforementioned, regardless their qualitative or quantitative 
nature, are divided into supervised or unsupervised approaches (Benoit and Däubler 
2014). In the first case, the substantive content of the left-right division is already 
predefined and parties are located accordingly to their distance from what is deemed to 
be left or right. By contrast, under the second approach researchers adopt an agnostic 
approach and policy dimensions are considered latent variable derived by “scaling 
observable party behavior” (ibid. 5). Instead of being already predefined, the substantive 
content of the left-right dimension is object of empirical research starting from how 
parties locate in an undefined political space.  
While the first approach is theoretically driven by the contributions of political 
philosopher and leading political scientists, the latter saw its emergence thanks to the 
development of machine learning and its application into the field of political sciences 
(Gabel and Huber 2000). As the methods stemming from them, each of them has strengths 
and weaknesses. Supervised approaches provide researchers with more information but 
may fall into excessive rigidity or may fail to account for the emergence of new political 
divisions, which are nonetheless salient (such as the so called valence issues). 
Unsupervised approaches, by contrast, guarantee room for any kind of division but hardly 
allow for cross-countries comparisons and has been vibrantly criticized for “assum[ing] 
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that we know more about the positions of key political actors, relative to each other, than 
we know about the substantive meaning of key policy dimensions” (Benoit and Laver 
2006, 50. Quoted in Benoit and Däubler 2014).  
The cases of  2011 Tunisia and Egypt guides nonethless the choice on this latter 
appproach. It is so both for the historical peculiarity of those countries and, as 
consenquence, for the current state of the art in such field. On the one hand, both countries 
come from more or less fifty years of semi-authoritarianism, without developing any 
genuine party-politics allowing to have an idea of what party competition was about. 
Further, their political tradition is vastly different from that of OECD countries and 
existing categories of what is left or right in those countries hardly applies to North 
African ones. On the other hand, at the time of writing, no effort to produce expert surveys 
data has been put forth. The only unsupervised technique among those enlisted before is 
Wordfish, so it will be used in this context. However, while seemingly being the result of 
lack of feasible alternatives, Wordfish perfectly suits the agency-based approach here 
adopted to understand polarization in that it assumes that party manifestos embodies 
overall party ideology resulting from the bargain and the strategic choices of political 
parties’ elites (Proksch and Slapin 2014; Slapin and Proksch 2008).  
 
 
6.2.3 Measuring polarization in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt  
 
“Bag-of-words” models like this one, assume that the use of some words but not others 
in party manifestos contribute to grasp parties’ positioning on a political space without 
defining it a priori. Instead, this is derived by the estimated words parameter. This 
characteristic makes Wordfish particularly appealing for having an idea of the political 
space in Tunisia and Egypt because we are left indeed with little authoritative guidance 
in assessing on what political competition is really about. To define the political space 
and locating political parties in it, Wordfish relies on a scaling model whereby words 
distribution is assumed to follow a Poisson naïve Bayes distribution formally put as:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  ∼ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡  =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑖𝑡  + 𝜓𝑗 +  𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝜔𝑖𝑡) 
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Where yijt is the count of word j in a party i’s manifesto at a time t. Out of this model, the 
placement of a political party within a political space at a specific time is a function of 
party elections fixed effect (𝛼𝑖𝑡), word’s fixed effects (𝜓𝑗) and the specific weight 𝛽𝑗 that 
a word has in discriminating between party i’s manifesto positions at a time t (𝜔𝑖𝑡).  
In estimating the model (for more details see Slapin and Proksch 2008), Wordfish returns 
then two set of results. The first is an estimation of political parties’ positioning on the 
latent dimensoin with a confidence interval for each manifesto. The second is a set of 
parameters accounting for the role of each word in concurring to parties’ placement. In 
this sense, words that are highly recurrent in each manifesto will have little role in 
determining it. By contrast words that are frequently repeated in just one of them will for 
sure be considered as important in determinng it (and have higher betas). While Wordfish 
proves really useful in placing political parties on a political space over time, in our case 
only one electoral race will be considered, so party-election fixed effects and party 
position across time will be constant. Heceforth, the function to be here estimated 
becomes:  
𝜆𝑖𝑗  =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜓𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗 ∗  𝜔𝑖) 
  
 
6.2.3.1 Party manifestos as data  
 
The data are of course constituted by the party manifestos in Arabic collected during field 
research or through political parties’ official websites. Because in both countries several 
political parties didn’t even present an electoral manifesto, the criterion followed has been 
that of using only those of parties gaining at least 10 seats in the parliament. By so doing, 
this allows to cover the 50% and 80% of the parliament seats in Tunisia and Egypt 
respectively while also surveying more parties than are the effective parliamentary ones 
(4,6 in Tunisia and 1,9 in Egypt)67. In Tunisia the surveyed parties are Ennadha, CPR, 
                                                             
 
67 The number of relevant parties is calculated as follow: 𝑁 =
1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 where p represents the proportion of seats 
gained by each party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). 
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PDP, Ettakatol and Aridha, while for Egypt the selected manifestos are those of the FJP, 
Nour, Building and Development Party, SDP, Free Egyptians, New Wafd and Wasat.  
Each document has followed a pre-processing that consisted in cleaning the text from 
useless elements. This procedure is very common in text analysis (Krippendorff 2013) 
and is aimed at retaining only what is strictly necessary by getting rid of numbers, 
punctuation and so. For the same reason, words are usually processed so as to reduce 
them to their roots through the stemming process. For some languages, like English, 
German, Italian, these procedures are very accurate. However, the stemming for the 
Arabic language is ‘not a solved problem’ (Nielsen 2013, 111) because it is a highly 
inflected language with a high rate of infixing. Contrary to most common languages, the 
same roots may then have very different meaning not only depending on the prefix or 
suffix, but also on a single letter inside the word itself (which is for instance the case for 
plurals or active forms). Following a rather conservative approach, the stemming package 
used here is the ‘arabicStemR’ recently developed for R users by Richard Nielsen. Here 
below an example of how it works:  
 
 
Table 6.1: Stemming process with arabicStemR 
Original text ةيطارقميدلا مساب ةروثلا 
  The revolution in name of democracy 
Stemmed text طارقميد روث 
  Revolution democracy 
 
 
6.2.3.2 Results  
 
After having preprocessed the relevant texts, the Wordfish model algorithm is applied in 
the two countries separately considered. As reported in figure 6.1, in both countries 
Islamist parties, namely Nour, Wasat, Building and Development party and FJP in Egypt 
and Ennadha in Tunisia, fall on the left side of the political spectrum, while more secular 
parties occupy the other extreme of the political spectrum. In Egypt, the right side of the 
political space is occupied by the Social Democratic Party and right/secular parties 
occupy the center. In Tunisia, Ennadha is isolated on the left side of the spectrum, while 
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PDP is located in the center and on the other extreme there are Ettakatol, CPR and al-
Aridha. 
 
Figure 6.1: Estimated party positions in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt 
 
Even though, in line with our expectations, the political space appears to be coherently 
divided between Islamists and secular parties -even though the moderate Wasat is 
surprisingly closer to Nour than other secular parties – this cannot be said a priori, for, as 
previously explained, Wordfish relies to an unsupervised approach. To assess what 
determines this division, it is then necessary to look at the estimated word parameters 
shown in the word plot (figures 6.2 and 6.3). Here the words contained in the corpus made 
up of all the party manifestos analyzed follow an “Eiffel Tower” distribution. Words on 
the top-center of the plot are those with higher fixed effects but low betas because are 
indifferently used from all the parties. By contrast, the words with greater weights, 
considered in absolute values, are those that majorly discriminate the placement of a given 
party in the political space (and therefore have low fixed effects). In our case, words with 
negative betas determine party positioning positioned on the left in figure 5 while words 
with positive betas are those affecting the positioning of parties on the right side. 
By looking at the word plot in Egypt, reported in figure 6.2, there is a difference in the 
topics addressed in party manifestos and, therefore, of language. Among the words with 
the lowest betas (on the bottom left of the plot), there are indeed “homeland”, “Hamas” 
and “Israel”, in red on the left side of the graph in figure 6.1, denoting an international 
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vocation of these parties and the salience regional politics has on the agenda of those 
formations. By contrast, parties on the right side seem to be more concerned with internal 
issues and civic engagement, stressing on “economy”, “election”, “activism” and 
“citizenship” (enlightened in red on the bottom right of the plot in figure 6.2). Words with 
highest fixed effects, on the top-center of the word plot, and that therefore are widely used 
by all the Egyptian parties are, from the highest psi’s scores “Egypt”, “state”, “job” and 
“politics”. Furthermore, on the center of the plot, “stability” and “change” emerge 
indiscriminately as major concerns of all parties along with the reference to “our identity” 
(yes, the stemming package sometimes fails), meaning that for political entrepreneurs 
identity politics in Egypt goes hand in hand with transitional politics.      
 
 
Figure 6.2: : Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Egypt 
 
 
In the case of Tunisia (figure 6.3), the words having the highest fixed effects which 
therefore appear more frequently with the same emphasis on all the party manifestos are 
(in order of psi values): “state”, “politics” (indeed the root of the word politics) and 
“nation”. These are enlightened in red on the top-center of the plot. Other words of 
common use (in red of the center) are challenge and elections, which denote the awareness 
of the historical moment and the stemming priorities. Out of this common language, 
differences emerge in the attention devoted by parties to certain issues rather than others. 
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By looking to the beta coefficients, it emerges that parties on the right side of the spectrum 
devote more attention to the themes of employment and independence (from the French 
economy and from free market policies, but also from the political paradigms of western 
countries) as denote the words “jobs” and “independence” in red on the right side of the 
x axis. On the other hand, among the top 50 words with negative betas there are 
“occupations”, “exclusion” and “marginalization” (in red in the left) denoting Ennadha’s 
attention to the issues of social justice probably due to its entrenchment in all the Tunisian 
landscape and especially in the poorer areas. Yet, it also emerges also a strong reference 
to the religious tradition embodied by the words “hadith”, “haji” and “our identity” 
enlightened in red. Nonetheless, there emerge also a tension to recall the revolutionary 
slogans, and to reassure the public about the achieved moderation on gender issues, as is 
evident by the frequent use of the words “dignity” and “women” (sic for the stem). 
   
 
Figure 6.3: Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Tunisia 
   
 
Indeed, this adds little to the common understanding about the political competition in 
Tunisia and Egypt: the main dividing theme is the role of religion in politics and the 
Egyptian political space is more polarized than the Tunisian one. However, an interesting 
finding nonetheless emerges. In Tunisia, Ennadha is located on the extreme of the 
political space far distant from the other political forces. By contrast, in Egypt, the 
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Islamists FJP is located on the center of the political space equally distancing form 
Islamists and Leftists. This acknowledgment doesn’t necessarily imply that the FJP was 
more moderated that Ennadha – after all, one side is entirely populated by Islamists 
parties-, nor necessarily that the center of the Egyptian political space was lees democratic 
than the Tunisian one because populated by an Islamist party – the division regards 
questions of identity, in both countries the word “democracy” is on the center of the 
political space. Rather these findings show that, in ideological terms, the eventual 
coalition with other Islamists was not as granted as previously supposed. Why not even 
try to dialogue with other secular parties? But also, where these different degree of 
polarization stem from?  
 
 
6.3 PARTIES’ STRUCTURING POLITICS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PAST 
 
 
6.3.1 Formal structures, political learning and polarization  
 
In constituting themselves as ‘combiners’ of the interplay between society and institution, 
thus determining both the nature and the depth, i.e. polarization, of political divisions, 
transitional parties play a ‘signaling game’ bounded by social political orientations and 
previous political legacies. While some authors downplay parties’ ability in mastering 
individual interests and values - because the conditions characterizing previous semi-
authoritarianism prevented the organization of political parties by posing on them severe 
limits on their activities or outlawing them (Albrecht 2010) and pushed individuals to 
dissimulate their preferences (Kuran 1991)-, most scholars pinpoint to the determining 
role of previous political learning in accounting for large part of parties’ choices when 
molding the political landscape (Bermeo 1990).  
Because the role of religion in politics and society has emerged during the transitions here 
considered as a divisive issue catalyzing the political debate, the scholarly traditions upon 
the authoritarian resilience and the inclusion-moderation hypothesis pinpoint to both the 
structures and the dynamics shaping the political learning of the political parties involved 
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in the critical phase of installation. These studies hold that the polarization of the religious 
divide depends on the previous relationships between the religion and the state and 
between the state and its oppositions. For Lust (Lust 2011), whether or not undemocratic 
regimes of the MENA region base their legitimacy on Islam, determines secularists’ 
perceived threat of political Islam and, therefore, the mistrust toward them eventually 
conducive to a radical distancing from these groups. This hypothesis applies to the 
Muslim-majority countries in that the inception of the ‘liberalization’ phase coincided 
with the Iranian revolution and after witnessed the civil war in Algeria. In this regard, the 
incentives for secularists to push in the direction of democratic reform varied depending 
on whether the regime already based its legitimacy on Islam or nor. In the former scenario, 
the case for fearing more room for Islamist oppositions was little because so is the 
perceived change with the status quo. By contrast, in the second case scenario, secularist 
felt more and more threaten by a radical depart from the incumbent secular regime and 
self-censored their demands of further overtures, siding, in case, with the regime. Yet, 
religious polarization can also derive from how the regime shapes its relation with its 
oppositions. As saw in the previous chapter, Arab autocracies rely on divided structures 
of competition with the aim of altering the cost of cooperation between the varying 
opposition groups. The mechanism triggered by such division are conducive mutual 
distrust, and hence, polarization around the topics through which the regime justifies the 
division between legal and illegal groups. In Tunisia and Egypt, up to 1970s the division 
was between “too leftist” parties and acquiescent ones, but from that moment on the lines 
of inclusion and exclusion relied on the division between Islamists and secularist – thus 
polarizing the religious divide. When such way of structuring conflict occurs within 
regimes relying on a secular legitimation system, then the effects on the polarization of 
the religious divide are simply magnified. As Lust (2005) notes, Islamists illegal 
oppositions will try to exploit mass demonstration organized by the legal ones so as to 
avoid the ax of repression. However, precisely because they were excluded from the 
formal contestation, secular legalized opposition will be highly uncertain about their 
strength and their true intentions and therefore will opt to avoid any form of mass 
demonstration in order not to risk losing their acquired privileges as consequences of 
either regime repression or Islamists’ takeover. At the same time, their exclusion from 
the formal sphere will push Islamists to radicalize their political programs and their means 
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of contestation thus further precluding any form of dialogue, or collaboration with other 
oppositions and/or dividing both fronts on the issue of whether to join forces against the 
regime or not (Lust-Okar 2005; Lust 2011). This reading is completely complementary 
to that furnished by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis according to which Islamist 
formations will moderate their agenda, thus reducing the polarization of the overall party 
system, inasmuch as they are allowed to contest elections following their inclusion into 
the formal political sphere (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Schwedler 2011, 2013a).  
However, as a matter of fact, the formal structures of contestation were the same for 
Tunisia and Egypt. In both countries access to formal politics was granted to a limited 
number of secular parties, while Islamists were excluded. Indeed, in both regimes 
Islamists had nonetheless the opportunity to contest elections as independent and/or 
within larger electoral blocs, but the rate at which this occurred in Egypt outweighed by 
far that of Tunisia. Hence, following this line of reasoning, it is to be expected that one 
once the regime collapsed, the Egyptian party system was less polarized than the Tunisian 
in force of Egyptian Islamists’ longstanding participation into the electoral arena. Yet, the 
contrary applies. The political space in Egypt was more polarized than that of Tunisia 
both in terms of ideological distance between the competing parties and for the presence 
of extreme religious parties such as those running under the Islamist bloc (Tepe 2013).  
 
 
6.3.2 Beyond mere configurational explanations: political center and polarization  
 
To account for both cases where inclusion in the political sphere is not conducive to 
moderation and cases in which Islamists undergo an ideological revision of their stances 
approaching pluralism and democracy in the absence of any involvement into the formal 
political sphere, less configurational and more contextual explanations have been 
proposed by either revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis or radically departing 
from it. 
From within the inclusion-moderation paradigm, a revision has occurred around the mere 
definition of moderation. At the time of its appearance, the concept of moderation (so as 
the entire approach itself) was ancillary to that of democratization (Bermeo 1990, 1997).  
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The very term ‘moderation’ was then simply used as a substitute for ‘more democratic’ 
(Ly Netterstrøm 2015) suffering from the normative and tautological biases often 
attributed to the entire stream of democratization studies (Anderson 2006; Clark 2006; 
Schwedler 2007; Wegner and Pellicer 2009). Such pitfalls are partially recovered by 
acknowledging the relational nature of the concept of moderation and by clearly spelling 
out the conditions under which it can be equated with democratization. For Somer then, 
moderation is “an adjustment to at least some attributes of the centre in a particular 
country at a certain time” (2014, 246) where the center is the overall political outlook of 
a given country in a given time. In his words:  
 
I maintain that the concept of centre has three components. The 
political-institutional component refers to the characteristics, values 
and interests of the dominant state institutions and agents, and of the 
dominant actors in “political society”, such as the main political parties. 
The social component involves the characteristics, values and interests 
of the median voters and of the dominant actors in civil society, 
including the main economic power holders and the intelligentsia. The 
international component captures the external context of moderation, 
and denotes the main international alliances and position of the country 
in global politics and economy. (2014, 248) 
  
As the case of Turkey shows, the inclusion of Islamist formations into a given formal 
political sphere is not automatically conducive to their acceptance of democratic norms 
and values, nor it is conducive to democratization. What really matters under this reading 
are the effects exerted on parties’ political adaptation and political learning by this 
complex and compounded center. As consequence, the real gateway to democratization 
is not the inclusion of anti-system parties into the political competition, but rather the 
construction of a democratic center. This can happen through hegemony or cooperation 
of opposition forces. Even though this conclusion proposes the problem of the feasibility 
of cooperation enlighten by Lust and other hard-core structuralists, it nonetheless has the 
merit of broadening the scope of the analysis beyond the simple inclusion into the 
electoral contestation while radically narrowing the extent to which moderation is 
conducive to democratization by contextualizing it.  
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In line with the notion of ‘center’ but totally departing from the inclusion-moderation 
approach, Cavatorta and Merone (2013) argue instead that the moderating path of the 
Tunisian Ennadha is not to be attributed to its institutional inclusion, which never 
occurred indeed, but rather from the characteristic of the Tunisian society and its political 
tradition. Tunisians, the authors claim, were inherently hostile to both assertive political 
Islam and to radicalization grounding instead their social and political culture on the 
peaceful co-existence of different and varied identities under the notion of ‘Tunisianité’. 
Therefore, they were ill-disposed toward Ennadha so as it appeared in the 1970s. 
Confronting with its initial exclusion from both the institutional arena and the society, the 
authors contend that the journey toward moderation was due to the necessity of escaping 
alienation and irrelevance both in the society and in the political arena. Contrary to the 
mainstream inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the push factor to moderation was not 
inclusion but rather exclusion. Nonetheless, accordingly with Tepe’s version of the 
inclusion-moderation hyptesis, Ennadha’s moderation took the form of an adjustment to 
some fortunate attributes of the Tunisian society.  
While the reference to the nature of the Tunisian society in constituting the democratic 
center might appear only partial (or too culturalist) to confidently equate moderation with 
democratization, and underplays the capacity of political parties to act as countervailing 
mechanisms to centrifugal pushes within society (Bermeo 1990; Tepe 2013), this 
contribution has the merit of shifting the focus from the formal structures of competitions 
to the informal factors triggering nonetheless moderation above and beyond them. In so 
doing the authors locate the conditions making Islamists’ moderation conducive to the 
mutual recognition and acceptance with secularist forces in “the common destiny of 
repression” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 870), which could be a fruitful point of 
departure to grasp cross-country differences in the degree of polarization across Tunisia 
and Egypt. 
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6.4 DIVIDED THEY STOOD, DIVIDED THEY FAILED  
 
If the structuring of politics is a signaling game wherein past political experiences serve 
as focal points, then it might be the case too look at the relationships between Islamists 
and secularists under the authoritarian rule. This topic is not new indeed. Attempts at 
coalition building between the different oppositions have constituted the focus of several 
studies under the assumption that their unification would have undermined the survival 
of the incumbent dictators. As the following review will report, while in Tunisia attempts 
at coalition building under Ben Ali were quite successful, in Mubaraks’ Egypt they 
weren’t. Yet, in any case the two dictators were forced to leave in 2011 indicating that 
unification of oppositions was not necessary to topple the regime. Nonetheless, as this 
section will show, past records of attempts of coalition building undertook by the different 
opposition groups account for their effects on the installation phase in two ways. First, as 
predicted by Somer (2014), this enables the construction of a ‘democratic center’ and the 
parties here included in this effort tend to moderate thus reducing transitional party 
systems’ polarization. Second, and more importantly, this enables the parties involved to 
resolve their commitment problems.  
At present, the two major narratives presented before (i.e. formal and informal structural-
based account) account for the conditions fostering successful cooperation or not. The 
different experiences across Tunisia and Egypt confirms that what indeed mattered for 
the success of such attempts was not only the formal division of oppositions between 
legal and illegal groups, but also the informal manipulation of the oppositions by the hand 
of the dictator. The case of Egypt exemplifies this point. On the one hand, the regime 
successfully co-opted legal oppositions each and every time these engaged in coalition 
building with other (legal and illegal) opposition groups. On the other hand, the FJP, 
which enjoyed a twofold power advantage for its informal inclusion into the polity and 
its control of the largest part of the mobilized public, had little incentives to engage in any 
kind cooperation with others. First, it didn’t need any change in the status quo to be 
admitted into the political competition. Second, it regarded with increasing mistrust 
successful opposition movements, such as Kefaya, for they were likely to deprive its 
monopoly over opposition voices – and therefore it tried to undermine them. In Tunisia, 
by contrast, the regime never intervened at undermining attempts at coalition building by 
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inducing precise groups to break ranks, rather it recurred to indiscriminate violence 
toward the entire coalition. Further, Ennadha, which was the strongest opposition group 
in terms of mass support, in light of its total exclusion, needed to change the status quo if 
it wanted to institutionalize such power.   
   
 
6.4.1 Coalition building in Tunisia  
 
Relations between Islamists and their secular counterparts have never been so hostile as 
some describe it. Indeed, Islamists engagement in politics was triggered by labor protests 
and coincided with the birth of the MSD that since the beginning constituted itself as an 
interlocutor thus influencing the same political agenda of Islamists.  
As already said, these latter’s awareness of the social problems, and therefore the need to 
go beyond the preaching and theological debate in order make the difference for 
believers’ lives, arose in the mid-1970s along with the labor protests of those years which 
encountered Islamists’ sympathy. As Gannouchi (Ennadha’s leader) had occasion to say: 
“The workers’ revolt […] had awaken us to the importance, and to the social and 
economic ramifications, of the problems the workers had been complaining of. Prior to 
that moment, we had only been preoccupied with the issues of da’wah [preaching] and 
tabligh [sacred message] and with pure intellectual debate” (Tamimi 2001, 50). Since that 
moment, the Islamists realized that Tunisians’ diseases were more related to the failure 
of Bourguiba’s economic policies and its ruling style than to a lack of pietism. Gannouchi 
and its clique soon felt the need of intervening in politics by proposing policy alternatives. 
In so doing, the impact of the left played a role of paramount importance. Jama’a 
welcomed Mestiri’s initiative to found a new party and a dialogue between these two 
factions arose which had the effect of introducing to Islamists themes as alien up to that 
moment as political liberalism, redistribution human rights and democracy. The 
realization that the lack of this latter was the ultimate cause of Tunisia’s hard times created 
a meeting point with other important oppositions which never proactively sided with 
regime’s anti-Islamist campaigns, but on the contrary in some occasion even manifested 
solidarity to the Islamists when violent waves repression hit them.  On the one hand, 
departing from government’s rhetoric, the MSD never regarded the Islamists as threat and 
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refused to ally with the RCD in order to form a common front against Ennadha at the 
1989 general elections, the only election Gannouchi’s party was allowed to contest. On 
the other hand, between 1989 and 1992, during the regime’s harsh repression of the 
Islamic movement, the Tunisian League for Human Rights took the defenses of Ennadha, 
firmly denouncing the violations of human right perpetrated on party’s adherents and 
sympathizers by the regime.   
These early instances of a mutual recognition eventually led the opposition parties to a 
genuine cooperation, if not to an alliance, as was the 2003 “Call from Tunis”. In this 
occasion, for the very first time, Islamists and Secularists signed a common document to 
“rally the Tunisian citizens around the democratic alternative, to which they all aspire”68. 
After expressing a deep concern for the current political situation, all the subscribers of 
this document engaged themselves to adopt a new constitution, thus establishing a 
political regime whose legitimation would be exclusively ground in popular sovereignty; 
to guarantee freedom of belief, and to fight against the perverse effects of both 
globalization and subjugation on the country’s economy. One year later, Ennadha, PDP 
and CPR joined forces to boycott the elections and encouraged by this successful 
experience created in 2005 the 18 October Coalition. This had the aim to “lay the 
foundations for a democratic transition and […] build a strong civil society that is capable 
of withstanding and throwing back all attempts at undermining the foundations of the 
democratic system” 69 . Worried by the escalation of repression, justified by the 10 
December 2003 Anti-Terror Law, directed against the personal freedom and the freedom 
of association and expression, the Tunisian Communist Labour Party, Islamists –i.e., 
Ennadha- and liberal parties, such as the MDS, PDP and the CPR, joined again their 
forces against the authoritarian regime. At first, it was just a hunger strike for freedom of 
information and expression, the release of political prisoners and, the adoption of a law 
on a general amnesty, but later it became a permanent platform for discussion. Compared 
with the 2003 “Call for Tunis”, the new coalition presented very few substantial 
differences. However, it inaugurated a new style of co-operation, based on a steady 
confrontation between the different factions of the coalition, under the assumption that a 
                                                             
 
68 Extract from the French version of the issues Declaration. See: “Déclaration de Tunis”, 17 Juin 2003, 
Aix-en-Provence. 
69 See: “Founding Charter of the 18 October coalition” 
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unifying spirit, along with the right to disagree, would better face the regime in that 
unbalanced competition. The participant political parties decided to guide their efforts in 
the establishment of clear political principles and political proposals allowing to guide 
the transition from the incumbent authoritarian regime and the Coalition was able to 
survive, despite regime repression, up to the uprisings periodically gathering the different 
political parties which discovered in each other a partner in the fight for democracy. Part 
of their efforts resulted in the publication in 2010 of a volume from the sibylline title Our 
way to democracy. 
 
 
6.4.2 Coalition building in Egypt 
 
Relationships between Islamists and secularists in Egypt, by contrast, were not as 
fortunate, nor meaningful as those of their Tunisian counterparts. Contrary to the case of 
Tunisia, the politicization of the Muslim brotherhood occurred at least as before as 1952, 
when it played an active role from the ranks of the Free Officers. Probably because the 
quietist strategy initially adopted by the Brotherhood, in the first years of the new republic 
it never engaged into open criticism with it, but it nonetheless pursued political activities 
competing with the left for the support of some segments of masses, remarkably students 
and professionals. For this reason, up to the 1990s, relationships between Islamists and 
secularist, in particular leftists, were quite antagonistic and two episodes are worth 
remembering. On the one hand, in occasion of the labor strike of 1977, the Brotherhood 
sided with the regime who ultimately repressed the protesters while blaming on leftist 
parties behind it. On the other hand, the Left welcomed the initiative of the regime to 
intervene on syndicate elections, with the 1993 Unified Law for syndicates, with the aim 
of containing the Islamist presence on them (Abdelrahman 2009). 
Attempts at alliance building between all the opposition forces can be subdivided into 
two periods. From early 1980s to late 1990s attempts at joining forces against the regime 
were led by political parties pursuing grand reforms, but proved largely unfruitful. After, 
from the 2000s oppositions cooperation took the form of spontaneous issued-based 
movements guided by the principles of consensus and independence (Abdelrahman 2009) 
whose membership was open to individuals but not to political parties. Not surprisingly, 
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in no of such occasions were radical religious groups, such as Nour, involved. The only 
Islamist movements partaking such initiatives were the FJP and Wasat. 
In 1983, promises of undertaking the road to pluralism and multipartitism were 
nonetheless balanced by several restrictions contained in the electoral law which nullified 
the introduction of a closed-list proportional system. The law in question stipulated 
indeed an 8% legal threshold, prevented electoral alliances between opposition parties 
and excluded independents from the electoral race. As saw in the previous chapter, such 
provisions hampered the capacity for oppositions to gain electoral seats, either because if 
legalized they had few chances to go beyond the electoral threshold alone or, if illegal, 
they could not file independent candidates (Blaydes 2011; Masoud 2014; Posusney 2002). 
In light of this limitations, all opposition groups – legalized or not- joined forces to form 
the National Committee for the Defense of Democracy (NCDD) with the aim of pushing 
the regime to return to the previous system or at least for adopting an “unconditional open 
list proportional representation system” (Shehata 2010, 93). However, this initiative had 
the unintended consequence of pushing the regime to force the hand. The parliament was 
dissolved and early elections were called. In response, the members of the NCDD 
announced their intention to boycott elections. Yet, the Wafd party nonetheless broke 
ranks and decided to participate, thus provoking the dissolution of the NCDD. The same 
dynamic applied both in 1986 and 1988. In both cases, the NCDD revived its activities 
following constitutional court’s pronouncement about the unconstitutionality of the 
electoral law (that regulating the 1983 elections in the first case and that regulating the 
1986 elections in the second one). In both cases, parties gathering in the NCDD saw in 
SCC’s rulings the occasion to make their voice heard and to finally take part in the 
electoral race. However, in both cases the coordination failed. In the first case, Wafd 
disowned the pact according to which opposition leaders would have run elections under 
its list. In the second case, and again, another party, namely the NPUP, decided to 
contravene NCDD’s decision to boycott elections, this time definitely burying the NCDD. 
Interestingly, the repetition of the same dynamics pushes Shehata (2010) to wonder with 
Shukr (1994) whether it is a coincidence that in each instance a party broke ranks, that 
same party gained a large number of seats in the upcoming elections.   
Another attempt for opposition parties to form a common front against the regime came 
under the impulse of the Committee for Coordination of Professional Syndicates in 1989. 
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Concerned by the loss of liberty in several arenas of the polity, the Committee succeeded 
in inviting the major political opposition forces, along with other civil society’s 
associations and NGOs to draft shared principles and goals that would have coordinate 
their conduct. In its scope and modus operandi, this attempt was the one which most 
resemble the Tunisian 18 October Coalition. After one year of discussion, this so-called 
National Consensus Project came up with a document very similar to the Tunisian Our 
way of democracy asserting as fundamental and guiding tenets those of pluralism, civic 
and political freedoms, limited government, popular legitimation and secularism. Agreed 
by the majority of participants, the draft document left Nasserists and Islamists discontent. 
The first denounced the absence of specific provisions making the state responsible for 
national development. The second refused the principle of secularism and pushed for the 
insertion of a specific clause making the Shari’a the principal source of legislation. None 
of these requests was satisfied. The two groups defected and the project of adoption of a 
national consensus charter collapsed. 
The Committee for Coordination among Political Parties and Forces (CCPPF), 
established in 1995, constitutes the last attempt seeing the explicit involvement of 
Egyptian political parties partaking shared initiatives. This draw much from both the 
NCDD and from the National Consensus Project. Very much like the former, it tried to 
coordinate parties’ behavior within elections. As the latter, it had also the ambition of 
working out an “agreed program for political and constitutional reform” (Shehata 2010, 
97). While all parties agreed to such political program, even if largely paralleling that of 
the national consensus project – nor sharia neither state interventionism were mentioned 
-, electoral coordination failed, again, both in 1997 and in 2000 posing and end also to 
the experience of the CCPPF.  
The new millennium signed the inception of a new phase of opposition coordination 
characterized by the absence of political parties, which proved really bad at making a 
common front, and the search of consensus (Abdelrahman 2009; Kraetzschmar 2011). 
Two remarkable initiatives in this sense were the Egyptian Popular Committee for the 
Support of the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) and more popular Kifaya, which in part the 
former. The first, born in the aftermath of the Palestinian Intifada and still dominated by 
political parties, even though not officially, avoided to purse grand political reforms and 
inaugurated a new form of issue-based political activism, which in the case was the 
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affirmation Egypt’s distancing from Israel. Despite MB members’ uneasiness in founding 
itself into a coalition dominated by the left, this formula allowed the EPCSPI to survive 
for almost five years, up to its confluence into Kifaya. This latter directed activists’ 
attention on more internal policy issues pushing toward more pluralism, freedom and 
democracy, but it insisted on the principles of individual membership and consensus as 
deliberating principle. In light of this and of its success in gathering mass support and 
infusing popular activism on the masses, the major opposition parties conceived it as a 
competitor and were always ambivalent toward it (Shehata 2010). Yet, this hostility did 
not prevent Kifaya to survive up to the moment of writing despite internal major 
disagreements upon its posture with political Islam, which occasionally resurge.       
 
 
6.4.3 Common destiny of repression, incentives for joining forces and the resolution of the 
commitment problem 
 
In Tunisia, opposition parties ventured in coalition building only in few occasion which 
proved all, even though at varying degree, successful and instructive. After the 2011 
elections, the importance of finding a “common ground” occupied the space of several 
debates in and out state institutions and was also one of the grand themes of an 
international conference organized by Center for Study of Islam and Democracy in March 
2013. In all these occasions, the spirit of the 18 October Coalition was, and still is, evoked 
with the hope this can be infused also into other political forces that were absent at that 
time, like Nidaa (CSID 2016). Even though some consider it as a political work of 
‘outdated history’ (ibid.), and others don’t see it as particularly remarkable in its political 
achievements (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011), the 18 October Coalition is rightly 
pinpointed as crucial for Tunisia’s democratization processes because it served as a forum 
for discussion which helped secularist and Islamists to overcome their possible mutual 
mistrust. The very fact that both factions engaged on a 5-years political debate whereby 
they agreed on a common political program largely helped them to resolve their 
commitments problems thus moderating the salience upon religion in the aftermath of the 
uprisings.  
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In Egypt, by contrast, the many attempts at coalition building among all opposition parties 
proved all largely unsuccessful. The NCDD and the CCPFF failed because of parties’ 
expectations of immediate gains, while the National Consensus project aborted under the 
lack of agreement between Islamist and secular upon the role of religion in politics. 
By broadly looking at the two party systems, the greater ideological polarization in Egypt 
is surely due to the presence of more radical Islamist parties (Nour and BD) than the 
mainstream ones (FJP and Wasat), which never had occasion to moderate for they were 
never included into the electoral competition, nor into the political debate, nor were they 
ever engaged into the several attempts at coalition building. However, polarization alone 
cannot sufficiently account for the lack of a coalition of national unity for leading the 
transition as that formed in Tunisia by Ennadha, CPR and Ettakatol. Indeed, as figure 5 
showed (see chapter five), the FJP, who alone controlled around 40% was equally distant 
form both other Islamist parties as it was from the secular ones. So ideological proximity 
would have allowed both kind of coalitions. Why then didn’t the FJP opt for a government 
of national unity that would have ease the installation process? Because of both external 
opportunities and past records of confrontation with other oppositions. The availability 
of other strong parties belonging to the same political family made FJP’s choice to 
coalesce with them all the more natural, even though Nour would subsequently back the 
military coup. Further, the FJP, contrary to Ennadha, despite its moderation didn’t 
managed to solve its commitment problems with secular oppositions. The many attempts 
at coalescing have always been sabotaged by either the regime, who succeeded in 
coopting the minor parties by promising them more seats, or by the FJP itself. Indeed, it 
saw in such initiatives a potential enlargement of its competitors’ following risking to dip 
into the basin of voters it managed to secure precisely because of regime’s benevolence, 
as the previous chapter showed. Confronting with these records, not only the seculars 
never arrived at having a clear idea upon FJP’s true intentions, but the FJP could not 
credibly trust the secular oppositions in light of their past propensty at withdrawing from 
whatsoever coordination initiative. In this regard, FJP’s experience proves that 
moderation is not conducive to democratization unless commitment problems are solved. 
However, this does not only apply to religious parties, as emphasized by Kalyvas and the 
major part of inclusion-moderation theorists, but all the parties involved in a given 
political system.     
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The fact that Tunisians succeeded where Egyptians failed doesn’t mean that the former 
were simply better at compromising than the latter. Regime’s strategies account also in 
this case. While in Tunisia the regime responded with indiscriminate repression to 
coalitions building, in Egypt the regime remained faithful to the divide-et-impera 
strategy, or what Brumberg (2013) pinpointed to as the regional variant of the protection-
racket policy, that is the reliance of  the governing power on its ability to manipulate 
identity conflicts by playing one group against the others and to subsequently furnishing 
its protection as a guarantee for their survival. Being politicized within such environment, 
Egyptian political parties replicated this behavior also during the transition alternatively 
recurring to the judiciary -as the secular left did-, or to the military -as every party, FJP 
included, did during the different stages of the transition and that culminated with the 
invocation of the military coup from the vast majority of the political parties.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
This work arose from the need to understand what is at the base of the different trajectory 
of Tunisia and Egypt in their way to democracy but without renouncing to the insights 
offered by the two seemingly alternative and irreconcilable paradigms produced by the 
discipline at the time this research started, namely democratization studies and the 
authoritarian reliance (or post-democratization studies). Both paradigms offer indeed 
invaluable insights for the comprehension of the Arab Politics in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings, yet their normative and theoretical rigidity risks to break the scholarly 
community into two not communicating factions. 
While the first reads the events in 2011-2013 Tunisia and Egypt as processes of transitions 
from authoritarian rule (even though one eventually failed), the second conceives them 
as instances of the authoritarian upgrade or at best as a change in the ruling coalition. 
While the first focuses on socio-economic determinants, actors and processes, the second 
looks to the structures instead. Nonetheless, the two are much more complementary than 
thought. While democratization studies offer a precious theoretical framework to appraise 
2011-2013 events in the region but are deemed to be too much concerned on what ‘ought 
to be’, post-democratization studies are really useful in enlightening ‘what actually is’ but 
fall nonetheless short in locating the causal links in time and space. After all, there were 
no such structures sitting inside the People Assembly or the National Constituent 
Assembly taking decisions for the future of their countries, but this cannot allow 
researchers to get rid of them.   
The hinge between these two paradigms has been found in this work by coming back to 
basics. That is by drawing from the theoretical framework of earlier transitologists and 
putting political parties front and center, as they deserve. This procedure has the merit to 
be faithful to the reality and suits the need to host the two aforementioned paradigms into 
a unified understanding providing for punctual explanations.  
Actually, the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt proceeded along a similar path up to the 
point whereby political parties took control of them from within the aforementioned 
representative institutions at the time of installation. This phase involves the search for 
an agreed and self-enforcing compromise providing for a limited form of government and 
the protection of participants’ vital interests. It should be a consensual decision-making 
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requiring the cooperative behavior of the actors involved, that in the cases here analyzed 
were precisely political parties. Within this delicate and necessary phase, political parties’ 
options were either to collaborate with the others or not. By reappraising the concept of 
agency proposed by transitologists to suit the unique nature of political parties as 
intermediate institutions, parties’ choice for one option or the other is the result of the 
interplay of pre-existent social divisions, their power resources and their ideological 
distance. Each of them has been therefore analyzed separately.  
The focus on pre-existent social divisions moved from the assumption that parties might 
be somewhat responsive to the demands of their electorate. In this regard, deeply divided 
societies are deemed to hinder democratic installations, which largely coincide with the 
process of constitution making, in light of the need for a “pre-constitutional societal 
consensus regarding shared norms and values that underpin the state” (Lerner 2011, 27), 
or what has been alternatively referred to as the sentiment of national unity (Rustow 1970) 
or some set of shared beliefs (Elster 1995, Higley and Burton 1989). From this 
understanding, the analysis upon the determinants of voting behavior at occasion of the 
2011-2012 founding elections in Tunisia an Egypt was aimed to search for possible 
cleavages, understood as forms of closure of social relationship (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 
216). A cleavage so defined is then the result of the overlap of the socio/economic 
conditions of individuals, their beliefs and political preferences, but also of the 
organization through which they socialize. Each of these levels has been then considered 
both separately and in conjunction with the others though a multinomial model on survey 
data furnished by the Arab Barometer project. This analysis has revealed that in both 
countries the discriminants in the vote choice between Islamist and secular parties were 
the role of religion in law-making and the organizational intermediaries. The more the 
respondents preferred Shari’a as a source of law and the more they attended mosques the 
more the probabilities they will vote for Islamists. Interestingly, this latter organizational 
model accounted more than others in predicting the vote choice of respondents. What was 
at stake then was not a cleavage properly defined, but rather a divide on the role of the 
Shari’a in the law-making arguably influenced by how people socialize. For its 
configuration then, the depth of the 2011 social divisions in Tunisia and Egypt was not 
so severe to have a great role in the overall transition process by outbidding parties - also 
because at the time of the founding elections, the implementation of the Islamic law was 
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not even mentioned among the perceived priorities. Hence, the remaining two factors 
might have had a deeper role.   
No doubt that the uneven distribution of power between Islamists and their secular 
counterpart was more pronounced in Egypt than in Tunisia and accounted for the different 
fate of the two countries. But where did it come from? The different electoral systems 
used, pure proportional in Tunisia and mixed in Egypt, account for different degrees of 
distortion between the votes received and the seats gained by Islamist parties, but it does 
not explain ‘the Islamist dominion’, that is the systematic preponderance of Islamists in 
both countries and their takeover in Egypt. Moreover, such dominion seems not justified 
by the political aspirations which inspired the Arab uprisings, that indeed spoke a leftist 
jargon, nor by individuals’ political orientations and beliefs. This aspect is enlightened 
by pinpointing to the structures of competition underneath the survival of the previous 
authoritarian regime, emphasized by post democratization studies. The division between 
legal and illegal opposition, engineered with the scope of preventing the unification of 
oppositions by altering the cost of cooperation, and the concomitant recourse to violence 
had benefited Islamists while at the same heavily undermining its rivals, in particular the 
left. First, the division between legal and illegal opposition, which largely overlapped 
with the division between secular and Islamist oppositions, allowed the co-optation of the 
secular while leaving Islamists at the margins of the formal structures of political 
participation, even though in some cases they run election as independents. This had the 
twofold effect of depicting the left as part of the system, inducing to the disaffection of 
its voters and its fragmentation into a myriad of small parties, while awarding Islamists 
with reputation. Second, the use of repression proved indeed more effective in 
jeopardizing leftists’ channels of mobilization than Islamists ones. It was so both because 
the constituencies of the left largely overlapped with those the regimes wanted to secured 
for their maintenance, but also because the natural channels of leftist mobilization, such 
as trade unions, universities, poor areas and so on, were much more institutionalized and 
easily recognizable than those infiltrated by Islamists, like charitable associations, health-
care centers and the like. As a result, during the last thirty years of authoritarian rule, the 
partisan left almost disappeared, while Islamists, sometimes under the benevolence of the 
regime for counterbalancing leftist oppositions, controlled a ‘parallel sector’. This double 
advantage created by the previous authoritarian structures is at the heart of the twofold 
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electoral gap characterizing the 2011 founding elections in both countries. One the one 
hand, by mean of their embeddedness into religious organizations, Islamist parties 
outperformed the left in reaching voters who would otherwise prefer a leftist option, but 
that they actually didn’t even know to exist. On the other hand, Islamists’ formal state of 
illegal party during the authoritarian era awarded the Islamist brand with a reputation as 
the truly alternative to the previous regime. This electoral gap was evident in both Tunisia 
and Egypt, but more in this latter case for the wider network Islamists managed to control. 
Nonetheless, the dominant position of one faction (in this case the Islamist one) over the 
others, while being potentially hurting for the prospects of an agreement, doesn’t 
necessarily mean the impossibility to reach it. In this regard, the ideological distance 
among parties is deemed to account for the possibilities to attain such result. The lesser, 
the more the prospects for a self-enforcing constitution to see the light.   
Measurements of polarization across the two party systems show that indeed, in 2011, 
Egypt was more polarized than Tunisia for the presence of more radical religious parties. 
Nonetheless, they also reveal that Egyptian FJP party, who alone controlled 40% of 
parliamentary seats was equally distanced from both other Islamists parties and the 
secular ones. In this sense, the ideological proximity could have allowed both an Islamist 
coalition, or one of national unity like the Tunisian Troika. What ultimately pushed the 
FJP to look to parties of the same political family, was not much its lack moderation, as 
expected from the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, but rather the absence of a common 
ground with other secular parties on the guise of that established in Tunisia between 
Ennadha and the other oppositions with which it eventually formed a government of 
national consensus. While under authoritarian rule Tunisian Islamists and secularists 
ventured in fruitful coalition building to contrast Ben Ali’s rule, in Egypt such kind of 
attempts failed. On the one hand, whenever coalition building among opposition parties 
surfaced, the secular forces were successfully coopted by the regime. On the other hand, 
the FJP, had no incentives in joining forces with others because its informal participation 
in elections granted by the regime allowed it to have nonetheless some kind of 
institutional power while monopolizing the opposition front. Other radical Islamist parties 
didn’t even try to engage in such common initiatives. Hence, rather than varying degrees 
of polarization, cross countries differences in previous experiences of coalition building, 
prove to be crucial for the installation phase. These are to be attributed to the different 
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strategies at the base of regime maintenance. While in Tunisia the regime responded with 
indiscriminate repression to coalitions building, in Egypt the regime remained faithful to 
the divide-et-impera strategy, that is the reliance of the governing power on its ability to 
manipulate identity conflicts by playing one group against the others and to subsequently 
offer its protection as a guarantee for their survival. Such dynamics not only prevented 
the establishment of some kind of common ground which could have solved parties’ 
commitment problems, but was also replicated by political parties during the phase of 
installation –as was evident in left parties’ resort to the judiciary to settle political 
disagreement or in the final invocation of the military intervention to solve the 2013 
political deadlock from the major part of them. 
  
To recompose the puzzle, from the perspective of party politics the different outcomes of 
the transitions across Tunisia and Egypt are to be attributed to the unbalanced distribution 
of power among the political parties involved in the phase of installation and to unsolved 
commitment problems. These aspects are in large part attributable to the structures and 
the mechanisms underneath the survival of the previous authoritarian regimes by mean 
of the different context of political socialization and the different opportunity structures 
laid down to the political parties which took control of the transition once those regimes 
collapsed.   
To conclude with a reference to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s founding contribution, these 
findings are not a deterministic capitulation. The results of the transition in Tunisia and 
Egypt were not pre-determined as the present findings may suggest. After all, transitions 
are always moments of exceptional politics characterized by a high degree of 
indeterminacy. This work was only aimed to explain the different outcomes observed, 
holding the processes as they actually were. Had a different electoral system been adopted 
in Egypt, probably a different research question would have been developed.  
Despite the little light made by the present work, the Arab politics currently offers itself 
to political scientists as an unspoiled land. Being this study one of the few conducted 
through quantitative methods, which are indeed quite common when other regions of the 
worlds are concerned, and the first quantitative text analysis on Arab party manifestos, 
much more efforts are needed to deal with Arab politics in a more systematic way and to 
produce empirical data. This entails the development of more survey data, but also of 
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political-system level data, such as expert surveys or all other means enabling researchers 
to assess the kind of representation political parties are mapping out. No such kind of 
project has seen the light thus far. No doubt this requires the effort of women and men, 
and significant resources as well. But before that, it is necessary to start conceiving the 
Arab politics as just politics, spurred of any ‘exceptional’ venue or prejudice. 
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ANNEX 
 
Table 7.1: Variables construction 
Variable  ABII question Coding  
House income  Q1016: Which of these statements 
comes closest to describing your 
household income? 
1 = our household income does 
not cover our expenses and we 
face significant 
difficulties in meeting our needs 
2 = our household income does 
not cover our expenses and we 
face some difficulties in 
meeting our needs 
3 = our household income 
covers our expenses without 
notable difficulties 
4 = our household income 
covers our expenses well and 
we are able to save 
 
Schooling years Q1003: Level of education  0 = illiterate/no formal 
education 
6 = elementary level 
9 = preparatory/basic 
13 = secondary level  
16 = BA degree 
18 = MA and above 
 
Urban/Rural  Q13: Urban/Rural 0 = urban 
1 = rural 
 
Marginalized  Q1: Province/Governorate/State 0 = favored areas (Tunis; 
Ariana; Manouba; Nabeul; 
Zaghouan; Bizerte; Sousse; 
Monastir; Mahdia) 
1 = marginalized areas (Beja; 
Jendouba; Kef; Siliana; 
Kairouan; Kasserine; Sidi 
Bouzid; Gafsa; Touzeur; Qbli; 
Qabs; Medenine; Tataouine) 
 
Self-definition of religiosity Q609: Generally speaking, would 
you describe yourself as…? 
1 = not religious 
2 = somewhat religious 
3 = religious 
 
Cultural conservativism Q60101-Q60116: Questions 
regarding individual attitude 
toward gender equality 
 
Continuous variable from 1 to 4  
(whereby conservativism 
increases) 
Suitability of democracy Q512: To what extent do you 
think democracy is appropriate for 
your country? 
Ordinal variable from 1 to 10 
(increasing suitability) 
 
State preference EG815/T917: Do you prefer that 
the state be…? 
1 = civil state 
2 = religious state 
 
Islamic law Q6052: The government and 
parliament should enact laws 
in accordance with Islamic 
law. 
1= strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = agree 
4 = strongly agree 
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Popular will  Q6051: The government and 
parliament should enact laws 
in accordance with the 
people’s wishes. 
1= strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = agree 
4 = strongly agree 
 
Trust in institutions Q2012: trust in the juduciary 
Q2014: trust in the police 
Q2018: trust in the SCAF 
1= absolutely don’t trust 
2 = trust to a limited extent 
3 = trust to a medium extent 
4 = trust to a great extent 
Mosque attendance Q6105: Do you attend Friday 
services? 
1 = never  
2 = sometimes 
3 = most of the time 
4 = always 
Trade Union Membership  Q5013: Are you member of a 
professional association/trade 
union? 
0 = no 
1 = yes  
   
   
   
   
Table 7.2: Variables construction for detecting leftist orientations  
 
Variable  ABII question  Coding  
Pluralism Q5181: How suitable if for your 
country a parliamentary system 
wherein all parties can contest 
elections? 
1 = not suitable at all 
2 = somewhat suitable 
3 = suitable 
4 = very suitable 
 
Redistribution Q2061 What is the most 
important |challenge facing your 
country today? 
1 = economic redistribution 
2 = fight against corruption 
3 = stability and internal 
democracy 
4 = others 
4 = don’t know 
Secularism  Q6052; Q6061-Q6064: 
Questions related to the source 
of law and the role of religion in 
politics 
Index from 1 to 4 (as resulting 
from a factor analysis on a 
polychoric correlation matrix) 
Gender equality  Q6012 - Q6014: Questions 
regarding individual attitude 
toward gender equality 
 
Index from 1 to 4 (as resulting 
from a factor analysis on a 
polychoric correlation matrix) 
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